“This is the first rotation in the 15-year history of the program to be certified as a MAGTF, and that’s a big deal,” Col. George Flynn, commanding officer of MRF-D 2026, explained to Defense News.

Flynn noted that being certified validates the MAGTF’s credibility and proficiency because, if called upon, a commander “knows the force is going to be able to accomplish all those tasks it’s assigned as part of its task order to facilitate operations in the theater.”

“What makes it special purpose is just the uniqueness of how it’s placed here in Darwin in support of the Pacific theater,” Flynn continued. “We’re responsible for being ready for the full spectrum of operations from full-scale combat to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”

This certification process was completed in early May during an exercise in the Philippines, making “an incredible statement” on its ability to respond to crises.

Flynn said MRF-D is authorized to have 2,500 personnel, but he typically has around 2,000 in his SPMAGTF. They arrived in Darwin in March, with his task force including, among others, the California-based 1/5 Marines and MV-22B Ospreys from the Hawaii-based VMM-268.

High tempo

Flynn pointed out that “the Marine Corps, we always seek to deploy”.

MRF-D has maintained a heavy operational tempo, with the commander saying personnel had traveled to six or seven different countries to date.

“We’re busy, but Marines are having a great time. For this deployment, we’ve had 13 planned operations, activities, investments or exercises,” Flynn said. “We’ve been in the Philippines, we have forces in Indonesia right now, and we have forces that are getting ready to go to Tahiti to do training with the French. And we’ve certainly been all over the Australian continent.”

The latter includes major exercises with the Australian Army’s Darwin-based 1st Brigade and Townsville-based 3rd Brigade. Operating with the 1st Brigade is particularly helpful to both parties, since that formation now specializes in littoral warfare.

“We get to share good practices,” Flynn noted. “We have a great relationship with 1st Brigade.”

Asked about difficulties operating in such far-flung locations, often simultaneously, Flynn acknowledged, “It’s a good challenge to have. It allows us to demonstrate our ability to be distributed, and how well we can achieve operational reach throughout the region.

“I think it goes to demonstrate that, where needed, Marines can show up and provide the support that Marines are capable of providing.”

He said the SPMAGTF’s expeditionary mindset, its ability to get to locations quickly and to sustain itself, has “really been eye-watering to watch.” Flynn noted formations typically “spend their workup getting to their max level of readiness and then, once that deployment starts, that readiness starts to degrade over time.”

However, this is not the case with MRF-D, as “we have the unique ability to gain and maintain readiness throughout the deployment,” he said. This is due in part to “the expansive training areas throughout the continent that give us some wonderful opportunities to be most ready when called upon.”

Capability growth

“We have a robust C2 [command-and-control] capability down to our supporting elements as well, and we’ve been able to work with those systems and demonstrate … the ability to go up and down on different communication systems using satellite capabilities down to high-frequency capabilities and the like,” Flynn told Defense News. “At no point have I ever felt challenged with being able to command and control the force based on the capabilities that we’re working with.”

The Marine Corps continues to evolve for modern combat, too.

“Our Sec War has been adamant about increasing capabilities of the force with regards to small UAS [unmanned aerial systems] and first-person-view, one-way attack drones. We’ve had the opportunity to experiment with those systems out here, and you saw some of that at the counter-landing live-fire in the Philippines,” Flynn said. “So, we’re definitely using those. We’ve also used others like logistics-based unmanned aerial systems to facilitate movement of logistical requirements throughout the training areas here in Australia.”

However, he noted the Marine Corps “is actively still working through to increase capabilities” in counter-drone systems.

Perhaps one of the biggest helps to the SPMAGTF would be more assets for “lift and the ability to move the force around the theater,” Flynn shared.

Nevertheless, he said, “I’m beyond happy with what we’ve been able to demonstrate with our operational reach, and I think it’s just the opportunities that exist to further achieve interoperability with our allies and partners with moving the force around the theater is something that we should continue to look at going forward”.

