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	<title>Cmdr. Douglas Robb, Author at Defense News</title>
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	<title>Cmdr. Douglas Robb, Author at Defense News</title>
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		<title>Are we sure China views sea power the same way the West does?</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/06/13/are-we-sure-china-views-sea-power-the-same-way-the-west-does/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jun 2024 20:58:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Asia Pacific]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[The problem with mirroring is that it catalyzes policies aimed at eliciting certain behaviors on the assumption that two actors think alike.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/" target="_blank"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy now includes multiple <a href="https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/5/" target="_blank">warship classes</a>, fifth-generation <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3253044/fresh-sightings-chinas-j-35-fighter-plans-deck-liaoning-aircraft-carrier" target="_blank">fighters</a> and an <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/09/21/satellite-images-reveal-chinese-expansion-of-submarine-base/" target="_blank">expanding submarine force</a>. These means — combined with, in the <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/China-s-territorial-claims-illegal-deceptive-U.S.-Indo-Pacific-chief" target="_blank">words</a> of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Samuel Paparo, illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive maritime <a href="https://www.c4isrnet.com/information-warfare/2020/11/04/the-military-must-learn-to-operate-more-in-the-gray-zone/" target="_blank">gray zone activities</a> — seemingly imply that China’s strategic ends are self-evident.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, on closer examination, strategists are right to ask if the U.S. — or more broadly the West — understands the extent to which China values sea power as an enabler for grand strategy. Are we <a href="https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-mirror-image-fallacy-understanding-the-soviet-union" target="_blank">mirroring or projecting</a> our reasonable and rational expectations onto Beijing?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The problem with mirroring is that it catalyzes policies aimed at eliciting certain behaviors on the assumption that two actors think alike. Such mirroring can be the product of institutionalization or a lack of imagination, something that took Western naval analysts decades <a href="https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/cop-2013-u-005622-final.pdf#page=13" target="_blank">to discern during the Cold War</a>. Even <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/05/07/how-dc-became-obsessed-with-a-potential-2027-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/" target="_blank">referring to China as the United States’ strategic “pacing challenge”</a> implies an element of mirroring by benchmarking one against the other.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consequently, policymakers should ask three questions to help frame our understanding of China’s view on sea power to <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/enhance-naval-deterrence-near-and-far" target="_blank">formulate</a> sound naval <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/august/campaign-plan-south-china-sea" target="_blank">strategy</a> and optimize resources for the future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>First, why isn’t China employing its naval force like we do? </b>China is <a href="https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a60116121/china-building-a-4th-aircraft-carrier/" target="_blank">building</a> aircraft carriers, but construction is not the same as operation. Ample evidence suggests China will <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/05/01/chinese-aircraft-carrier-fujian-leaves-for-first-set-of-sea-trials" target="_blank">employ</a> its ships differently than the U.S. or U.K. navies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For instance, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/06/17/china-launches-third-aircraft-carrier/" target="_blank">Chinese carriers</a> sail almost exclusively in the so-called near seas, rarely venturing beyond the first island chain, which stretches from Japan’s East China Sea islands through the Philippines. This is curious considering these waters are largely enveloped by the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/03/10/chinas-neighbors-seek-expanded-partnerships-with-us-to-deter-defend/" target="_blank">weapon zones of China’s neighbors</a>.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/AP23362427525984.jpg.jpg" alt="In this photo released by Xinhua News Agency, a J-15 Chinese fighter jet prepares to take off from the Shandong aircraft carrier during the combat readiness patrol and military exercises around the Taiwan Island by the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) on Sunday, April 9, 2023." class="wp-image-107969"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">A Chinese J-15 fighter jet prepares to take off from the Shandong aircraft carrier during a military exercise around Taiwan on April 9, 2023. (An Ni/Xinhua via AP)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Conversely, Western naval doctrine prioritizes safeguarding high-value assets, employing carriers in the open ocean to exert sea and air control over a wide area.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, whereas Western navies use carriers for power projection, China appears to use them to protect other naval forces. China has armed the capable Renhai-class cruiser with long-range anti-ship missiles that could make <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/06/28/china-launches-its-most-advanced-homegrown-class-of-guided-missile-destroyers/" target="_blank">this ship</a>, rather than a carrier, the centerpiece of a task force.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some assess that China’s aircraft carrier program is a “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-aircraft-carriers-play-theatrical-role-pose-little-threat-yet-2023-05-05/" target="_blank">propaganda showpiece</a>.” Perhaps China’s naval buildup is about number parity or another <a href="https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Egregious-Cases-of-Chinese-Theft-of-American-Intellectual-Property.pdf" target="_blank">instance</a> of <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2094627/why-china-still-cant-beat-us-become-worlds-most" target="_blank">copycatting</a>. Or maybe China <a href="https://interpret.csis.org/translations/comrade-xi-jinpings-remarks-to-the-eighth-collective-study-session-of-the-ccp-politburo/#:~:text=A%20strong%20country%20is%20a%20strong%20maritime%20power,%20and%20a%20weak%20country%20is%20a%20weak%20maritime%20power" target="_blank">believes</a> carriers are a mark of superpower status.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Irrespective of the rationale, we fall into the trap of mirroring if we assume similar ships flying different ensigns will be employed similarly.</p>


	<aside class="smg-interstitial-link wp-block-smg-interstitial-link">
		<a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/03/24/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all-about-war/" class="smg-interstitial-link__inner">
							<div class="smg-interstitial-link__media">
					<img decoding="async" width="300" height="187" src="https://one.sightlinemg.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-1235533987.jpg.jpg?w=300" class="smg-interstitial-link__image wp-post-image" alt="" />				</div>
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				<span class="smg-interstitial-link__kicker">Related</span>
				<h3 class="smg-interstitial-link__title">Why is China strengthening its military? It’s not all about war.</h3>
									<p class="smg-interstitial-link__excerpt">A grasp of the myriad drivers could help observers more accurately assess the danger posed by the People&#039;s Liberation Army modernization.</p>
							</div>
		</a>
	</aside>
	


<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Second, why doesn’t China seek maritime partnerships like we do? </b>The U.S. Navy values multilateral maritime partnerships in the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/04/03/pacific-problems-why-the-us-disagrees-on-the-cost-of-deterring-china/" target="_blank">Indo-Pacific region</a> and strengthens them through exchanges, exercises, combined operations and industry cooperation. China has not pursued the same capacity-building approach.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Although China carries out periodic exercises in the Indian Ocean with Iranian and Russian warships, the commitment is lukewarm at best; in 2021, the Chinese <a href="https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/are-iran-russia-china-naval-drills-symbolic-or-security-tilt-east" target="_blank">didn’t show up</a>. The interoperability practiced by the U.S. and its allies remains beyond the scope of Chinese naval ambition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">More recently, China has eschewed an opportunity for maritime multilateralism by <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/21/beijing-u-s-red-sea-shipping-00132861" target="_blank">declining</a> to participate in <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/12/19/us-unveils-international-force-to-defend-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/" target="_blank">Operation Prosperity Guardian</a> in <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/02/12/all-the-houthi-us-navy-incidents-in-the-middle-east-that-we-know-of/" target="_blank">the Red Sea</a>. This move underscores Beijing’s unilateral and skeptical approach, possibly out of fear of losing face in a congested maritime space or a <a href="https://www.hudson.org/chinese-perspectives-alliance-alignment-entrapment-concerns-chinas-foreign-relations-liselotte-odgaard" target="_blank">belief</a> that partnerships are liabilities rather than enablers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By assuming that partnership-building is a cornerstone of all regional naval strategies, Western navies risk projecting allied diplomatic and military expectations onto China.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Third, why doesn’t China use its overseas naval facilities like we do? </b>One of the key features of a global blue-water navy is a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/05/03/with-chinese-warships-anchoring-in-cambodia-the-us-needs-to-respond/" target="_blank">network of bases and port-access agreements</a> in friendly countries. Western fleets use foreign ports to extend operational endurance and sustain forward presence.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While much has been written about the maritime elements of China’s Belt and Road Initiative — including construction projects in <a href="https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/" target="_blank">Djibouti</a> and <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/pakistan.html" target="_blank">Pakistan</a> — there is a difference between ports and bases; Long Beach is not San Diego.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Ream_DJ_PierComparison.png.png" alt="" class="wp-image-118260"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">From left, a satellite image shows a naval base in Djibouti with Chinese military presence, and a near-replica pier in Cambodia&#8217;s Ream Naval Base that China uses. (Courtesy of BlackSky)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests" target="_blank">China’s military facility in Djibouti</a> is its sole overseas base but is only used regularly by China’s modest, three-ship Middle East <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/back-to-engagement-chinas-escort-task-force-naval-diplomacy-post-covid/" target="_blank">task force</a>. And while the hydrographics and piers can <a href="https://news.usni.org/2021/04/20/africom-chinese-naval-base-in-africa-set-to-support-aircraft-carriers" target="_blank">reportedly accommodate</a> carriers, none have entered the Indian Ocean to date.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">China has favored direct commercial investment rather than military facility construction. Consequently, it holds relatively little maritime influence in the Indian Ocean. Though Chinese warships refuel in Sri Lanka; repairs and rearming are conducted back home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mirroring happens when we expect China to use its overseas facilities as an extension of its naval might. These assumptions can then form the basis for U.S. policy decisions that allocate time and finite resources.