The Secretary of War’s November 7th memo “Transforming the Defense Acquisition System into the Warfighting Acquisition System to Accelerate Fielding of Urgently Needed Capabilities” is a significant effort to overhaul a system seen as too slow and risk averse. This is at least the 7th acquisition reform effort since the 1986 Packard Commission. Each added new processes and bureaucracy, so to date, none of these efforts have led to accelerated capability fielding.
What is different about today’s effort? The current transformation places greatest emphasis on rapidly fielding capabilities but will only be transformative if it treats one sentence as more than rhetoric “Maximize use of Modular Open System Architectures (MOSA)”. Adhering to the use of MOSA will bring the largest change, and should be a strategic commitment. This is not theoretical. We have seen in recent field competitions, a MOSA compliant vendor field 7 complex multifunction communication, electronic warfare and PNT systems on a multi-slot system in 3 months, integrating modules from multiple vendors.
For decades, DoW optimized around exquisite platforms. Requirements expanded. Timelines stretched. Systems were architected for 30-year lifecycles. The F-35 began in the early 1990s, achieved Initial Operational Capabilities in 2016, and is projected to be in service until 2088. The platform had to be perfect, because upgrades are very expensive and the architecture is not open. Proponents of proprietary systems claim the absence of standard interfaces allow them to optimize performance and cost. The fallacy in that argument is apparent when considering the system as performance fails to outpace the threat (slow to upgrade) and costs grow (vendor lock). Standardizing interfaces at the module level is a successful MOSA approach that yields procurable units with the latest technology from a robust industrial base.
In a true open system, the architecture is built on government or consensus-based interface standards. Software and hardware can be combined as “plug and play”, coming from any vendor, provided the interface standards are met. A system can be modularly assembled and updated. This approach is being demonstrated today during the Army’s 4ID Ivy Sting field demonstrations to transform Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2). Designed to field to the Division level in 18 months, Ivy Sting is proving the model. Open data and infrastructure software, radios, electronic warfare modules, and applications from multiple vendors are paired in real time. If they conform to the standard, they operate. If something performs better, it can replace an existing module without redesigning the system. MOSA lets the Army field what works today and lets future capabilities be integrated when ready. MOSA allows the Department to field capabilities at the soonest possible time, with a clear pathway to upgrade.
MOSA also expands the vendor base, and restores competition over the life of a system. Multiple vendors compete at the module level and enhance the supply chain. The Department does not need to rely on a single vendor for sustainment.
To ensure the Acquisition Transformation endures, the DoW must be vigilant in assessments of MOSA adherence, and resist the waiver culture that has hampered previous efforts. Declaring MOSA is easy, enforcing is not. It will require commitment from the government, but also commitment from industrial consortiums like the SOSA consortium to stay relevant. Standards must be managed by a consortium of stakeholders to allow controlled evolution.
In short, the 2025 version of Acquisition Transformation, which is needed, can succeed where others did not if the Department remains committed to enforcing MOSA—allowing vendors to deliver at the speed of relevance.