As I read Lt. Col. Paul Darling's "Value of Stealth Bombers Is Overstated" [Commentary, Aug. 10], I was struck by what seems to be a gross misunderstanding of the subject. Although I do fly tactical aircraft for a living I am not a student of Douhet or Mitchell. I don't believe that airpower alone can win wars. Lt. Col. Darling seems to misunderstand what we use our aircraft for. His statement "while purchasing aircraft that we never use" leads the reader to believe we routinely buy aircraft that we don't use. I would challenge anyone to point to a bomber, either tactical or strategic, that hasn't been used extensively in the last 10 to 15 years. He seems to believe that aircraft have to be used either for deterrence or conventional, not both. That is truly not the case as B-2s were used in the initial strikes on Afghanistan as well as Iraq to great effect, while retaining their capability to engage in the nuclear mission. Our job, as the military, is to be prepared to fight the potential wars our country could face. There have to be aircraft capable of succeeding against the largest threats.
The reality is, no matter how easy it is to attack a target with guided munitions there are still significant limitations that can apply. For one, an aircraft can only be in one place at a time, meaning no matter how accurate your bombs are, you can't attack multiple targets in different geographic areas at the same time. Second, when mixing the proverbial apples and oranges in his discussion, the amounts of ordnance that tactical aircraft carry compared to strategic aircraft is dramatic. According to US Air Force documents, the B-2 can carry up to 40,000 pounds of ordnance, meaning on the order of 80 500-pound guided bombs at one time. At best an F-35 can carry a 17,000-pound payload, which has to include its missile loadout. One can't forget that the F-35 is designed to be air-to-air and air-to-ground, something that is flexible and quite useful but limits its range and payload. Both types of aircraft are incredibly useful and necessary against current and future threats.
That brings us to the claim that the Air Force, and by proxy the military, has neglected missiles. I can't think of a less accurate statement. I can't tell if the author's point was that the Air Force was using the threat of missile systems in an untruthful manner to sell stealth technology or whether he was referring to our own missile technology. Whatever his reasoning, the enemy surface-to-air missile threat is very real. It's why our government has worked so hard to keep the Russians from selling the Iranians the S-300 missile system.
As an aviator I don't desire to conduct a mission without stealth technology where there's the threat of an S-300. The ability to strike our potential adversaries is necessary and can't be ensured without our stealth bombing aircraft. I find that stealth aircraft and the capabilities they offer are necessary and desirable, even though the cost can seem exorbitant. The capabilities those aircraft bring can't be overstated and to do so hints at ignorance, not the understanding of future capabilities.
US Navy Lt. Cmdr. Josh Fuller
Washington
THE A-10 STANDOFF
Retired Gen. John Michael Loh's dismissive comments about those fighting to keep the A-10 in the inventory are followed up with a series of force structure and basing schemes that border on fantasy ["Settle the A-10 Retirement Standoff," Commentary, Aug. 10]. The real issue is a failure of US Air Force leaders to earn the trust of Army ground commanders who understandably like the notion of air power they can count on.
Let's not forget how hard President Dwight D. Eisenhower had to fight to get the Air Force to swing the B-17s and B-24s from bombing targets deep in Germany to supporting the D-Day invasion in the days before June 6, 1944. Now, the Air Force is asking the Army to trust that the over-budget, underperforming and very late F-35 can do everything.
One must also question why the general's suggestion to tie Air Force squadrons to Army ground units for exercise and deployments hasn't been put in motion before it becomes a selling point for parking the A-10s. After all, the Air Force need look no further than the Marine Corps to find an air-ground team concept with proven results.
The A-10 has proven to be an effective and economical platform for the battlefields we have been involved in for nearly three decades with no end in sight. Keep the A-10 on board until the F-35 is on the ramp with deployable close-air support capability.
If the F-35 turns out to be as good as the advertising promises, I bet the Army will be happy to see it replace the A-10, but not before it is proven. Lonely is being on the ground facing a dangerous opponent while close-air support is still in flight test at Edwards Air Force Base, California.
Michael R. Gallagher
Hillsboro, Ore.
MIXED MESSAGES ON CAS
What the heck is this? Back in March, the US Air Force argued to retire the A-10, that it was not needed, that its close-air support (CAS) role could be filled by other aircraft such as the B-1B and the F-35. Agree or not, one could at least present data to support or refute the position. But now, the plan is to consider a brand new replacement CAS aircraft ["USAF Explores Future of Close-Air Support," Aug. 24].
Excuse me, but the reason that the A-10 is at risk is lack of funds to keep it operating and modernized. Any replacement aircraft program will not only cost more than maintaining the existing A-10, but will most certainly further compete for the same already inadequate funds.
The congressional hearings should be interesting, along the lines of the 1975 comedy "Adventure of Sherlock Holmes' Smarter Brother," where every time the woman in distress (here played by the USAF) makes a statement, the hero (congressional committee chairman) shouts back, "LIAR!"
Chester Kojro
Rolla, Mo.