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In fairness, it can be easy to commit the mirroring fallacy. To an untrained eye, China’s warships, aircraft, weapons and even uniforms look recognizably similar. And its tit-for-tat scorekeeping and documented belligerency makes it easy to assume the worst.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, the truth may be that our views on sea power fundamentally differ. Look no further than <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/05/31/testing-the-waters-chinas-maritime-militia-challenges-foreign-forces-at-sea/" target="_blank">China’s use</a> of a <a href="https://www.foyles.co.uk/book/naval-constabulary-operations-and-fisheries-governance/sean-a-g-andrews/9781032641973" target="_blank">“para-naval” militia</a> to enforce maritime policies, a tactic anathema to Western conceptions of the rule of law at sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The scale and impact of China’s “opaque second navy” are monumental: Its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-more-coercive-chinese-coast-guard-and-potential-prc-quarantine-taiwan" target="_blank">Coast Guard</a> alone forms the world’s largest of its kind, and its <a href="https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9df19f53-b931-4d04-acd3-58a71c6b1a5b/content/sofia/2022/fishing-fleet.html" target="_blank">fishing fleet</a> is the world’s largest.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Analysis must be clear-eyed given the stakes involved with two nuclear powers. Therefore, as the U.S. and its allies position their policies and platforms for the future, we would be wise to recognize if and when we may be mirroring our perceptions onto competitors. Only then can we appreciate that the beauty of sea power may be in the eyes of the beholder.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. Lt. Cmdr. Andrew Ward is a warfare officer with the British Royal Navy, and is currently a Royal Navy Hudson fellow at Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the U.K. Defence Ministry, the U.S. Department of the Navy, nor the U.S. and U.K. governments.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/" target="_blank"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lt. Cmdr. Andrew Ward]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>In platform design and construction, the best surprise is no surprise</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/05/15/in-platform-design-and-construction-the-best-surprise-is-no-surprise/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2024 16:53:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[The case of the ubiquitous Boeing 737 airliner can provide a useful guide to ensure ships are scalable, affordable and relevant.]]></description>
		
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/" target="_blank"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When it comes to naval capacity, <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/02/12/all-the-houthi-us-navy-incidents-in-the-middle-east-that-we-know-of/" target="_blank">the more the better</a>. This includes platforms like guided-missile destroyers (DDG) — the current and future backbone of the surface force — that remain critical to the U.S. Navy’s missions and, by extension, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2023/06/13/key-lawmakers-flex-new-positions-to-bolster-shipbuilding-industry/" target="_blank">America’s defense-industrial base</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As the Navy considers <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf#page=13" target="_blank">transitioning procurement</a> to the next-generation surface combatant, called <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/12/12/us-navy-secretary-sees-no-need-to-rush-next-gen-destroyer-program/" target="_blank">DDG(X)</a>, in fiscal 2032, the case of the ubiquitous Boeing 737 airliner can provide a useful guide to ensure these ships are scalable, affordable and relevant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Indeed, similarities abound between airliner manufacturing and destroyer construction. Both involve <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2021/12/06/bath-iron-works-plays-catch-up-on-ship-delivery-after-years-of-upheaval/" target="_blank">corporate duopolies</a>, large-scale production, detailed assembly, multiple supply vendors, a slow-grown workforce and <a href="https://aviationweek.com/mro/aircraft-propulsion/commercial-aviation-set-steady-growth-decade-ahead#:~:text=Looking%20ahead%2C%20the%20global%20aircraft,deliveries%20and%20the%20latter%2042%25." target="_blank">rising demand</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, the newest 737 and DDG are hardly designs created from the ground up; they <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/destroyers-us-navy-two-classes-destroyers-are-really-five" target="_blank">evolved</a> from successful predecessors as missions and environments necessitated — remodeled rather than rebuilt.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In short, these platforms leveraged new technologies incrementally to mitigate risk, avoid obsolescence and keep pace with requirements. So as the Navy <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/03/21/osd-comptroller-says-u-s-shipyards-cant-build-3-destroyers-a-year" target="_blank">considers ways to bolster production</a> of its preeminent surface combatant and design its successor, it should study lessons from Boeing’s history with 737s. Here are some of them:</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Incremental innovation yields efficiencies by building upon previously proven work.</b> Boeing’s enduring, modified 737 design has allowed the company to maintain a hot production line with forecast output of a staggering <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-sets-record-737-production-goal-july-2025-sources-2023-10-03/" target="_blank">57 planes per month</a> by next summer. Similarly, the stable Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51 blueprint allows shipbuilders to work on multiple hulls simultaneously.</p>


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				<span class="smg-interstitial-link__kicker">Related</span>
				<h3 class="smg-interstitial-link__title">Without change, US Navy’s future fleet looks too ambitious for industry</h3>
									<p class="smg-interstitial-link__excerpt">For industry to execute the plans in the Future Years Defense Program, major improvements will have to take place.</p>
							</div>
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	</aside>
	


<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Economies of scale in training, crewing and maintenance cut costs and make equipment and people interchangeable — a business strategy employed by airlines like Southwest and Alaska, which operate fleets almost entirely of 737 variants. Similarly, the Navy operates 73 DDG-51s and has plans to field <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/08/15/u-s-flight-iii-destroyer-multiyear-deal-grows-to-10-ships-3-hulls-awarded-in-fy-2023" target="_blank">at least 90</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Therefore, using the current destroyer’s hull, mechanical and electrical layouts as a starting point — a design <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24105503highfullversion.pdf" target="_blank">strategy</a> that commercial shipbuilders employ to great effect — obviates the need to wholly reconfigure shipyards and retrain the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/04/25/gulf-shipyards-struggle-to-find-workers-amid-shipbuilding-spree/" target="_blank">workforce</a>, which can induce production and hiring <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/04/02/us-navy-ship-programs-face-years-long-delays-amid-labor-supply-woes/" target="_blank">delays</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Iterative design must consider size, weight and power-growth potential.</b> The 737 airframe and DDG-51 hull were designed with space and power for future growth — an open-architecture concept fundamental to their long-running success.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For example, Boeing’s P-8A Poseidon, a militarized 737 used for anti-submarine warfare and reconnaissance, delivered legacy capability to bridge the gap until its predecessor, the P-3C Orion, retired. Subsequent increments added improved sensors and tactical data links for detection and targeting. Further <a href="https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/04/01/boeing-p-8a-aircraft/?utm_content=cmp-true" target="_blank">upgrades</a> will transform the plane’s weapons capabilities, intelligence collection operations and processing power.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Similarly, while the first DDG-51 was designed before the advent of personal computers or email, the newest Aegis combat information centers have evolved into their modern glass cockpit design. And hulls have been <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32109/274#page=7" target="_blank">modified</a> over time to fit helicopter hangars, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/01/12/us-navy-reports-successful-tests-of-newest-shipboard-radar/" target="_blank">new radars</a> and <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/01/19/navy-refining-plan-for-its-17b-destroyer-electronic-warfare-backfit-with-4-test-ships" target="_blank">silhouette-altering hardware</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consequently, an iterative approach — using better existing, rather than revolutionary, unproven technologies — can underwrite a platform’s <a href="https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-00%20General%20Operations%20and%20Readiness%20Support/3000.12B.pdf" target="_blank">availability</a>. For ships, it allows program managers to reinvest time and capital into things like <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/03/13/its-time-to-appreciate-energys-influence-upon-sea-power/" target="_blank">energy-efficient systems that can maximize operational endurance</a>, or new power schemes to drive directed-energy weapons with unlimited magazines, all at relatively low risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Incremental innovation keeps supply chains strong and assembly lines uninterrupted.</b> Another benefit of building off stable platform designs is the ability to adopt thriving networks of sub-vendor supply chains. This creates business predictability and assured access to original equipment manufacturer parts that enhance system readiness and reliability.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, strong and diversified supply chains are critical to controlling costs, especially when supplier competition is limited, vendors hail from the same geographic area, <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/how-covid-19-is-reshaping-supply-chains" target="_blank">disasters</a> cause <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3726418/navy-resources-arrive-in-baltimore-to-support-key-bridge-efforts/" target="_blank">disruption</a> or <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/05/04/pentagon-says-inflation-has-made-one-company-request-to-cancel-a-long-term-contract/" target="_blank">currency fluctuates</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">History has demonstrated that building sub-vendor capacity is difficult once initial contracts are signed because sunk costs make new business unprofitable. Moreover, interrupting hot production lines can create delays or cost overruns — something the Navy experienced when it closed (and subsequently reopened) the Arleigh Burke line to shift to Zumwalt-class construction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>Proven production attracts allies.</b> For example, nine countries already or plan to fly the P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. Allies recognize the value of evolutionary programs that allow them to interoperate with the U.S., keep growth affordable and minimize their risk as others expend research dollars before agreeing to foreign military sales.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20231118raaf8185016_0943.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-118551"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">A P-8 Poseidon aircraft with the Royal Australian Air Force performs a handling display during an air show in 2023. (FSGT Ricky Fuller/Australian Defence Department)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Some, like Australia, ink cooperative development contracts that permit the defining of combined requirements ahead of the design phase.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The U.S. and its naval <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/why-u-s-naval-power-needs-asian-allies/" target="_blank">partners</a> have benefited from <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank">collaboration</a> in everything from missiles to fighter jets. Consortium approaches also offer potential for shipbuilding, where allies operate similar naval combatants and shipyards whose <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-Navy-to-identify-which-Indo-Pacific-shipyards-it-can-use-in-wartime" target="_blank">capacity can be leveraged</a> to overcome domestic constraints. Future combatant design should embrace commonalities and pursue collaborative production to <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/budget/2024/05/14/house-panel-takes-aim-at-navy-size-new-capabilities-in-defense-bill/" target="_blank">increase fleet capacity</a> on time and on budget.