Despite the heinous Paris terrorist attacks, US President Barack Obama's determination to stick with a decidedly long-term strategy to defeat the Islamic State group — it will "take time" — creates a defining moment for our European allies.

Will Europe, consistent with its sustained secular trend of avoiding away from the use of force as a means of solving global problems, follow this cautious and highly debatable approach that seeks to avoid the deployment of Western ground troops at any cost and that accepts the inherent risk of episodic terrorist attacks over a sustained period of time?

Or will Europeans, with France in the lead, do something they have not done for a generation — come together with an effective, shorter gestation strategy, act boldly, lead the world to a decisive military defeat of this scourge on humanity and play a significant role in the post-war reconstruction of Syria?

France's request in recent days for defense and security assistance from other members of the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty at least puts on the table the prospect that a robust European approach will be considered.

While the Obama administration's multi-faceted approach to IS may have made some limited progress, the president's statements confirm that he is content to rely on what is effectively a five-year plan to achieve our goals. The US government's allergy to the use of ground forces, and its self-imposed conditions on the training of rebel groups in Syria, provision of material support and selection of targets certainly do not wreak of urgency.

An anti-ISIS campaign that largely relies on airstrikes (manned and unmanned), limited special forces, and collateral measures, such as police raids against potential terrorists and beefed-up intelligence and homeland security, will not destroy ISIS in the near term.    

And these cautious US measures have been anything but reassuring to our allies — also signaling that they do not need to step up either. It is hard for the US government to convince other nations of the need for urgent action when its own actions belie this.

In the absence of decisive military power now, these other measures will only mitigate, not eliminate, the risks of significant terrorist actions in Europe and the United States. As the Paris attacks show, a determined enemy like ISIS can potentially plan and execute Western terrorist acts without detection — intelligence is never perfect. Thus, Europeans will need to adjust to the new reality of constant threats, cancellation of events (witness the German soccer game) and other disruptions.   

Europe also will continue to face, for a sustained period, an immigration crisis of immense proportions due to events in Syria that threatens its safety. In fact, at least one of the Paris attackers slipped into Europe with the refugee flow. And the combined threat of terrorism and continuing refugee flows creates pressures for the end of open borders in Europe, threatening the very essence of the European Union. In short, European nations face very real and imminent risks to their national and European interests, beyond those faced by the United States.

The burning question is whether Europe, with France in the lead, will simply tolerate these risks in the aftermath of Paris, as it has in the aftermath of other recent terrorist actions in Europe, or coalesce around a more robust approach that goes against the recent tide of European history.

Secular changes over several decades have fueled a long-term trend toward the "debellicization" of Western Europe. British historian Michael Howard coined this term to describe the tendency in post-World War II Europe not only to refrain from war, but to deny the legitimacy of armed force as a tool for security — in other words, to become distinctly unwarlike. After centuries of warfare, much of Europe has now become pacified.

Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, Europe has adopted a more sanguine view toward security threats (even after 9/11) and has focused increasingly on non-military solutions. Even in the limited military operations they have joined — from the Balkans to Afghanistan — European nations have established self-imposed limitations on their willingness to use force that have reduced their utility.

Consistent with this broad societal trend, there have been significant long-term declines in European defense spending since the end of the Cold War. After a temporary uptick in European NATO defense spending after 9/11, it declined once again later in the decade — especially after the 2008 financial crisis — and since then has remained flat.

Today, European nations continue to spend far less than the United States in per capita terms — roughly 1.4 percent versus 3.6 percent of GDP — prompting several US presidents and secretaries of defense to urge Europe to spend more and share more of the security burden.

Not surprisingly, Europe's limited investment in defense has resulted in an erosion of its military capabilities, especially for out-of-area expeditionary warfare. NATO Europe has repeatedly made capability commitments to NATO that have been honored in the breach. Europe today lacks substantial, readily deployable expeditionary forces for sustained use in either high- or low-intensity war fighting.

To be sure, Europe has shown a willingness to engage in the use of soft power tools for international crises and has managed a number of small operations under the EU banner. Nevertheless, Europe has even shied away from major civil/military operations and commitments.

Witness Europe’s unwillingness to substantially engage in Libya in the aftermath of former Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi's Qadhafi’s downfall despite its significant involvement in airstrikes that led to his downfall. Plainly, this was a clear violation of the so-called Pottery Barn rule ("If you break it, you own it").  

Thus, viewed through the lenses of European history, attitudes and culture, Europe today faces a stark and difficult choice. Will it do the comfortable thing and follow the Obama administration’s unwillingness to use all the necessary force to defeat ISIS now?

The alternative, more robust approach may not necessarily involve the Obama administration's bogeyman of large numbers of ground troops (i.e., the military intervention could potentially be a more scaled-down joint effort of sizable numbers of special forces combined with local groups). It also could involve a phased action, with a mini-surge in Iraq first, where more local forces exist, followed by action later in Syria in the context of some type of political settlement. But in any event, it will involve the considerable application of resources.

That said, a Europe newly committed to defeating ISIS can potentially mobilize a coalition, including other countries and groups in the Middle East, that can achieve a sustainable victory on a more rapid timeline than the Obama plan and put together an overall political framework for a workable post-ISIS stabilization effort. And just maybe, Europe can help to elicit a more robust US engagement as well.

While it’s easy for European leaders to declare war on ISIS and express moral outrage in solidarity with France, whether they will actually have the will to really go to war now and work to ensure the peace later in the presence of a reluctant United States remains to be seen.

Jeff Bialos is a partner at Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, a Washington-based law firm.

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