Keen Sword, the largest U.S.-Japan biennial joint drill, will feature two key systems of the Marine Corps’ littoral force: the anti-ship NMESIS (Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) and air-defense MADIS (Marine Air Defense Integrated System).

Yonaguni’s local government disclosed the deployment on Friday, a day after the Okinawa Defense Bureau relayed deployment plans on Oct. 1.

The systems will be deployed to Yonaguni for the first time, as this year’s iteration shifts to ground-based, multi-island, sea-denial operations aimed at distributing American and Japanese forces across the southwestern islands.

The deployment also reflects a broader shift by the United States and Japan toward mobile missile and air-defense systems that can operate from scattered islands.

NMESIS and MADIS form the cornerstone of the U.S. Marine Corps’ force design modernization and restructuring plan, which moves away from heavy armored platforms to focus on small-unit, expeditionary forces that can capture and defend islands.

NMESIS can strike targets at around 115 miles and could threaten ships operating in waters around Taiwan. The reported deployment, in turn, has drawn criticism from Chinese military experts even while China’s PLA Navy and coast guard vessels have increased activities around Taiwan.

The NMESIS and MADIS systems first arrived with the Okinawa-based 12th Marine Littoral Regiment 3rd Marine Division in June. The units were earlier deployed to the Philippines’ northern Batanes Islands and western Laoag province during the Balikatan drills.

The deployment comes as Japan tests what defense officials describe as standoff-strike capabilities, missile systems that can strike targets far from enemy weapons, while strengthening its southwestern islands for distributed military operations.

According to the Ministry of Defense, troops from nine countries, including the Australian and French armies, will join 45,000 Japanese Self-Defense Forces personnel for this year’s exercise, which will run from Oct. 19 to 29.

The exercise will also bring together a number of U.S. and Japanese ground-based missile systems.

The U.S. Army will deploy HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) weapons to Camp Ishigaki, some 80 miles from Yonaguni.

The Army’s Typhon missile launcher will also be moved to Okinawa mid-month, although no disclosures have been made about whether the mid-range system will be used for the exercise.

In past iterations of the drill, the USS George Washington joined the exercises, but the carrier strike group was sent to the Arabian Sea in August to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln, which was returning home after a prolonged deployment.

That prominent naval absence is expected to emphasize the exercise scenario shift toward a land-based network of mobile systems.

Last year, exercises in Yonaguni focused on maximizing the island as a forward operating base. This year, Keen Sword will showcase the Ground Self-Defense Force’s three anti-ship missile systems, which are the core of Japan’s long-range standoff-strike capabilities.

The JGSDF will train with the new ground-launched Type-25 surface-to-ship guided missile system, formerly known as the upgraded Type-12, which was fielded across the Nansei Islands in late March. The Type-25 SSM has a strike reach of 1,000 kilometers.

The lineup also includes the Type-88 ground-to-ship missile and the upgraded Type 03 Chu-SAM Kai medium-range ground-to-air guided missile.

Keen Sword was originally planned as a much larger exercise, local government officials said, but opposition forced the ministry to scale it down to its current iteration.

Yonaguni is Japan’s last inhabited island in the Nansei, a chain of scattered islands in southwestern Okinawa and a fast-emerging flashpoint amid rising tensions around Taiwan.

The JGSDF set up a radar and surveillance system on the island in 2016 to fill a “surveillance vacuum” in the seascapes stretching from the island to Taiwan, according to officials.

The island has seen increased joint exercises between Japanese and U.S. troops while it faces incursions from Chinese ships.

In June this year, the government reported incursions by Chinese Coast Guard ships encroaching on Japan’s exclusive economic zone between Yonaguni and Taiwan. In 2022, China’s ballistic missile landed just 80 kilometers from the island.

While tensions surround the island, local officials have raised concerns about the use of civilian roads, ports, and airways.

Large equipment for the exercise will be transported by sea through Kubura Port, and local authorities have asked residents to avoid using roads during the movement of military equipment.

There are also concerns after a Japan Self-Defense Forces V-22 Osprey was involved in a ground-strike incident in the same exercise in 2024. The incident prompted then-defense minister Gen Nakatani to order the grounding of Japan’s 17 Osprey aircraft.