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To be sure, recent headlines and congressional hearings have spotlighted how prioritizing quality controls and safety cultures are essential to preserving taxpayer investments and upholding institutional trust. Questioning attitudes about engineering <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2019/04/02/mit-expert-highlights-divergent-condition-caused-by-737-max-engine-placement/?sh=6272396840aa" target="_blank">modifications</a> or equipment <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/fleet-needs-common-bridge-navigation-system" target="_blank">dissimilarities</a> are essential. And program experts should be mindful that single points of mechanical or electrical failure, including in <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/february/electronic-charts-ready-navigation" target="_blank">navigation</a>, steering and <a href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/the-inside-story-of-mcas-how-boeings-737-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/" target="_blank">engine design</a>, can be unrecoverable both in the air and at sea.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nevertheless, as the Navy considers its broad approach to the next large surface combatant, which could sail until the end of the century, it should start by innovating on proven designs that leave room for growth. This strategy of building a little and learning a lot is a pragmatic way to expand warship capacity while mitigating risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After all, as Holiday Inn’s revolutionary 1950s ad campaign <a href="https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-08-25-fi-1005-story.html" target="_blank">proclaimed</a>: “The best surprise is no surprise.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. Capt. Wayne Lewis is the deputy commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 10, and has served as a test pilot for the Boeing-made P-8 Poseidon. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>
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      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Capt. Wayne Lewis]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>To expand the US Navy’s fleet, we must contract</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/04/17/to-expand-the-us-navys-fleet-we-must-contract/</link>
					<comments>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/04/17/to-expand-the-us-navys-fleet-we-must-contract/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2024 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily News Roundup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Naval]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[After decades of corporate consolidation, the pendulum now swings toward consensus that the U.S. defense-industrial base must once again expand.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/" target="_blank"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is no substitute for <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/01/10/navy-chief-to-prioritize-getting-more-ships-ready-for-action/" target="_blank">fleet capacity</a>. But generating it depends on healthy partnerships between the government and industry. After decades of <a href="https://www.dau.edu/sites/default/files/Migrate/ARJFiles/ARJ100/ARJ100_Deutch.pdf" target="_blank">corporate consolidation</a>, the pendulum now swings toward consensus that the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/01/17/pentagon-restarts-meetings-to-implement-new-industrial-strategy/" target="_blank">U.S. defense-industrial base</a> must <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2024/02/20/the-pentagon-wants-industry-to-transform-again-to-meet-demand-can-it/" target="_blank">once again expand</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/01/11/pentagons-first-industrial-strategy-calls-for-generational-change/" target="_blank">Recent efforts</a> by the <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/04/pentagon-reorganizes-industrial-policy-office-shore-defense-firms-supply-chain/365980/" target="_blank">Defense Department</a> and <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/03/06/big-changes-congressional-panel-proposes-new-defense-budget-system/" target="_blank">Congress</a> reflect this new course and a desire to attract new companies that have not historically contributed to the defense mission. While these strategic frameworks are valuable for shaping the department’s vision, translating them into action also requires adjusting the underlying tactical and administrative processes that bind ideas and obligations. That means turning attention to how the Navy contracts for supplies and services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To many, contracting remains a perceived acquisition obstacle: The Federal Acquisition Regulation, or FAR — canonically referred to as the contracting bible — includes the phrase “shall not,” “may not” and “will not” 1,379 times.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nevertheless, four contracting policy alterations can complement the broader acquisition change taking place and <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/04/09/us-navy-secretary-points-to-foreign-shipyards-practices-to-fix-delays/" target="_blank">accelerate delivery</a> of fleet capability and capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>1. Tailor flow-down requirements to make it more attractive for nontraditional defense companies to operate within the defense market. </b>Currently, defense acquisition constructs include <a href="https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia-article/subcontracting#:~:text=the%20Federal%20Acquisition%20Regulation%20and%20its%20supplements%20contain%20certain%20contract%20clauses%20that%20must%20%22flow%20down%22%20to%20subcontractors" target="_blank">oversight provisions that flow down from prime contractors</a> to their multitiered chain of subcontractors and vendors. Primes and subs are then subjected to the same regulatory constraints. Complicating matters, primes tend to assign more flow-down requirements than necessary to limit their own risk exposure.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This practice <a href="https://dair.nps.edu/bitstream/123456789/1574/1/SYM-AM-18-061.pdf" target="_blank">dissuades</a> nontraditional companies — like tech startups — from bidding on prime contracts or partnering with larger defense firms because they are unable or unwilling to comply.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Programmatically, existing acquisition governance gives program managers latitude to <a href="https://acqnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/DOD-Instruction-5000.02-Operation-of-the-Adaptive-Acquisition-Framework-8-Jun-2022.pdf#page=11" target="_blank">tailor in regulatory requirements</a> that are either not applicable or burdensome. In contrast, contracting regulations are more stringent. The DOD <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-11-17/pdf/2023-25158.pdf" target="_blank">recently addressed this</a> — partially — by restricting flow-down requirements to those companies that provide commercial products or services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But why stop there?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The government could take this a step further by granting contracting officers and prime contractors leeway to pick and choose when and to which subcontractors — regardless of <a href="https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part-2#FAR_2_101" target="_blank">commerciality</a> — such conditions should flow downstream. Another option is to expand the <a href="https://aaf.dau.edu/aaf/contracting-cone/" target="_blank">adaptive acquisition framework</a> to permit a blend of FAR-based and statutory strategies under a single contract vehicle.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These approaches would assuage primes’ compliance concerns, incentivize market investment and capitalize on widespread participation within the defense-industrial base.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>2. Codify pathways to more consistently transition capabilities procured using unconventional acquisition authorities.</b> Whereas FAR-based contracting prevails in traditional programs, the DOD is increasingly using <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/on-dod/2021/11/amid-explosion-in-dods-use-of-otas-myths-abound-about-how-and-whether-to-use-them/" target="_blank">other transaction authorities</a>, or OTA — a less rigid procurement agreement structure — to <a href="https://ppbereform.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Commission-on-PPBE-Reform_Full-Report_6-March-2024_FINAL.pdf#page=74" target="_blank">foster innovation and adaptability</a>, as well as encourage participation by nontraditional companies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, problems arise when the prototyping phase ends and there is no on-ramp to an enduring program of record where stable funding resides. These nontraditional companies (and their products or services) could be orphaned.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">From a contracting perspective, OTA-to-OTA pathways exist, while transition guidance based on an OTA-to-FAR route remains ambiguous. Consequently, because these firms often lack the institutional knowledge to navigate such ambiguities, they are more likely to leave frustrated.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Navy-Cover2_web.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-82093"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Seaman Semajia Marshal heaves a mooring line on the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser Antietam on June 26, 2018. (MC2 William McCann/U.S. Navy)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This problem is especially acute for small businesses, which lack the independent research and development budgets of their larger, established counterparts. In the end, the DOD risks losing the very industry capability and talent it was trying to harness in the first place. Therefore, formal direction governing ways to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/innovation-adoption-for-all-scaling-across-department-of-defense/#:~:text=a%20transition%20partner%20who%20will%20%22own%22" target="_blank">transition OTA efforts to programs of record</a> would better link them to established portfolios with existing funding streams. This would increase acquisition transparency and predictability, as well as entice nontraditional companies to join — and importantly remain in — the industrial base.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>3. Automate parts of the contracting process to recognize efficiencies and create speed without sacrificing thoroughness or quality.</b> <a href="https://www.dau.edu/library/damag/march-april2024/defense-acquisition-workforce-2023-awards" target="_blank">More than 160,000 civilian and uniformed members</a> comprise the defense acquisition workforce, 7,700 of which are assigned to contracting positions within the Department of the Navy, per the service’s acquisition talent management office.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the Federal Procurement Data System, in fiscal 2023 alone, Navy contracting officers negotiated, evaluated and executed approximately $150 billion across more than 216,000 contract actions. New contracting methods, evolving acquisition authorities and heightened urgency have increased corresponding workloads for these critical service enablers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, just as the Navy cannot instantly develop ship captains, neither can it grow experienced contracting officers overnight. To ease this workforce strain, leaders should explore ways to automate parts of the contracting process — such as drafting and reviewing documents, selecting clauses, tabulating figures or ensuring regulatory compliance — to realize manpower and analytical efficiencies among the service-enabling competencies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Automation would deliver numerous benefits. Artificial intelligence and machine learning can accomplish many of these human analytical functions faster and more thoroughly. This could free contracting officer bandwidth to maintain a wider aperture on the overall process, and reduce the types of errors and rework that inject contracting delays and stifle overall delivery timelines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, administrative efficiencies gained through automation could yield more consistent contracting workloads over time, thereby overcoming the <a href="https://ppbereform.