After 45 years as a defense acquisition practitioner, policy developer and senior adviser to the US Air Force secretary, I have seen and been involved in numerous studies and other efforts to improve the defense acquisition process. Despite all of the studies and related process-improvement efforts, the process still fails us more often than we can afford.

There are important lessons that should have been learned from experience, but have not.

The No. 1 lesson: Stop tinkering with the process whenever an acquisition program fails to measure up to expectations. The more tinkering with the process and the more rules, regulations and legislation we pile on the process, the more the flexibility and creativity of our acquisition professionals are stifled.

When this happens, and I believe it has already happened, the acquisition process is destined for failure.

What is the answer? Stabilize Defense Department acquisition processes and procedures and resist the temptation to continue noodling with the fundamentals. Instead of continuing to search for the holy grail of acquisition process reform, concentrate on finding and recruiting the right people with the right DNA to be acquisition leaders, especially at the top of the organization pyramid: the political appointees.

Ensure the Defense Department has people with the right education, training and experience at the top, people who have grown up through the process loving what they do and absorbing every nuance of a highly complicated process. Once in a while, the Defense Department has people like this at the helm, but not often enough.

How can these people be found and recruited into service to their country? Start by establishing mandatory criteria for each leadership position and ensuring that candidates for these positions meet the criteria before they are ever seriously considered — no waivers and no exceptions.

Congress must be the policeman. The Senate must not allow anyone who doesn't meet the criteria to slip through confirmation, no matter what other qualifications they may possess.

Congress and the White House should take another look at the post-government employment constraints that are in vogue, and also make adjustments to reduce the pain of the mandatory financial divestiture requirements that deter some of the most highly qualified candidates from serving.

Those involved in nominating and confirming senior acquisition leaders should keep in mind that one program decision at a critical point can make the difference between success and failure of any acquisition program. However, it often takes years for the effects of acquisition decisions to come to fruition, long after the people who made them are gone and forgotten. This is why the leadership selection criteria are crucial.

Rarely is it possible to evaluate the true quality of DoD acquisition leaders until many years after they have left office, maybe decades. As a result, the selection process itself should be relied upon to ensure the quality of DoD acquisition leaders, their decisions and the success of defense acquisition programs.

Finding the right people will not be easy. Leaders experienced with the system, possessing demonstrated judgment and a willingness to serve, are never easy to find.

Nonetheless, let's establish a minimum set of qualifications that includes "hands-on" DoD acquisition experience (e.g., contracting officer, program manager, etc.) for each senior acquisition leadership position.

It seems everything else has been tried. Why not try the one suggestion that has never been implemented?

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Marlow is a retired US Air Force colonel and adviser to the Center for Naval Analyses. These views represent only the author's.

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