This year, however, the V-22 Osprey will not participate, Yonaguni Mayor Tsuneo Uechi told Mainichi Shimbun on Oct. 2.

While the island understands the need for military training, Uechi said it is not ready for large-scale exercises that exceed the island’s capacity. The local government remains opposed to the exercises and continues to hold talks with the defense ministry.

The worry comes as Washington exerts pressure on South Korea to support U.S. operations in the Strait of Hormuz, where the war with Iran is choking worldwide oil supplies, even while North Korean threats escalate.

The South Korean Army reported that the North had fired two ballistic missiles on Sunday and earlier this month launched a 5,000-ton guided missile destroyer in the Pacific.

The security environment in East Asia raises a military allocation concern, especially since South Korean officials mentioned sending a “practical contribution” to U.S. efforts in the Middle East.

“If such [U.S.] requests become recurrent, Seoul could face trade-offs between extra-regional missions and deterrence around the Korean Peninsula,” Ju Hyung Kim, president of Security Management Institute, a Seoul-based defense think tank, told Defense News.

Last week, President Lee Jae Myeong had drawn the line and said there would be “no deployment to a war.”

The government may instead extend the activities of the Cheonghae Unit, a naval task force group stationed in the Sea of Aden for counter-piracy operations.

The Cheonghae Unit is a small maritime task group that includes a KDX-II destroyer, a maritime helicopter, as well as Marines, naval special forces and support personnel.

The Cheonghae may be the “least burdensome option,” Kim said, and would allow the Lee government to skirt the domestic political costs of a troop deployment and provide a military contribution.

While the range of operations could extend from Somalia to the Middle East, an expert based in Seoul told Defense News on condition of anonymity that the unit’s role will be limited to protecting South Korean ships and conducting humanitarian assistance activities.

“I don’t see the possibility of upgrade or recalibration … given the current security situation in the region,” the expert said.

Either way, the Cheonghae detachment would be navigating rough waters. Esmaeil Baqaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, warned on Sept. 7 that any foreign military involvement in the strait could face serious consequences.

Iranian academic Mohammad Marandi said that Tehran could regard South Korea as an enemy and target Korean economic and military assets across the Persian Gulf if Seoul joined a U.S.-led effort to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

The warnings had escalated anxieties in Seoul, where the deployment question remains a point of contention.

If South Korean personnel or assets are targeted, Lee would be pressured to either “escalate by deploying combat forces or to scale back to contain domestic backlash and protect his political standing,” Kim said.

“Seoul would need to define the mission, geographical scope, rules of engagement and command arrangements very carefully, while also managing external expectations about what a ‘practical contribution’ actually entails,” Kim said.

The government had begun to assess contribution requirements, which experts said are evident in an earlier recon mission to the United Arab Emirates to examine the Al Dhafra Air Base and Jebel Ali Port.

Findings from the trip have not been made public. But a successive mission to Bahrain, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the multinational Combined Maritime Forces, “could involve examining basing, logistics, intelligence-sharing, maritime-domain awareness and coordination with multinational forces,” Kim said.

The Cheonghae Unit may be enough to appease Washington for now, especially after Seoul committed a $20 billion investment in an energy project in Texas, Kim said.

But the larger challenge is the precedent it might create: President Donald Trump might expect additional contributions as the conflict in the Middle East continues.

And Kim said force allocation will become a graver concern if alliance commitments take South Korean assets far from the peninsula for a prolonged period of time.

“A P-8A deployed to the Gulf, for example, cannot simultaneously perform maritime-surveillance or anti- submarine missions around the Korean Peninsula,” he said.

“So the key question is not simply whether the Cheonghae Unit is sufficient now, but whether it becomes the beginning of recurring U.S. expectations for South Korean deployments beyond Northeast Asia,” Kim said.

The Ministry of National Defense said Monday that the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue will cover wartime operational control transition, the countries’ joint defense posture and shipbuilding cooperation.

Experts believe the dialogue will also cover the deployment of a South Korean contingency to the Middle East, the prospect of which which has triggered demonstrations in Seoul.

The talks come as tensions between Seoul and Washington escalate over security and trade amid a heated domestic debate in South Korea over troops serving outside the peninsula.

According to local media reports, the government is considering deploying a P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, a naval logistics support vessel and about 150 personnel.