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Commission-on-PPBE-Reform_Full-Report_6-March-2024_FINAL.pdf#page=83" target="_blank">use-it-or-lose-it mentality</a> at the end of a fiscal year, when a rush to obligate funds creates a tidal wave of contracting actions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lastly, leaning into existing technologies better aligns with the direction of the workforce as the government seeks to attract and retain a new generation of workers who have had access to such automation their entire lives.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="3000" height="2000" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/40_naval_electricboat.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-117827"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The Virginia-class submarine Iowa sits in a graving dock at the Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Conn., in August 2023. (General Dynamics Electric Boat)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>4. Align contracting and acquisition culture.</b> The DOD is making a concerted effort to change acquisition culture; its governing directive <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/500001p.pdf#page=2" target="_blank">uses language</a> like “deliver performance at the speed of relevance,” “develop a culture of innovation” and “be responsive.” Such sentiments are largely absent from contracting governance and contracting officer training.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And while the DOD has shortened its <a href="https://acqnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/DOD-Instruction-5000.02-Operation-of-the-Adaptive-Acquisition-Framework-8-Jun-2022.pdf" target="_blank">19-page acquisition instruction</a> to make it usable, the FAR and its defense supplement — at a whopping 3,496 pages combined — remain a doorstop.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Arming contracting officers with new tools could repair this cultural disconnect. One approach would be to author a contracting guidebook, which could better articulate how-to guidance for contracting officers and complement other <a href="https://aaf.dau.edu/guidebooks/" target="_blank">modern acquisition references</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By design, the Navy’s approach to contracting is methodical and iterative, emphasizing fairness and best value. But the ability to compete in today’s threat environment remains, in large part, a function of our acquisition and contracting agility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For the fleet to expand, it must — as the double meaning suggests — contract.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. Kate Robb served as a Department of the Navy acquisition professional for 17 years, most recently as the procuring contracting officer for the DDG-51 shipbuilding program. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/author/douglas-robb/" target="_blank"><i>Click here</i></a><i> to see the entire series.</i></p>
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      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kate Robb]]></dc:creator>
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		<title>It’s time to appreciate energy’s influence upon sea power</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/03/13/its-time-to-appreciate-energys-influence-upon-sea-power/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2024 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily News Roundup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy & Environment]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Here are four moves that could build energy resilience and maximize efficiencies in the U.S. Navy's fleet.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the fifth commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the third </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i> and the fourth </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/02/06/want-an-interchangeable-naval-force-expand-foreign-exchanges/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is no more valued attribute, as famed naval tactician Wayne Hughes declared, than “the number of ships &#8230; a fleet can have.” But ships must be sustained — something the naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan recognized nearly a century earlier when he <a href="https://archive.org/details/letterspapersofa0003maha/mode/2up" target="_blank">wrote</a>: “Fuel stands first in importance of the resources necessary to a fleet.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The U.S. Navy spent nearly $3.9 billion on operational fuel in fiscal 2022 alone, roughly the <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32109.pdf#page=2" target="_blank">cost</a> of two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. In terms of scale, the Department of Defense is the <a href="https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/Pentagon%20Fuel%20Use%2C%20Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Costs%20of%20War%20Revised%20November%202019%20Crawford.pdf#page=2" target="_blank">world’s largest institutional user of energy</a>, consuming more than corporations like Amazon or developed nations like Sweden and Portugal.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Energy — specifically fuel — thus becomes a central planning consideration for any globally present maritime strategy. In <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3265955/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-surface-navy-association-symposium/#:~:text=one%20tactic%20to%20keep%20our%20ships%20out%20of%20ports%20and%20in%20the%20fight.%20Refuel%20and%20Resupply%20are%20just%20as%20critical" target="_blank">the words</a> of Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, refueling options are essential “to keep our ships out of ports and in the fight.” And as Mahan noted: “The distribution and storage of fuel is, therefore, eminently a strategic question.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A return to nuclear power could address many of these surface combatant endurance challenges. But such an approach is costly and unlikely.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead, four programmatic and policy choices can build energy resilience and maximize efficiencies in the fleet, which can yield innumerable benefits as the Navy designs, employs and sustains its force deep into this century.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>1. Expand in-theater, at-sea refueling options to increase capacity and accelerate mobilization timelines.</b> Beyond the Navy secretary, senior uniformed leaders <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3376612/general-expresses-concerns-over-readiness-in-sealift-air-refueling/" target="_blank">at U.S. Transportation Command</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/indopacom-nominee-logistics-aerial-refueling/" target="_blank">in the Pacific</a> have highlighted the need to expand capacity. Military Sealift Command currently <a href="https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/1.17.2024-letter-to-navy.pdf#page=2" target="_blank">operates 32 refueling ships</a> — only a third of the requirement and a number that will remain stubbornly low, even as new oilers <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43546/63" target="_blank">replace</a> their aging predecessors. The Maritime Administration’s Tanker Security Program and Voluntary Tanker Agreement provide additional surge capacity in the event of a conflict or national emergency, but these reinforcements can seem like a drop in the proverbial ocean.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Partnering with industry can <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/02/22/u-s-navy-building-robust-logistics-framework-in-indo-pacific" target="_blank">augment</a> logistics force <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-503.pdf" target="_blank">shortfalls</a>. <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/12/31/the-us-military-ran-the-largest-stress-test-of-its-sealift-fleet-in-years-its-in-big-trouble/" target="_blank">Military Sealift Command</a> charters some <a href="https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/Portals/43/Publications/Annual%20Report/MSCAnnual2023.pdf?ver=fbYjcU4-Vj_Xm5cLPbwjSQ%3d%3d#page=13" target="_blank">niche support vessels</a>, but identifying and contracting commercial, replenishment-capable ships that are underway could <a href="https://cimsec.org/tankers-for-the-pacific-fight-a-crisis-in-capability/#:~:text=The%20long%20supply%20chains" target="_blank">shorten</a> supply lines. A government-developed containerized kit, which <a href="https://www.ndtahq.com/navy-develops-modular-consol-capability-to-refuel-oilers-at-sea/" target="_blank">allows</a> commercial tankers to pump fuel to Navy oilers in a process known as consolidated cargo replenishment at sea, is a disruptive capability that can rapidly expand at-sea refueling capacity and deserves investment.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="2048" height="1245" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/7150324.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-112941"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The fast combat support ship USNS Supply and the commercial tanker MT Maersk Peary conduct a replenishment at sea. (2nd Mate Daniel Hall/U.S. Navy)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such approaches would require new — but solvable — procedures to vet crews and ships, communicate securely, and integrate these commercial units into existing military logistics constructs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, public law <a href="https://www.maritime.dot.gov/ports/cargo-preference/cargo-preference#:~:text=Cargo%20Preference%20Laws%20and%20Regulations,-The%20U.S.%20uses&#038;text=The%20Military%20Cargo%20Preference%20Act,this%20means%20all%20military%20cargo." target="_blank">mandates</a> all military cargo to be carried aboard U.S.-flagged vessels. Congress should revisit this statutory requirement and authorize the use of tankers registered to treaty allies so we can <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2023/12/04/del-toro-aims-to-reinvigorate-us-shipping-to-strengthen-fleet/" target="_blank">leverage our trusted partners’ capacity</a> and overcome domestic constraints.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>2. Establish a single-fuel standard for ships and aircraft to increase operational flexibility.</b> Combatants carry two different fuels on board in separate fuel systems because while shipboard gas turbine engines are <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA248542.pdf#page=26" target="_blank">capable</a> of burning multiple types of fuel, their embarked helicopters only use a single high-grade variant called JP5 in the maritime environment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Complicating matters, the managers who oversee surface and aviation fuel standards, purchasing, and distribution reside in different Navy systems commands and do not always reach consensus when evaluating engineering, supply chain and operational risk.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Economically, the U.S. Navy is one of the few consumers of JP5, which sends a weak demand signal to industry. A single naval fuel — <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA416087.pdf" target="_blank">whether JP5</a> or a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/smr/energy-and-environment/" target="_blank">different alternative</a> entirely — would increase demand for specialized mixtures and lower artificially high prices through economies of scale. It would also align with the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/01/11/pentagons-first-industrial-strategy-calls-for-generational-change/" target="_blank">recently released</a> National Defense Industrial Strategy’s priority of resilient supply chains by simplifying purchasing, transportation and distribution logistics.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Technologically, a <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1167318.pdf" target="_blank">single-fuel standard</a> for ships would also result in a finer-grade fuel, <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA248542.pdf#page=33" target="_blank">which could</a> enhance system performance, allow engineers to revisit underway maintenance periodicity assumptions and identify manpower efficiencies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Thankfully, engineering problems beget solutions — and few fuels are unburnable. Additives can alter fuel properties to make it suitable for shipboard use without damaging tanks or systems. And improved purification methods, gasket materials and engine modifications can safeguard equipment during storage and operation. <a href="https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/sustainable_aviation_fuel.html" target="_blank">New mixtures</a> are also becoming more ubiquitous — many with favorable properties — and they should be tested for shipboard use.