Little Credible Ship … Some Day: The Drift, S. II, Vol. XXXII

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Navigation Brief

This is a copy of an e-newsletter that first ran on July 30, 2020.

ALEXANDRIA – Good Evening, Drifters

Things here in the Alexandria Bureau continue at its COVID-19 pace, which is in fits and starts. And that’s not too much different from the pace of the Littoral Combat Ship program. Its nickname, bestowed on it by its detractors, is the “little crappy ship,” so-named because of its complicated and spotty propulsion system and general lack of what some would want in terms of sensors and armaments.

But it’s coming along. The mission modules are, of course, about a decade late, though mine and antisubmarine warfare mission packages are both nearing the finish line in terms of testing. It’s possible that by 2022 the LCS will be the little credible ship at last.

I have a story forthcoming about LCS with some updates on the program and the way forward, and as part of it I spoke with Bryan Clark, a former top aide to Adm. Jon Greenert, a retired bubblehead and senior fellow at Hudson Institute (and, of course, Friend of The Drift). The story’s not done yet, which is entirely the fault of your humble correspondent, but I thought you all would get something out of the conversation we had about making the best out of LCS. That’s what we’re talking about tonight.

Let’s Drift!

-DBL

Talking LCS

The Drift: What do you see as the main challenges the Navy needs to overcome to get the most out of LCS?

Bryan Clark: The propulsion architecture’s unreliability means you are going to have to come up with a different way to deploy the ship that doesn’t require every deployment to be transoceanic. By the time the ship gets to Singapore it needs a lot of work done to it and your deployment time is cut down by the fact that you have to repair the ship once it arrives. Then it has to return to the U.S Both those trips are so fraught that the Navy ends up devoting a lot of time and resources to it.

Instead, forward station and maybe keep them forward station for longer than you planned. What the Navy should think about is getting them out to Sasebo, even if it’s a little bit early because technically those are supposed to be the mine module. And then you would deploy them from there.

The other thing they need to do is come up with a way for the mine warfare capabilities to be deployed, to the degree they are available, and come up with the concept of operations for that. That means the warfare folks in San Diego would need to come up with concepts for the equipment they do have rather than what they want to have.

The mine mission module is still a ways from being fully deployable, but it’s not an all-or-nothing. They could deploy it with a partial mine module, maybe with the Mark 18 Mod 2 Kingfish mine detection system and the SeaFox mine neutralization system. It could carry some of those modular mine warfare systems out of Sasebo.

So, getting them on deployment and getting the mine warfare mission package, in some form, are the primary challenges. The LCS does give you a unique mine-warfare capability that you are just not going to have when the minesweepers start to retire in the next five years. They really do need to get some ships out there and how to do mine warfare with them.

TD: You think the mine mission modules is more important than the ASW mission module?

They need to decide if the ASW mission package is going to be part of LCS. The ASW module is the module with the most proven capability in it and is the one that would offer the best improvement in LCS contribution to the fleet. But it’s also the most expensive and if LCS is not deploying then why spend the money on it? And with the frigate coming along, it’s going to be doing the same missions with the same kind of systems so why invest in the LCS version?

The question is then: do I take the LCS and treat them as small combatants that are able to do mine warfare and call it good? [Chief of Naval Operation Adm. Michael] Gilday has to work through the blocking and tackling of ‘What’s plan C for LCS?’ And I think that would be acceptable to a lot of people.

I’d argue you really don’t need the LCS for ASW if you are going to shift increasingly to unmanned systems. You’ve got the medium unmanned surface vessel and the frigate coming along.

TD: That trip to Singapore is challenging for LCS, but I can’t imagine a trip up to the GIUK Gap would be a picnic either for LCS. Seems you would need to station them maybe in Scotland or Iceland or some place like that.

If the LCS does ASW in the Atlantic, it’s not positioned anywhere close to where I needs to be so you’d need to drive there and I can’t even imagine what it’s like to take an LCS up into the high north.

TD: Congress has been making a habit of cutting the funding to the mission modules, that also seems to be driving delays into getting those mission modules out there.

BC: The funding, as they see it, is early to need. There is funding in there that’s not being obligated or used effectively so Congress’ point is that this money is going toward something that hasn’t been fully tested and is not ready so you’re not sure it’s going to be used effectively.

TD: So, Adm. Gilday says he’s going to push to get LCS to an acceptable place. Perhaps senior-level focus will move the program in the right direction?

BC: I think that’s terrific. When we were getting the first LCS delivered, [former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon] Greenert told the surface Navy, ‘Hey, you need to come up with a plan because these are supposed to come in at three or four per year and we don’t have a clear idea of how we’re going to man them, base them, manage them or deploy them.’

We didn’t get a whole lot of movement on that and we still haven’t. So, it’s good to hear Gilday is taking it on. But I think part of that is going to be accepting that we’re not going to ever get where we wanted to be on LCS, and accepting second best is probably the best way to get the most from LCS.

You’ll have to say ‘We accept the fact that we’re not going to have a full mine warfare mission module. We accept that we’ll have to deploy them forward and eliminate these long transits and ASW is probably out the window.’

So, it is about making hard choices like that and taking the heat. Luckily, he’s a new CNO and he’s been outside of all of this in the cyber world.

He can say, ‘Look, I inherited all of this. I’m not part of the cabal that created this thing, I’m not one of the people who made these decisions.’ So, that’s one good thing about being a surface guy who came from outside of all these decisions. Arguably, that makes it easier for him to make these hard choices.

TD: Thanks as always, Bryan.

BC: Oh, you’re welcome.

Now on to The Hotwash!

The Hotwash

Straight to the links tonight.

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