The government has reiterated that no decision has been made, and any troop deployment would require final approval from the National Assembly, South Korea’s parliament.

Last week, the Foreign Ministry sent an inspection team to the United Arab Emirates to assess the situation. Findings are expected to be released Thursday.

Some form of military dispatch is highly likely at this point, according to Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute, a Seoul-based defense policy think tank affiliated with the National Assembly.

While support assets would not change the military balance with Iran, Kim said the move shows that “the United States is capable of mobilizing allied support beyond its traditional partners in Europe and the Middle East.”

South Korea, on one hand, had little wiggle room to deny a military contingent even as Washington’s growing demands leave officials increasingly frustrated.

Washington has pressed Seoul to spend more on defense, pay more for U.S. troops on the peninsula, and, last month, downscaled a joint training exercise without advance notice.

“Seoul is in a difficult position because it has limited room to reject a U.S. request outright at a time when several sensitive alliance issues are already under discussion,” Kim told Defense News.

A deployment to the Middle East could help alleviate some U.S. concerns, Kim said, and it might also ease Washington’s wariness over the timing of wartime operational transfer (Opcon), which the Lee Jae Myung government hopes to accomplish as early as 2027.

Seoul could use the Iran deployment to show that pushing ahead with the Opcon transition does not make South Korea less committed to the alliance, Kim said. On one hand, while it could portray Seoul as a more active U.S. ally, it could also reduce Seoul’s pragmatic relations in the Middle East.

Military officials have been discussing a deployment that could parallel the Zaytun Division contingent, which was sent out to carry out humanitarian, peacekeeping and medical missions in 2003 to support U.S. military campaigns during the Iraq War.

In the end, the military dispatch may be limited to maritime surveillance, logistics, escort, intelligence or other support missions rather than troop deployment, but the actual size, role, and location will be difficult to determine, Kim said.

U.S. and South Korean officials are also expected to discuss concerns relating to the Opcon transition. Washington has opted for a “conditions-based” system for the transfer and asked South Korea to meet significant command, air defense and strike capabilities first.

American military officials have estimated the transition to begin in 2029, later than Lee’s 2027-2030 timeline target.

“Washington has reasons to be cautious about moving too quickly, particularly as North Korea continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, incorporates lessons from the war in Ukraine … and as concerns over a potential Taiwan contingency continue to grow,” Kim said.

The South has flagged the North as a primary security focus and has held back commitments relating to Taiwan.

In recent years, the North has deepened military ties with Russia, deploying troops and supplying weapons to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine while receiving substantial economic and trade support from China.

“North Korean capabilities are advancing rapidly — their nuclear capabilities, their missile capabilities,” Victor Cha, Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Defense News at the sidelines of the Manila Strategy Forum last week.

This year alone, Pyongyang has launched eight ballistic missiles and added new warships, cruise missiles and drones. Experts worry that North Korea’s Ukraine experience might make them capable of applying sophisticated drone tactics on the peninsula.

Cha said it is difficult to predict how the U.S.-South Korea relationship will evolve after recent frictions, but he said it might lead to an unexpected result: America’s pressures against Seoul might compel Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table.

North Korea has declined to revive peace talks with Seoul and downplayed Washington’s calls for a meeting.

The United States has “very few tools to disrupt” North Korea and Russia’s relationship, Cha said, but an interaction between President Trump and Kim Jong Un could be a good way “to distract the North Koreans from what they’re doing with the Russians.”

“President Trump has made very clear his desire to resume summit diplomacy. So I think that there is a pretty good chance that these two leaders will meet at some point,” Cha said.

The Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency selected Terra B1, a rocket-launched interceptor drone, after a demonstration with the Maritime Self-Defense Forces last month.

Terra B1 is developed by domestic industrial giant Terra Drone and serves as the Japan-made counterpart to Terra A1, which had been fielded on Ukraine’s battlefields earlier this year.

ATLA neither disclosed the number of units on order nor the contract price.

In late May, the defense ministry released a tender to rapidly acquire and deploy drones that can intercept one-way attack drones such as the Shahed and anti-radar loitering munitions such as the IAI Harpy.

The latest decision is the fastest to date, industry insiders say, as the tender took only three months compared to previous bids which took one to two years.

The decision also reflects the government’s growing efforts to increase 3D printing capabilities to support defense needs.