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In short, we can transform vulnerabilities into strengths while preparing for a <a href="https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/FFT%20Project/MEPC80-INF.10%20-%20Summary%20report%20on%20the%20study%20.PDF#page=18" target="_blank">transition</a> to biofuels and alternatives, which the International Maritime Organization and experts agree are the energy future — albeit one that will require time and platform design changes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>3. Retrofit energy-efficient systems aboard combatants to maximize operational endurance.</b> To date, many programmatic efforts to field energy-efficient, shipboard systems have been focused on new production and forward fitting. But with a current force of 73 guided-missile destroyers, applying selected hull, mechanical and electrical <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1164919.pdf#page=31" target="_blank">improvements</a> to today’s force can yield tens of millions of dollars in annual <a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1164919.pdf#page=71" target="_blank">savings</a> that can be redirected toward other priorities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Apart from upgrades to shipboard generators and electrical distribution systems, additional gains can be realized by replacing large current-drawing appliances like heating, ventilation and air conditioning units — or even the dish-washing scullery. <a href="https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/news-content-hub/hvac-boosting-energy-savings-and-sustainability-75958" target="_blank">For example</a>, the cruise industry found that a 30% enhancement in air conditioning efficiency leads to 5% annual fuel savings — a staggering $193 million if applied to the Navy. Similarly, the Air Force <a href="https://www.safie.hq.af.mil/Portals/78/documents/IEN/Value%20of%20Data%20Leave-Behind.pdf?ver=WE2dKN_NMyGY21Kr3KeX3Q%3d%3d#page=2" target="_blank">calculated</a> that a 1% energy efficiency improvement fuels 8,000 additional sorties.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">And seemingly insignificant actions can make a sizable and compounding impact: When United Airlines <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-travel-briefcase-united-inflight-magazine-20180120-story.html" target="_blank">moved to a lighter-weight paper</a> for its inflight magazine, a 1 ounce difference amounted to 170,000 gallons and $290,000 dollars in annual savings.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><b>4. Improve data capture and analysis to guide operations more efficiently.</b> The surface force still relies on manual processes to collect and submit fuel data, interpret predictive graphical curves, and estimate fuel percentages. But reporting methods, proficiency and even units of measurement can vary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A better option would be to digitize these analog-intensive processes, apply machine-learning algorithms and mirror the Air Force’s Operational Energy Data Collection Strategy that has saved the service <a href="https://www.safie.hq.af.mil/Portals/78/documents/2022%20Annual%20Report%20-%20APPROVED.pdf?ver=hOdE83IFyRv1NIoELrYY6g%3d%3d3#page=10" target="_blank">$31 million per year</a>. Meanwhile, the Defense Logistics Agency should continue investigating options to securely automate fuel sensing and collection to standardize application across the Department of Defense.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, while stakeholders across the enterprise incorporate energy data into policies and plans, coordination can be streamlined. For instance, operations researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School have occasionally delved into these issues, and the Navy sends a few supply officers each year to the University of Kansas business school’s petroleum management program. However, no formal link exists between academia and organizations like the Office of Naval Research. Much like the Naval War College’s advanced research programs, such connections could help guide research questions, create unity of effort and align intellectual capital with operational requirements.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In times of strained capacity, and given American supply chains that span the Earth’s surface, new sustainment approaches can extend the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/01/09/seeking-75-ready-ships-navy-turns-to-new-readiness-orgs/" target="_blank">surface force’s operational staying power</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As Mahan noted: “Without ammunition, a ship may run away, hoping to fight another day, but without fuel she can neither run, nor reach her station, nor remain on it, if remote, nor fight.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford, where Ensign James Potticary earned a Master of Science degree in energy systems and </i><a href="https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:78cc4455-02ab-43fd-8485-df9d8a7c8d76/files/d7h149q554" target="_blank"><i>wrote a dissertation</i></a><i> exploring the feasibility of alternative fuel sources for U.S. Navy ships. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the fifth commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the third </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i> and the fourth </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/02/06/want-an-interchangeable-naval-force-expand-foreign-exchanges/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ensign James Potticary]]></dc:creator>
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Want an interchangeable naval force? Expand foreign exchanges.</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/02/06/want-an-interchangeable-naval-force-expand-foreign-exchanges/</link>
					<comments>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/02/06/want-an-interchangeable-naval-force-expand-foreign-exchanges/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 16:47:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily News Roundup]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Refocusing exchange programs through the lens of potential military conflict can accelerate the benefits of collaboration.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the fourth commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i> and the third </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nearly two decades after then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen championed a <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/naval/2021/10/05/navy-secretarys-new-strategic-guidance-focuses-on-deterring-china-from-invading-taiwan/" target="_blank">1,000-ship Navy</a>, the <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2007/january/1000-ship-navy-and-maritime-strategy" target="_blank">rationale</a> for a combined fleet — that is, a maritime fighting force augmented by international allies and partners — is more relevant than ever.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/12/19/us-unveils-international-force-to-defend-red-sea-heres-what-we-know/" target="_blank">Recent events</a> demonstrate that keeping vital waterways free and open requires both political resolve and — in the words of <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/07/21/how-franchettis-experience-made-her-bidens-pick-to-lead-the-navy/" target="_blank">the current CNO, Adm. Lisa Franchetti</a> — ”<a href="https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jan/09/2003372761/-1/-1/1/AMERICAS%20WARFIGHTING%20NAVY.PDF" target="_blank">players on the field</a>.” But oceans are vast, ships cannot be in two places at once, and building them quickly is difficult and costly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Luckily, the U.S. is the central node in a network of democratically minded, technologically advanced partners that confer a strategic advantage. Moreover, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/why-u-s-naval-power-needs-asian-allies/" target="_blank">many of these allies</a> operate similar platforms and systems in their respective navies — gas turbine engines, the Aegis shipboard combat system, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, H-60 helicopters, and F-35 fighter jets — that can yield efficiencies in force design, generation and employment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, leaping from interoperability to interchangeability is, in part, a human endeavor. To that end, the U.S. Navy has exchange agreements to host foreign professionals and send U.S. personnel abroad. Refocusing these programs through the lens of potential military conflict can accelerate the benefits of collaboration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, expand the number of enlisted <a href="https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Career-Management/Language-Culture/PEP/" target="_blank">personnel exchanges</a> to build a deeper reservoir of expertise across the allied force. Within today’s U.S. Navy, approximately 80 of nearly 300 foreign personnel exchanges are at the enlisted level — a number that <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/11/30/first-us-submarine-repairs-in-australia-scheduled-for-summer/" target="_blank">should rise</a> as the <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/12/02/defense-officials-put-technology-at-center-of-aukus-summit/" target="_blank">AUKUS pathway</a> is implemented. These exchanges should be increased and modified to include a tour aboard a ship or with an aircraft squadron common to both navies, followed by an assignment at a regional maintenance facility, fleet logistics center or schoolhouse. Such an approach would develop common knowledge and capitalize on diversity of experience to generate better business practices and warfighting advantages for both sides. Leveraging some common ratings may even <a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/04/19/army-navy-and-air-force-predict-recruiting-shortfalls-this-year/" target="_blank">ease the strain on U.S. personnel</a> by filling important, but <a href="https://news.usni.org/2022/10/25/navy-needs-to-fill-about-9000-at-sea-billets-in-more-than-a-dozen-ratings-says-personnel-command" target="_blank">gapped</a>, seagoing billets.</p>


	<aside class="smg-interstitial-link wp-block-smg-interstitial-link">
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				<span class="smg-interstitial-link__kicker">Related</span>
				<h3 class="smg-interstitial-link__title">What’s next for the US-Philippines basing agreement?</h3>
									<p class="smg-interstitial-link__excerpt">The Philippines is expected to work on dozens of projects this year to upgrade military bases as part of an agreement with the United States.</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, improve allied officers’ exposure to U.S. Navy operations and decision-making. Currently, foreign officers — including those with whom I served aboard all three of my destroyers — embed within an operational unit for a multiyear tour, and then return home. Consequently, their experience can vary based on their unit’s prescribed mission and seagoing time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One option is to shorten the duration, widen the aperture and increase throughput to maximize the program’s return on investment. For example, a condensed assignment aboard a mission-ready ship, with an immediate successive rotation on a carrier strike group or numbered fleet commander staff, would expose exchange officers to challenges and problem-solving at different levels of command.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Conversely, it may make sense to lengthen some exchanges on common platforms (<a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank">such as guided-missile destroyers</a>) to achieve near-perfect tactical synergy — just like “<a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/stations/raf-lossiemouth/news/mbe-for-pioneer-p-8-pilot/" target="_blank">Project Seedcorn</a>,” in which British maritime patrol pilots <a href="https://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/id/eprint/46022/" target="_blank">integrated</a> into allied squadrons for up to eight years to maintain their flying proficiency while the U.K. transitioned airframes from the Nimrod to the now-ubiquitous P-8A Poseidon.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, pair student learning exchanges with fleet experience to develop a more comprehensive picture of the American way of war. The Naval Academy runs myriad <a href="https://www.usna.edu/InternationalProgram/index.php" target="_blank">international undergraduate programs</a>, ranging from reciprocal semesters abroad to four-year immersion, but foreign graduates return to their home country after earning their diploma.