The commentary piece by Clark Murdock and Thomas Karako (Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence Requires new Capabilities 7/13) is accurate but way overdue. Their article recalled one we wrote for the project on nuclear Issues in April 2007 (CSIS Nuclear Notes, Winter 2007). This included the following paragraphs.
"We currently have no clear understanding of how to wield an effective threat to reduce the hostility of radical Islam, whether of national or terrorist origin. Warnings we have made to Iran that further steps along the path to acquisition of nuclear capabilities have been ignored. Because we have no plan to enforce such threats, we lose face merely by making them.
"If our nuclear warheads are no longer effective in a deterrent mode and are not likely to be used in a pre-emptive mode, their only use would be in retaliation for an attack on us. A dismal hypothesis, but illustrative of the need to reconsider all our policy options before decisions are made on whether we need to invest in new nuclear warheads, and what specific capabilities the new ones should possess."
The concerns expressed in those paragraphs built upon a warning we gave in a 2003 Defense News commentary (Living with Proliferation) in which we noted, "Despite international agreements designed to prevent proliferation, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and their means of delivery by ballistic and cruise missiles remains a growth industry."
In conclusion we noted that while missile defense might not be a final answer to this proliferation, it could provide an interim response giving us time to devise other means of ensuring stability in this increasingly unstable world.
Sadly successive administrations have not heeded these warnings. Rather than devoting efforts to remain secure in a proliferated world, diplomatic efforts have been made to eliminate nuclear weapons. A noble concept, but one doomed to failure while nations that are hostile to our democratic way of life envisage the possession of nuclear warheads as a safeguard against undue pressure from the Western alliance.
North Korea has demonstrated the ability to defy international conventions by the possession of a nuclear capability, and the reported agreement between Iran and the P5+1 nations will provide further evidence of the truth of this belief, as Iran — overtly or covertly — continues the quest for nuclear warheads.
Three decades have elapsed since President Reagan initiated the missile defense program, a concept that was devised to enhance deterrence by providing the ability to intercept missiles. The development program has resulted in significant advances in the capabilities required for successful interception of attacking missiles. These include the non-nuclear hit-to-kill capability, advanced radar for tracking and discriminating warheads from decoys and other missile components, and the complex software for command, control and information exchange.
The naval systems deployed on Aegis ships have a proven record and can provide theater defense against limited raids, but the national missile defense located in Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, California, still lacks a proven capability.
Thus as a nation we are less secure now than during the Cold War when reliance was placed on the heartily disliked mutual assured destruction (MAD), the very policy that led Reagan to initiate the missile defense program. During the MAD standoff, we faced one opponent, the Soviet Union. Now more nations possess nuclear capabilities and as others seek to join them the danger grows that capabilities may be passed to terrorist groups.
We can assume that such groups could not be deterred from using them by the threat of instant retaliation. Thus our missile defense capabilities will assume greater importance as time passes. But as was pointed out over a decade ago, this is likely to provide only an interim solution to the growing danger.
For decades the major powers have been able to achieve diplomatic agreements because they possessed the power to influence events, and could thereby get the agreements they sought. The proliferation of nuclear capabilities will do far more that merely modify worldwide security; it will significantly reduce the ability of America and others to persuade less advanced nations to modify their policy positions. Diplomacy will be far different when more nations possess weapons of mass destruction.
We need a thorough reassessment of our national security and diplomatic policies in the light of the changes that are occurring. The agreement recently announced between the P5+1 and Iran could become is likely to be immaterial if it fails to win adequate Senate support. likely to reject the deal Some of the details that have been released suggest that Iran will sooner or later become a nuclear weapon state, and others will be forced to follow their example merely for their own protection.
Our warnings may have been premature in 2003, they are certainly not premature in 2015. Too much time has been wasted in ignoring a growing problem. The US national security teams need to focus on these issues. In that sense the comment in the Murdock and Karako article that "New thinking from Washington is also required" is what we expected to see in a CSIS study. Sadly it is still lacking.
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