Using 3D printers will “simplify and shorten” the design and prototyping stage, CEO Toru Tokushige told Defense News. It will also allow Terra B1 to move into mass production as quickly as possible and meet contract requirements.

Aside from lowering costs and accelerating production, 3D printing will allow the company ample time to modify the interceptors to adapt to evolving threats and the fast-changing drone tech landscape without delaying the deployment schedule.

Terra Drone also plans to spread out production across multiple locations, and later expand to local printing farms, as a precautionary measure to ensure manufacturing can continue even if one facility comes under attack.

“Even if one production site were attacked by a system such as a Shahed-type drone, this distributed model could significantly reduce the risk of the entire supply chain being disrupted,” Tokushige said.

3D printing has been changing military and defense logistics since the U.S. Army and Navy deployed printers in the field in 2012. In Ukraine, printing farms have become a frontline

necessity: They produce drone parts and a range of tools to support brigades in the ongoing war.

The defense ministry’s decision to adopt the technology signals a massive shift in the defense industry, which experts warn may be unable to keep pace with the current administration’s export drive and increasing global demands.

“We believe 3D printing is not simply about reducing manufacturing costs. It has the potential to transform Japan’s defense manufacturing into a faster, more flexible and more resilient production model,” Tokushige said.

Department of War Undersecretary for Policy Elbridge Colby made the remarks in Manila on Monday amid growing concerns that China has been narrowing the gap — or eclipsing — U.S. military capabilities, as its demands in the Middle East have potentially drained stockpiles.

“There’s been a lot of news about the United States military being stretched. Please don’t be misinformed,” Colby told Manila’s defense and security elites at a closed-door event organized by the Stratbase Institute think tank.

“The United States military, and especially including those [maritime and aerospace] capabilities, are ready and capable of filling the priority missions that the president has given to them,” Colby said.

Colby, one of the Pentagon’s leading strategists, has pushed to prioritize the Indo-Pacific and East Asia over the Middle East and Europe. The Manila stop is the first in a week-long Southeast Asian tour that includes visits to Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia.

His visit also comes amid an increasingly tense period between Manila and Beijing following a confrontation in Second Thomas Shoal on July 20, when Chinese personnel hit and wounded a Philippine Navy sailor in the head.

The incident triggered another tit-for-tat between Manila and Beijing over the contents of a highly classified “provisional agreement” reportedly signed in 2024 that allows Philippine vessels to safely deliver supplies to troops stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre floating outpost.

After last month’s incident, officials noted that China has appeared more assertive, indicating a shift in how China perceives the implications of the mutual defense treaty.

Tensions have also intensified as China has routinely deployed carrier strike groups in the West Philippine Sea, and last month, fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile toward the Pacific.

While military deterrence forms one component of the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, Washington is employing a “strategy of strong, clear, but quiet” action designed to address the challenge without altering the status quo, according to Colby.

“In terms of our relationship with China, I think we’ve been able to communicate…our approach directly to Chinese counterparts,” Colby said.

“We combine a clear diplomatic line, a policy of respect towards the People’s Republic [of China], clarity about…our being in favor of the status quo, along with…strength in terms of being willing to defend our interests and those of our allies like the Philippines,” he added.

Apart from strengthening the U.S.’ forward posture and fielding combat-credible forces, Colby noted that measures are being set up, albeit quietly, to allow for the U.S. to come to the Philippines’ aid.

Colby described the U.S. approach to the region as “defensive” and “aligns with the interests of regional states.”

“We’re not trying to dominate this whole region. It’s a strategy of denial, designed to deny any state the ability to become the regional hegemon,” Colby said.

The visit comes a week after the Pacific Command and the Philippine armed forces signed an eight-point partnership plan for 2027, which includes an undisclosed series of joint military exercises, and before President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.S. in September.

“If you are trying to project power, whoever you are, into the aerospace and maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific, you are going to come up against the very best military in the world at its apex predator status,” Colby concluded.

Defense Logistics Agency head Yusuf Jauhan told reporters in late June that plans to domestically produce the jets will not materialize, confirming speculations that Jakarta had cancelled agreements to domestically manufacture the Korean jets under a 2015 co-production agreement.