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Instead, Congress should amend <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/347" target="_blank">public law</a> to make these graduates eligible to attend fleet-accession training alongside their classmates, and then serve a shortened tour in the U.S. Navy so they return home as seasoned junior officers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Similarly, assigning foreign graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College or even the Surface Warfare Schools Command — which teaches four ship-handling and tactical courses to international naval officers — to fleet staffs would better expose them to U.S. naval planning and operations, albeit on a larger scale than in their home navies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The U.S. Navy has active agreements to host foreign personnel from <a href="https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Career-Management/Language-Culture/PEP/" target="_blank">20 countries</a>, <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/" target="_blank">18 of which</a> are parties to collective defense arrangements. However, at the Naval Academy, only 19 of the 57 midshipmen currently in the service academy’s four-year foreign student program hail from allied countries.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Though some highly capable allies operate their own national military academies, encouraging and favoring applicants from this partnership pool — authority Congress has granted to service secretaries — would generate maximum combined warfighting utility.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lastly, reassess how the Department of the Navy is organized in order to optimize the foreign exchange program’s effectiveness. <a href="https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/05000%20General%20Management%20Security%20and%20Safety%20Services/05-700%20General%20External%20and%20Internal%20Relations%20Services/5700.7J.pdf" target="_blank">Responsibilities</a> for international engagement policy, personnel placement, hardware sales and information access are currently <a href="https://peoiws.stemrocks.net/programs" target="_blank">divided</a> across the <a href="https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Team-Ships/NAVSEA-21/International-Fleet-Support/" target="_blank">fleet</a>, Navy staff and <a href="https://www.secnav.navy.mil/nipo" target="_blank">secretariat offices</a>. Mirroring the Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs office, which consolidates many of these programmatic functions under one managerial umbrella, could better centralize <a href="https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Portals/55/Reference/MILPERSMAN/1000/1300Assignment/1306-921.pdf" target="_blank">execution</a> of diplomatic exchanges and align resources with operational needs.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/7977446.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-118503"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Officers with U.S. Navy carrier strike groups meet with Tactical Training Group Atlantic staff on Aug. 15, 2023. (MC2 Isaac Maxwell/U.S. Navy)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">To be sure, interpersonal challenges remain to achieving interchangeability. One is military rules of engagement, which can complicate real-world combined operations when they differ by country. Another is information sharing, where restrictions can delay personnel placements, induce frustrations and undermine program goals.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fortunately, thanks to AUKUS, Congress is melting the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-23/australia-laments-bureaucratic-permafrost-that-s-slowing-aukus-alliance" target="_blank">bureaucratic permafrost</a> that can freeze international coordination. For instance, the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act includes a mandate to “reform and improve the policies, processes, and procedures,” “increase efficiency and reduce timelines,” review foreign disclosure <a href="https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/523011p.pdf" target="_blank">policies</a>, and reduce the use of <a href="https://www.dcsa.mil/Portals/91/Documents/CTP/CUI/DOD-CUI_Marking_Handbook-DOD_(2020).pdf" target="_blank">Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals</a> handling caveat.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These solutions can be applied more broadly to provide access, preserve safeguards, and enhance high-end combined tactical training opportunities in our warfighting development centers, schoolhouses and afloat commands.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Expanding soft power personnel exchanges can build common knowledge and complement the hard power platform choices many American allies have deliberately made to enable closer cooperation. Such investments — like Project Seedcorn — may grow into a sea of a thousand ships.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the fourth commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i> and the third </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>
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		<title>Repair deployed ships in theater to optimize combat power</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/</link>
					<comments>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024/01/17/repair-deployed-ships-in-theater-to-optimize-combat-power/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Daily News Roundup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Naval]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newsletters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Opinion]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Vast ocean distances that take weeks to traverse make the ability to regenerate forces quickly a critical enabler for mission success.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the third commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, and the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/video/2024/01/12/behind-the-headlines-lessons-from-the-red-sea-crisis/" target="_blank">Recent maritime events</a> underscore the importance of continuous global naval operations. They have also reignited debates about how best to employ forces without <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/12/in-2024-will-the-navy-again-reasses-increasing-demands-on-the-surface-force/" target="_blank">overcommitting or burning them out</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With demand <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/12/world/middleeast/houthis-yemen-us-strikes-retaliation.html" target="_blank">unlikely to ebb</a>, increasing the <a href="https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-00%20General%20Operations%20and%20Readiness%20Support/3000.12B.pdf" target="_blank">operational availability</a> of our current supply of forces — especially those ships <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-navy/2024/01/10/navy-tests-how-to-relieve-carrier-strike-group-warships-on-station/" target="_blank">already deployed</a> — becomes paramount. Vast ocean distances that take weeks to traverse make the ability to regenerate forces quickly a critical enabler for mission success.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such a task is difficult in peacetime because a shrunken defense-industrial base has left few domestic shipyards capable of performing maintenance. The <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106673.pdf" target="_blank">Government Accountability Office</a> asserts this has induced backlogs and cost overruns as well as contributed to some ship decommissioning recommendations that combine to strain capacity. Cumulative “maintenance delay days” <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/01/09/seeking-75-ready-ships-navy-turns-to-new-readiness-orgs/" target="_blank">dropped in fiscal 2023</a>, but the job gets <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-246.pdf" target="_blank">harder in wartime</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">While the <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D211-PURL-gpo146467/pdf/GOVPUB-D211-PURL-gpo146467.pdf" target="_blank">Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan</a> is a start, improvements are estimated to cost $21 billion and take 20 years to implement. This has led some <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/01/04/navy-houthis-ships-shipyards-sailors/?wpisrc=nl-theeditorial+board" target="_blank">prominent voices</a> to support “shifting funds from shipbuilding to modernizing U.S. shipyards” to keep “the existing fleet as lethal as it can be.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Meanwhile, reconstituting the Navy’s once robust, in-theater expeditionary ship repair capabilities can help overcome domestic constraints and answer the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf" target="_blank">National Security Strategy’s charge</a> to build “a combat-credible military.” Some such efforts are underway, but further strategic and policy choices can deliver the operational benefits sooner.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, reexamine current and future platform requirements to incorporate organic ship repair capabilities wherever feasible. For example, repurposing in-service expeditionary sea base ships could transform them into floating repair facilities. These vessels, like those in the Maritime Administration’s <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/09/21/heres-every-ship-activated-for-transcoms-massive-sealift-surge-and-what-it-does/" target="_blank">Ready Reserve Force</a>, contain expansive spaces suitable for large workshops, machinery overhaul, additive manufacturing technology, parts storerooms and command posts. Their mobility also reduces risks associated with <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47589" target="_blank">permanent infrastructure</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Looking to the horizon, resourcing experts should explore whether the <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/10/us-navy-issues-updated-solicitation-on-asx-submarine-tenders/" target="_blank">submarine tender replacement</a> could also perform intermediate-level surface ship maintenance. Though hard to envision a return to 1945 when the fleet included nearly <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/get-involved/essay-contest/2017-winners/rising--2nd-prize.html">200 repair-type ships</a>, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2023/12/14/congress-passed-the-fy24-defense-policy-bill-heres-whats-inside/" target="_blank">FY24 initial procurement funding</a> still affords planners time to evaluate the next-generation tender’s utility and quantity before its estimated delivery toward the end of the decade.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, reconsider engineering development and systems fielding strategies to emphasize reliability and flexibility. The GAO <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-246.pdf" target="_blank">observed</a>: “Modern warships have intricate electrical, radar, and computer systems that did not exist on World War II-era warships, making damage assessment and repair of modern ships significantly more complex.” Therefore, a back-to-the-future approach to de-digitize and re-analog certain components could enhance redundancy, streamline assessments and support faster work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Such simplification could also spur unpalatable, but important discussions among engineers and operators to return functional, but imperfect mission-capable combatants to service — just as the Navy did with the <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/ships/aircraft-carriers/uss-yorktown.html">aircraft carrier Yorktown in 1942</a> so it could fight at Midway.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Additionally, Navy warfare centers and program offices should use modeling, simulation, <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/january/what-got-us-here-wont-get-us-there">threat-centric planning</a> and artificial intelligence to predict <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/06/08/is-the-navy-ready-to-repair-battle-damaged-ships-in-wartime/" target="_blank">ship vulnerabilities</a>. By understanding how and to what extent adversarial armaments could inflict damage, engineers and logisticians could pre-stage the forecast tools, parts, materials and personnel to undertake mission-critical repairs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, reorganize the maintenance community to form deployable <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/revive-expeditionary-battle-damage-repair-squadrons" target="_blank">repair detachments</a>. In this construct, a program manager-experienced officer could lead a team of uniformed and civilian specialists and stage aboard forward-operating auxiliaries to conduct on-scene repair assessments, oversee towing or salvage, and orchestrate preventive and corrective work.