LONDON — Shortfalls in protected vehicles, support helicopters, ISTAR and other equipment were a feature of the failed British military effort in Iraq, an official inquiry into the conflict has ruled.

The UK's military role in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 ended "a very long way from success," said John Chilcot, who led the inquiry.

Most of the report's criticism is reserved for the Labour government and particularly Tony Blair, who is the longest serving Labour prime minister, serving from 1997-2007. But the military and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) also received blame for an "intervention that went badly wrong."

Blair took his country into a badly planned, woefully executed and legally questionable war in Iraq in 2003, according to the findings of the long-delayed inquiry published July 6.

The Iraq War resulted in the deaths of 179 British military personnel and cost the country at least £9.2 billion (US $12.1 billion).

Chilcot's damning verdict was that the war ended in humiliation for the British military after they withdrew, having earlier reached an agreement with local militia in Basra, Iraq, to exchange detainees in return for an end to the targeting of UK forces.

A late decision to increase the size of British forces to be deployed resulted in shortcomings in planning and preparation and risks involved in the deployment of a large force, including three army brigades. The resulting equipment shortages were not properly identified nor fully exposed to ministers, Chilcot said in a statement Wednesday.

The shortfalls were exacerbated by the lack of an effective asset-tracking system for military stores, which although it was a recognized problem had not been adequately addressed by the MoD.

The ministry came in for wide criticism on a range of issues, not least the speed with which it responded to the growing threat posed to British troops by improvised explosive devices (IED).

"We found that the MoD was slow in responding to the threat from IEDs and that delays in providing adequate, medium-weight protected patrol vehicles should not have been tolerated," Chilcot said.

Members of the media inspect the volumes that comprise Iraq Inquiry report, during its presentation by Report Chairman Sir John Chilcot, at the QEII Centre in London on July 6, 2016. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair rode a wave of "Cool Britannia" optimism in his first heady years in office but is now reviled by many Britons who accuse him of leading the country into an unnecessary war in Iraq that shattered his legacy. Published 13 years after the 2003 US-led invasion, Wednesday's Iraq War Inquiry report pointed the finger squarely at the former prime minister for catastrophic planning failures. / AFP / POOL / Dan Kitwood (Photo credit should read DAN KITWOOD/AFP/Getty Images)

The UK's military role in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 ended "a very long way from success," according to John Chilcot, who led the inquiry.

Photo Credit: Dan Kitwood/AFP via Getty Images

The British eventually purchased several hundred protected patrol vehicles from the US but not before troops suffered heavy casualties in the lightly armored Land Rovers originally operated in Basra and other locations in southern Iraq.

Work on purchasing an improved protected patrol vehicle had begun before 2002, but orders weren't made until 2006, and only then following the intervention of ministers, according to the report. Funding was not the problem — it seems some in the Army were more interested in pursuing other vehicle priorities.

"It appears that the longer-term focus of the executive committee of the Army Board on the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) [armored vehicle program] inhibited it from addressing the more immediate issue related to medium weight protected patrol capability," the report said.

FRES was eventually canceled and only now is the program to supply 8x8 wheeled vehicles regaining priority in the shape of the Mechanised Infantry Vehicle program the Army is likely to issue a request for information on later this year.

The report also blamed the decision by the Labour government in 2006 to deploy forces to Afghanistan for causing additional capability shortfalls in Iraq, particularly helicopters and intelligence and surveillance assets.

Andrew Chuter is the United Kingdom correspondent for Defense News.

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