The KF-21 Boramae, developed by Korea Aerospace Industries, is a twin-engine fighter designed to succeed South Korea’s aging F-4 and F-5 fleets. Indonesia intended to use these jets to replace older warplanes.

Jakarta had initially agreed to cover 20% of the development cost, then priced at 1.6 trillion won ($1.3 billion), to be paid until 2026. The deal includes the transfer of one prototype and technology that would allow state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) to produce 48 units of KF-21 Block-I fighter jets in Bandung.

But the agreement had been bogged down by delayed payments and allegations of sensitive data theft, which were carried into numerous renegotiations on cost-sharing arrangements.

In 2024, Jakarta requested to extend the payment timeline until 2034, but Seoul declined because it would derail deployment plans. The countries eventually agreed to reduce Indonesia’s contribution to 600 million won, but the deal will significantly lessen tech transfer coverage.

There had been confusion on the status of the KF-21 co-production deal, which had been kept tightly under wraps.

Earlier in April, Indonesian authorities revealed that the KF-21’s domestic production would no longer push through and confirmed in June that the government had scrapped the program.

This comes after Jakarta finished settling the 600 million won commitment under the reduced agreement in exchange for a single-seat KF-21 prototype. Officials also said they are more interested in buying ready-made jets.

Jakarta’s decision “appears to be largely practical and financial,” Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute think tank, told Defense News.

“Indonesia may still want the aircraft, but not necessarily the burdens of local co-production. From Seoul’s perspective, this is probably easier to manage and potentially more attractive for the KF-21’s broader export campaign,” Kim said.

If Jakarta’s plans push through, Indonesia would also become a good first reference case for the KF-21 jets and will boost its market potential, Kim said.

Local officials said that procurement plans are still being explored. PTDI told Defense News that internal discussions are ongoing and no definitive plan has been established.

While purchasing the KF-21 remains on the table for Jakarta, official sources told Defense News the odds are in favor of existing contractors with more attractive tech transfer arrangements.

Officials are reportedly weighing the purchase of 24 additional French Dassault Rafale jets to supplement the 42 jets the government ordered under a contract signed in 2022.

Jakarta also signed in April an overseas loan scheme to buy 48 KAAN stealth jets from Turkish Aerospace Industries worth $10 billion, which will be delivered beginning in 2032.

Editor’s note: This story was updated to correct the name of the president of the Security Management Institute think tank.

The U.S. Embassy in the Philippines announced this week the transfer of the AUSVs worth 754 million pesos ($13 million) and produced by American firm Ocean Aero to the sea forces to enhance capabilities “to detect and respond to maritime challenges and illegal maritime activities.”

The transfer comes after the Armed Forces of the Philippines revealed that China discreetly deployed a 6×6 meter floating platform equipped with an antenna in late May at the southeastern portion of Scarborough Shoal, a fishing lagoon within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Philippine officials claim the platform was being used to illegally gather Philippine maritime data and could serve as a prelude for China’s island-building activities. Philippine officials lodged diplomatic protests, and China removed the structure last week.

Solar-powered Tritons are capable of autonomous navigation both on the surface and underwater and can support a diverse array of missions such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, maritime strike, and mine countermeasures.

The drones can be fitted with video cameras, thermal imaging and sonars, and may be deployed from shore, vessels, or aircraft. It can dive down to 100 meters and remain underwater for 10 days. It can also conduct surface patrols for up to 30 days.

In Ocean Aero’s headquarters in Gulfport, Mississippi, the AUSVs are mobilized to protect subsea cables from sabotage, and the company has pitched the AUSVs for U.S. Navy mine-clearing in the Strait of Hormuz.

Officials told Defense News the AUSVs were shown to the Navy during the recent iteration of Exercise Balikatan and are among a series of systems and platforms the U.S. had planned to transfer to the Philippines to boost military capabilities.

The Tritons will also boost existing efforts to monitor subsea cables and gas pipelines, officials said.

“The ability to monitor and respond to maritime challenges — illegal fishing, gray zone activities, and threats to freedom of navigation — requires persistent, long-endurance awareness that no single ship or aircraft can provide alone. The Triton fills that gap by expanding the capabilities of the Philippine Navy into critical waterways,” U.S. Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Bridgette Walker said in a statement.