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In 2022, the Navy’s largest intermediate-level regional maintenance center in San Diego, California,<a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3122325/southwest-regional-maintenance-center-welcomes-littoral-combat-ship-maintenance/" target="_blank"> established</a> an expeditionary maintenance department to support scheduled littoral combat ship voyage repairs. This model could be mirrored in other regions and expanded to incorporate in-theater crisis response.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, appeal to Congress to amend <a href="https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section8680&#038;num=0&#038;edition=prelim" target="_blank">public law</a>, which currently prohibits U.S.-homeported ships from undergoing maintenance in foreign shipyards except for mid-deployment voyage repairs or to correct battle damage. While the U.S. Navy operates public ship repair facilities in Japan and contracts with private yards in Bahrain and <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/03/push-to-base-six-us-navy-destroyers-in-spain-could-be-gaining-steam/" target="_blank">Spain</a> to fix forward-deployed vessels stationed there, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3240877/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-columbia-university/" target="_blank">acknowledged</a>: “The intense repair-and-revive demands of a high-end conflict in Asia will require significant shipyard capacity in the Pacific.” This is why his <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3538420/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-harvard-kennedy-school/" target="_blank">maritime statecraft</a> approach includes increasing throughput by using <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2023/12/04/del-toro-aims-to-reinvigorate-us-shipping-to-strengthen-fleet/" target="_blank">previously untapped shipyards</a> — public, private, at home and abroad — to expand in-theater maintenance options with <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/use-allies-shipyard-modernization?check_logged_in=1" target="_blank">likeminded and capable</a> partners. This is particularly important in ports with <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/news/446582/uss-hershel-woody-williams-hosts-msceuraf-during-malta-maintenance-period">dry-docks</a>, which are vital to repairing external hull, propulsion, steering, and underwater damage.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/7848678.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-118742"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">The U.S. Navy expeditionary sea base Hershel “Woody” Williams sits in dry dock at the Palumbo Malta Shipyard on May 24, 2023. (Christina Johnson/U.S. Navy)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Moreover, thanks to foreign military sales, many Indo-Pacific navies operate American engineering equipment, combat systems and weaponry — <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-navy/2023/12/30/new-in-2024-even-more-us-australia-submarine-collaboration/" target="_blank">commonality</a> that creates economies of scale in the transfer of parts, personnel and expertise. These reasons explain why U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-able-maintain-america-naval-vessels-repair-shipyards-pacific-e2bfd39b" target="_blank">championed a collective approach</a>, noting: “American warships shouldn’t be sailing home for repairs when a trusted ally can do the job.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It would be sensible to test these options in peacetime before the U.S. urgently needs them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lastly, ask Congress to authorize the creation of a new four-star Navy Materiel Command — akin to the Army and Air Force Materiel commands. Many complex shipboard programs — for example, IT infrastructure or aviation facilities — have multiple two- and three-star <a href="https://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Pages/ASNRDAOrgChart.aspx" target="_blank">program</a>, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Military-Units/navy/#938.9323120117188" target="_blank">systems, type and installation</a> command stakeholders with overlapping or ambiguous jurisdiction. Though seemingly counterintuitive, an added layer of authorities would better integrate repair efforts by synchronizing approaches, assigning accountability and streamlining decision-making.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As Secretary Del Toro <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2023/03/09/in-aukus-navy-eyes-a-full-service-submarine-garage-in-asia-pacific/" target="_blank">affirmed</a>, the ability “to do forward-based repair and maintenance is critical” to the Navy’s mission. In a protracted conflict far from home, every contributor will count. But while preserving a domestic ship repair industry is a <a href="https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/technology-evaluation/56-national-security-assessment-of-the-u-s-shipbuilding-and-repair-industry-2001/file" target="_blank">national security interest</a>, limited shipyard options <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/why-u-s-naval-power-needs-asian-allies/" target="_blank">justify</a> a new approach.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Revitalizing in-theater expeditionary ship repair capabilities can harness the agility, mobility and scalability that are hallmark advantages of naval power so that if called upon, our ships can sail to the battle line — and stay there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the third commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>, and the second </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>
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		<title>Reloading vertical missile tubes at sea is within a crane arm’s reach</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 18:11:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Naval]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[Here are five ways to help sustain naval power in strategically important waters.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the second commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is available </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Recent events in the Middle East raise questions about how best to sustain finite naval power in strategically important waters. The U.S. Navy destroyer Carney <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/10/19/u-s-destroyer-used-sm-2s-to-down-3-land-attack-missiles-launched-from-yemen-says-pentagon" target="_blank">fired missiles</a> <a href="https://news.yahoo.com/making-sacrifice-uss-carney-departs-165248717.html?guccounter=1&#038;guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&#038;guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAN4y0u32hrqwdhHLXss9q5y-pWzzpUI9vsk82zq0McWaVmCxY_0tFxzIEiC7s7mm3IXFYASRLyhd01LVDJdAV1jy0GPYegpmAUy3dZZ-lqMcACmklYYh904U0kQZrosikwlfkejKLYWhL10QXRK9FxAd_Np8larYERiR8xgIj6Wk" target="_blank">mere weeks</a> into its deployment; the destroyer Thomas Hudner <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2023/11/23/uss-thomas-hudner-shoots-down-one-way-attack-drones-in-the-red-sea/" target="_blank">downed drones</a> twice in eight days; and the destroyer Mason <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3598708/us-partner-nation-task-force-respond-to-commercial-vessel-distress-call/" target="_blank">foiled a piracy attempt</a> after which two ballistic missiles were fired toward it. And all this in a maritime theater that does not host America’s “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3567545/dod-officials-participate-in-a-conversation-at-the-atlantic-councils-global-chi/">top pacing challenge</a>.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><a href="https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169871/destroyers-ddg-51/" target="_blank">Like these ships, guided-missile destroyers, or DDG,</a> form the backbone of the U.S. surface force, which operates 73 of them and has <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/08/15/u-s-flight-iii-destroyer-multiyear-deal-grows-to-10-ships-3-hulls-awarded-in-fy-2023" target="_blank">plans</a> to field at least 90. While they carry a large arsenal of vertically launched offensive and defensive weapons — as will the forthcoming Constellation-class frigates — onloading missiles takes time and precision. Once their magazines empty, ships must retreat to a safe port to refill while other units replace them — or not.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I have argued that the U.S. should pursue a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank">collaborative shipbuilding approach</a> with allies to increase the supply of forces and reduce pressure on the current fleet. But such a campaign would take years.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Meanwhile, this is precisely why Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro — a former DDG commanding officer — has <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3240877/secnav-delivers-remarks-at-columbia-university/" target="_blank">issued calls</a> to <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/02/at-sea-rearming-deemed-a-main-priority-by-secnav/" target="_blank">prioritize concepts</a> like reloading warships’ Vertical Launching System cells at sea to “increase forward, persistent combat power with the current force.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“If we are able to rearm our warships’ vertical launch tubes at sea,” Secretary Del Toro <a href="https://www.navy.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&#038;ModuleId=698&#038;Article=3265955" target="_blank">argues</a>, “we can stay ‘in the fight’ far longer. We won’t have to withdraw from combat for extended periods to rearm.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Unlike underway replenishments — when ships resupply while traveling tethered — onloading missiles requires immovability. Consequently, aside from strategic, geographic, environmental and logistical factors, stillness becomes a critical prerequisite.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">When loading ammunition pierside, the ship is tied to a fixed structure that keeps its direction steady and prevents movement from the lapping waves. The crane sits on land.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">However, at sea, ships are vulnerable to the effects of wind, waves and current, which induce rolls and change the ship’s direction, or heading. While commercial technology called <a href="https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/OCSNCOE/References/Custom-Ref-Books/Intro-to-DP-Systems-Dec2019.pdf?ver=d1Z9tUwX9p__Mi05A_NkwA%3d%3d" target="_blank">dynamic positioning</a>, or DP, allows the crane ship to hover nearly motionless, DDGs lack such capability and are subjected to the powerful hydrodynamic effects of the crane ship’s thrusters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nevertheless, recent Vertical Launching System, or VLS, rearming experiments — <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/03/28/us-navy-prioritizes-game-changing-rearming-capability-for-ships/" target="_blank">including one aboard</a> the DDG I commanded — demonstrate its promise. Additional doctrinal advances and equipment investments could help realize at-sea rearming’s operational potential even sooner.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, refine engineering solutions to steady ships when transferring ordnance at sea. One option is to revive so-called <a href="https://www.rya.org.uk/blog/med-mooring-stern-to" target="_blank">Med Mooring</a> techniques used in ports with tight slips (but less commonly employed by today’s U.S. Navy ships) where both the bow and stern are fixed to an anchor or buoy. This stabilizes the receiving ship’s heading by preventing it from swinging. Another includes <a href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lightering.html" target="_blank">lightering</a>, in which the delivery and receiving ships compensate for motion by tying together without engines running, allowing both vessels to move or drift in harmony. Still another is to revisit sea-basing concepts where the DDG first moors to a larger ship — like a tender, expeditionary sea base or auxiliary (the basis for <a href="https://news.usni.org/2022/10/18/navy-tests-reloading-missiles-on-destroyer-in-san-diego-bay-open-ocean-tests-tougher-task" target="_blank">previous trials</a>) — to mitigate the sea churn caused by the DP thrusters. Standard operating procedures and go/no-go criteria would guide commanding officers and ensure safety of personnel and equipment.