The drones are included in the Philippines-U.S. Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, a multi-year agreement to ease the acquisition, transfer, and sharing of equipment like radars and unmanned systems to strengthen maritime surveillance.

Last December, the U.S. Senate earmarked $2.5 billion for Philippine military modernization to be disbursed from 2026 to 2030.

State procurement agency Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency has released notices for a demonstration schedule next month with the goal of fast-tracking acquisitions and expediting mass production and deployment.

The interceptor drone systems are expected to be installed by 2027 near radar sites, bases, vessels and other critical locations, the agency stated.

This follows an earlier notice released by the Ministry of Defense late last month for autonomous unmanned systems that could detect and counter swarms of “multiple long-range suicide UAVs … such as the Shahed-136.”

The envisioned craft should already be in use by other armed forces and have successfully shot down Shahed-like drones, according to the notice. In addition, they must be able to connect with existing radars and command-and-control systems, require two or fewer personnel for stand-off launch and flight management, and need minimal and simple maintenance.

The interceptor drones are recent additions to Japan’s massive UAV fleet plan. The ministry had been in talks with drone firm Terra Drone since the company fielded two types of interceptor drones in Ukraine through Kyiv-based startups.

In March, Terra Drone divulged investments in Amazing Drones to field Terra 1, a rocket-type interceptor, and two months later launched fixed-wing variant Terra 2 through Ukrainian defense tech firm WinnyLab.

The feedback is “very much positive,” company CEO Toru Tokushige told Defense News. He said there had been great interest in the interceptors, especially within the Japanese defense ministry.

Drone technology is quickly evolving in Ukraine, affirming the importance of interceptor drones as low-cost alternatives to interceptor missiles, Tokushige said.

Meanwhile, the conflict in the Middle East has shown the lethality of Shahed-like drones, which have been used more extensively than missiles.

The extended reach of the Shahed drones has also raised the stakes in East Asia. The aircraft flew as far as 1,100 miles from Tehran to Tel Aviv, and while battlefield circumstances and geography vary, the distance means such weapons launched in Northeast Asia could reach Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

“Originally my image of the defense industry is that it’s very much traditional, very much bureaucratic, very slow. But after visiting Ukraine, and also because of the war in the Middle East, everybody understands the value of drones and the value of investing in drones,” Tokushige said.

The Japanese government’s urgent call for proposals comes after reports that the U.S. military’s 38-day Iran campaign under Operation Epic Fury has strained missile stockpiles.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank warned of a “near-term risk” munitions shortage after the Iran campaign, which has already delayed U.S. supply contracts with European allies, raising worries that it could also push back Tomahawk deliveries for Japan.

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi both denied the Tomahawk conundrum, but Koizumi said the ministry plans to develop more domestic missile systems. This comes on top of a recent production agreement under Operation Supercharge, which will see the U.S. and Japan jointly manufacture interceptor missiles such as the SM-6 and SM-3.

Japan’s defensive umbrella, set to be completed in 2027 after five years, includes fielding standoff capabilities, missile defense networks, and unmanned systems such as drones, ground vehicles, and submarines.

Budget allocated for unmanned defense capabilities alone leaped this year to 277 billion yen ($1.72 billion) from 111 billion yen ($690 million) in 2025.

And the government’s move to increase defense spending up to 3.5% of GDP will likely see more investments in unmanned systems. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party on June 9 approved a proposal to produce some 80,000 drones annually by 2030, though allocations have not been finalized.

Col. Dennis Hernandez of the Philippine Marines told Defense News the cruise missile was launched at around 12:10 a.m local time on May 5 and landed at the impact area within Fort Magsaysay, the Army’s main battle camp, in Laur, Nueva Ecija, roughly an hour later.

“The missile was very precise. Let’s say if you want to hit a window from a far distance, it lands directly into that window,” Hernandez said. “This skimming missile traveled all the way from Tacloban to the target in Laur.”

Exercise officials meant for the Tomahawk missile to support ground troops in a night land maneuver exercise led by the 25th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay, part of the ongoing Balikatan annual joint drills between American and Filipino troops.

This year’s Balikatan drill involves roughly 17,000 troops from Japan, Australia, France, Canada and New Zealand.

The Typhon launcher’s presence in the Philippines, let alone a test-firing of one of its variable munitions, has irked Chinese officials because of its long-range capability, especially when loaded with Tomahawks.

Philippine officials said training on the Typhon missile system will help guide future acquisitions.

There was some back-and-forth earlier in the exercise about whether the Typhon launch would happen at all. Local defense officials initially announced it for May 4 or May 5, but U.S. military officials suggested it could be canceled because of unspecified “obstacles.”

In the end, the launch was timed ahead of a joint maritime strike in Ilocos Norte, according to exercise planners. That event will feature the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Type 88 anti-ship missile system and the U.S. Marine Corps’ NMESIS weapon, a mobile, shore-based missile launcher designed to sink ships.

An April 27 navigational warning issued by the Philippine Coast Guard in Eastern Visayas, where Tacloban City is located, urged locals to take precautionary measures from May 5 until May 7 due to activities in the waters off San Pedro Bay during the Balikatan exercises.

Later, another notice was issued to warn residents of a missile-related activity involving the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile system (TLAM).

“Using the Tomahawk was planned — but it depended on the scenario on the ground. There’s a control group that controls the scenario and the exercise and if it is needed, then it is fired,” Hernandez explained.

“It just so happened that the scenario last night required using the Tomahawk to support ground troops,” he added.

Gordon Arthur contributed to this report.

Editor’s note: This story was updated the correct the distance traveled by the Tomahawk missile and the exact launch time.

This development marks a key shift in the country’s defense strategy. Japan committed to acquiring 400 Tomahawks last year to equip its eight Aegis destroyers as part of a larger standoff capability, which includes fielding upgraded Type 12 missiles in the southwest and deploying hyper velocity gliding projectile systems across the country.

The existing missile defense network may not be fully capable of responding to threats, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi told reporters in a briefing on Friday.

“To prevent missiles flying through the missile defense network and to prevent further armed attacks, it is necessary to … have the ability to counterattack. Stand-off missiles can also be used for this counterattack ability,” Koizumi said.

The destroyer’s launcher modification marks a landmark milestone in the country’s efforts to rapidly deploy stand-off capabilities and bolster deterrence measures, he added.

Stand-off weaponry describes a class of arms with ranges so long that operators can fire them from a safe distance, without fearing countermeasures capable of reaching them.

The defense ministry introduced stand-off capabilities in 2017, and it formed the core of the security strategy shift in 2020, which later expanded to additional policy documents, including a detailed buildup plan in the country’s southwest in 2022.

The Tomahawk cruise missiles can be launched from ships or submarines with a range of over 1,600km. The Japanese variant can be rerouted during flight, and advanced versions are capable of hitting moving targets.

The refitted JS Chokai can load and fire both the Block IV and V variants of the cruise missiles.

JS Chokai arrived at Naval Base San Diego, California, in October 2025 for renovations and crew training with the U.S. Third Fleet. Live-fire training is scheduled for August, before JS Chokai returns to its home port in Sasebo Naval Base in the southwestern Kyushu Island in September.

Japan is moving toward a “denial and limited strike” model by fast-tracking the implementation of its 2022 strategy, maritime security expert Benjamin Blandin told Defense News. Blandin is a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan.

“Japan is operationalizing a long overdue counterstrike capability, shifting from strict homeland defense to semi-regional deterrence by being able to strike ground and naval targets at up to 1000 km,” Blandin said.

Japan’s existing defense force, including its stand-off missile capability, is the “minimum necessary for self-defense,” Koizumi said, adding that these would only be used “in the event of an armed attack from another country … and it does not pose a threat to other countries.”

Analysts have raised worries that the U.S. Tomahawk stockpile may be strained after reports indicated that over 800 missiles were used in four weeks during Operation Epic Fury against Iran, and this might impact missile orders for allies, including Japan.

Blandin said Japan’s Tomahawk orders are unlikely to be affected immediately, but prolonged military campaigns in the Middle East could cause minor to moderate setbacks.

American manufacturer RTX, in a Feb. 4 press release, said it had signed five agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense to boost production and expedite deliveries of Land Attack and Maritime Strike variants of the Tomahawk cruise missiles, with annual production expected to increase to more than 1,000.

“No major impact expected in regards to Iran, as deliveries will not take place all at once but probably over the course of a few years,” Blandin said. “In any case, the U.S. will likely prioritize Japan as a key Indo-Pacific ally.”