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, identify deep-water harbors, protected anchorages and <a href="https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2023/september/13546-us-navy-s-destroyer-uss-rafael-peralta-completes-missile-reload-in-australia.html">foreign ports</a> in which to reload safely, and invest in low-cost mobile facility enablers — <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/publication-508-pdf/contested_logistics_508_050423.pdf">like those used</a> in the 1940s — as an alternative to permanent infrastructure. These include floating pier-like <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/2002173539/" target="_blank">pontoon platforms</a> to secure ships during ordnance transfers, and <a href="https://pdf.nauticexpo.com/pdf/maritime-international/naval-products-division/32737-78201-_10.html" target="_blank">fenders and separators</a> for ship classes like DDGs whose bow flare and protruding sensors complicate side-by-side mooring.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/190710-N-TP834-1081C.jpg.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-118693"/><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Sailors maneuver a docking module for the Improved Navy Lighterage System over the side of the maritime pre-positioning force ship USNS 2nd Lt. John P. Bobo during lift-on, lift-off operations in Apra Harbor, Guam, on July 10, 2019. (Petty Officer 1st Class John Philip Wagner Jr./U.S. Navy)</figcaption></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3513936/managing-logistics-in-contested-areas-is-key-to-military-success/" target="_blank">procure and pre-position</a> commercially produced <a href="https://www.dco.uscg.mil/OCSNCOE/Support-Vessels/Types-of-OSVs/" target="_blank">offshore support vessels</a>. These ships — with geo-stabilized cranes and DP propulsors designed for oil platform resupply, wind turbine maintenance and more — are built by numerous Gulf Coast-based American firms and can be adapted for military rearming. Navy program experts explored this idea in 2020, and Navajo-class towing, salvage and rescue ships currently in production integrate some of <a href="https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2020/SNA2020-USNS_Navajo-ChrisPaulus.pdf?ver=2020-01-15-154401-857" target="_blank">these technologies</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fourth, incorporate at-sea rearming hull, mechanical and electrical requirements into future platforms like DDG(X), and explore retrofitting them onto newer DDG-51s and frigates whose service lives extend for decades. Absent traditional ballast systems, adding DP thrusters or drop-down <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/12320/perry-class-frigates-had-these-crazy-pop-out-auxiliary-propulsion-pods" target="_blank">auxiliary power units</a> could help DDGs minimize movements during these precise evolutions. A back-to-the-future return of foldable <a href="https://dsiac.org/articles/a-promising-future-for-us-navy-vertical-launching-systems/">VLS “strike-down” cranes</a> capable of handling modern missile cannisters during replenishments may make operational sense, too.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Fifth, ask allies for help. <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167856/mk-41-vls/" target="_blank">At least 11 allied nations</a> employ a variant of the American-made MK 41 VLS. Many are home to thriving manufacturing industries capable of tackling these challenges. Collaborating on this capability would fit neatly into the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/26/2003328880/-1/-1/1/ADVANCING%20DON%20PRIORITIES_FINAL.PDF/ADVANCING%20DON%20PRIORITIES_FINAL.PDF" target="_blank">Department of the Navy’s enduring priorities</a> to strengthen maritime dominance and enhance strategic partnerships. Moreover, it would build collective operational resilience among likeminded navies and demonstrate that at their core, alliances are mutually beneficial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The 2022 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf" target="_blank">National Security Strategy</a> declares: “A combat-credible military is the foundation of deterrence and America’s ability to prevail in conflict.” Reloading ships at sea will — excuse the pun — deliver.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the second commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The first part is available </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>
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		<title>Japan, South Korea and the US should mirror AUKUS for destroyers</title>
		<link>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/</link>
					<comments>https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/10/05/japan-south-korea-and-the-us-should-mirror-aukus-for-destroyers/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cmdr. Douglas Robb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2023 17:03:20 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[But before breaking a celebratory bottle of champagne across the bow, obstacles must be addressed.]]></description>
		
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the first commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The second part is available </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Last month in Washington, leaders from Japan, South Korea and the United States <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/" target="_blank">gathered</a> to “inaugurate a new era of trilateral partnership.” Such alignment, they declared, would be necessary to generate “the common capacity required to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is thriving, connected, resilient, stable, and secure.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">As an instrument of national power, naval military capacity is important because it deters potential aggressors and is a <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/bigger-fleets-win" target="_blank">prescient indicator of victory</a> in a war at sea. However, U.S. defense-industrial base constraints complicate unilateral capacity-building efforts. Despite unprecedented bipartisan budgetary support for shipbuilding, domestic producers have <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/04/us-navy-oceanic-trade-impact-russia-china/673090/" target="_blank">struggled to keep pace</a> with Navy requirements.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Overcoming these challenges requires an ambitious approach. One alternative is to reduce or eliminate ships’ upkeep periods to extend operational windows, though doing so compounds future maintenance bills. A better one is to capitalize on our collective strengths and leverage our allies’ production resources while continuing to build at home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Consequently, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. should mirror <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2023/09/05/aukus-standoff-australia-uk-wait-on-congress-to-approve-pact/" target="_blank">the AUKUS framework</a> between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to create a multinational guided-missile destroyer construction program.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Japan and South Korea — the latter also known as the Republic of Korea, or ROK — have thriving shipbuilding industries that manufacture commercial vessels but also guided-missile destroyers, known by their naval designator DDG — and for <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/02/asia/japan-south-korea-naval-shipbuilding-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html" target="_blank">less money</a> than the American variant I commanded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Enter AUKUS’ paradigm-shifting approach, in which the three nations will contribute to a new class of attack submarines — termed SSN-AUKUS — that is rooted in a U.K. design, incorporates technologies from the three partner nations, and will be built by both Australia and the U.K. Ultimately this will increase combined capacity by embracing commonality and leveraging all three nations’ industrial bases.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For “DDG-JROKUS” to work, all three nations would have to agree to a standardized ship design. In theory, this should not be contentious because modern Japanese and South Korean destroyers already share American phased array radars, combat systems, vertically launched missiles and even silhouettes.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are several ways in which a combined DDG-JROKUS shipbuilding program could be implemented:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Each country could independently and simultaneously manufacture an entire ship.</li><li>Countries could specialize in different phases of construction.</li><li>Companies could band together in a teaming approach to assemble a single hull.</li></ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Regardless, collaborative production offers myriad benefits while demonstrating that improving capability and capacity need not be mutually exclusive.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">First, DDG-JROKUS would overcome <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665/385" target="_blank">domestic industrial base constraints</a> to grow the size of the fleet — especially important considering the oldest American destroyers will begin to decommission in the early 2030s. Such a dire need exists to grow the U.S. surface force that the question should not be whether we build here or there, but how to build here and there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Second, DDG-JROKUS would enhance tactical flexibility. While deployed, I sailed alongside ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the South Korean Navy, and I can attest to their competence and professionalism. But there is no denying that operating a common platform would better position us to train and fight together at sea. This also creates efficiencies in repairing, replenishing and <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2023/03/28/us-navy-prioritizes-game-changing-rearming-capability-for-ships/" target="_blank">rearming ships</a>, which will improve fleet endurance far from home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Third, a combined military construction project would <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/2023/08/18/biden-brokers-new-defense-commitments-between-japan-south-korea/" target="_blank">strengthen diplomatic ties among the three nations at a critical moment in history</a>, creating the social and political cohesion required to prevail in a protracted conflict.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Lastly, DDG-JROKUS would send a clear geopolitical signal that regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region are aligned in their commitment to maintaining a free and open maritime order. Like AUKUS, the strategic messaging benefits from DDG-JROKUS may be as powerful as the platforms’ firepower.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">But before breaking a celebratory bottle of champagne across the bow, obstacles must be addressed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One barrier are societal attitudes against acquiring U.S. warships from overseas because of America’s proud manufacturing history. While patriotic, other countries have outsourced warship construction and design, just as the U.S. did for the forthcoming Constellation-class frigate.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A second argument is that <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/105519" target="_blank">legal provisions</a> governing export controls, supply restrictions and information sharing would sink such a plan at the pier. But we allow foreign military sales of sensitive technology when the risk justifies the collective reward, just as we did to outfit Japan’s and South Korea’s current destroyers. And we have collaborated with friendly military consortiums before to build common platforms like Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and NATO SeaSparrow missiles.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Importantly, AUKUS is addressing these issues, and the diplomatic, legislative and programmatic solutions can be applied to DDG-JROKUS as well. Unlike AUKUS, a conventional warship program does not involve notoriously secretive nuclear reactor technology, which could accelerate a combined venture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complex nature of maritime warfare necessitates tactical and technical partnering with our most capable allies to multiply our combat advantage. Allied warship production can weld American alliances and ensure the Indo-Pacific region remains prosperous for all — now and in the future.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy nor the U.S. government.</i></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><i>This is the first commentary in a multipart series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. The second part is available </i><a href="https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2023/12/04/reloading-vertical-missile-tubes-at-sea-is-within-a-crane-arms-reach/" target="_blank"><i>here</i></a><i>.</i></p>
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