Positive vibes

Asked about what he has gained from leading the deployment, Flynn said, “Every day, I get a chance to lead all these Marines and sailors that are under my command, and how they generally seem to understand their purpose, and they operate with happy hearts out here.

“The relationships we’ve built with the Australians and with other nations, allies and partners we’ve got a chance to work with — and just a demonstration of what it means to be a MAGTF operating in the Pacific theater — has just been really powerful for me personally.”

Flynn said MRF-D has contributed to a free and open Indo-Pacific theater.

“I think our presence, our posture and our ability to demonstrate that we can get into locations and be responsive to countries in need facilitates that free and open Indo-Pacific. All countries in this area have their own sovereignty and we respect that, and we stand by to support and protect that sovereignty as required.”

Each MRF-D deployment lasts six months. The current one ends in October, just before the wet season arrives in northern Australia.

Department of War Undersecretary for Policy Elbridge Colby made the remarks in Manila on Monday amid growing concerns that China has been narrowing the gap — or eclipsing — U.S. military capabilities, as its demands in the Middle East have potentially drained stockpiles.

“There’s been a lot of news about the United States military being stretched. Please don’t be misinformed,” Colby told Manila’s defense and security elites at a closed-door event organized by the Stratbase Institute think tank.

“The United States military, and especially including those [maritime and aerospace] capabilities, are ready and capable of filling the priority missions that the president has given to them,” Colby said.

Colby, one of the Pentagon’s leading strategists, has pushed to prioritize the Indo-Pacific and East Asia over the Middle East and Europe. The Manila stop is the first in a week-long Southeast Asian tour that includes visits to Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia.

His visit also comes amid an increasingly tense period between Manila and Beijing following a confrontation in Second Thomas Shoal on July 20, when Chinese personnel hit and wounded a Philippine Navy sailor in the head.

The incident triggered another tit-for-tat between Manila and Beijing over the contents of a highly classified “provisional agreement” reportedly signed in 2024 that allows Philippine vessels to safely deliver supplies to troops stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre floating outpost.

After last month’s incident, officials noted that China has appeared more assertive, indicating a shift in how China perceives the implications of the mutual defense treaty.

Tensions have also intensified as China has routinely deployed carrier strike groups in the West Philippine Sea, and last month, fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile toward the Pacific.

While military deterrence forms one component of the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, Washington is employing a “strategy of strong, clear, but quiet” action designed to address the challenge without altering the status quo, according to Colby.

“In terms of our relationship with China, I think we’ve been able to communicate…our approach directly to Chinese counterparts,” Colby said.

“We combine a clear diplomatic line, a policy of respect towards the People’s Republic [of China], clarity about…our being in favor of the status quo, along with…strength in terms of being willing to defend our interests and those of our allies like the Philippines,” he added.

Apart from strengthening the U.S.’ forward posture and fielding combat-credible forces, Colby noted that measures are being set up, albeit quietly, to allow for the U.S. to come to the Philippines’ aid.

Colby described the U.S. approach to the region as “defensive” and “aligns with the interests of regional states.”

“We’re not trying to dominate this whole region. It’s a strategy of denial, designed to deny any state the ability to become the regional hegemon,” Colby said.

The visit comes a week after the Pacific Command and the Philippine armed forces signed an eight-point partnership plan for 2027, which includes an undisclosed series of joint military exercises, and before President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.S. in September.

“If you are trying to project power, whoever you are, into the aerospace and maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific, you are going to come up against the very best military in the world at its apex predator status,” Colby concluded.

Seeking to counter concerns about Washington’s reliability, Elbridge Colby, undersecretary of Defense for Policy, reiterated the U.S. interest in the region as he called for greater burden-sharing and “partnership, not dependency.”

“America is definitely not disengaging from Asia,” Colby said in a speech in Manila. “We are not leaving; in fact, we are digging in, to ensure a favourable balance of power where it matters most.”

The Philippines, the United States’ oldest treaty ally in Asia, is the first stop on a Southeast Asian trip that also will take Colby to Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia.

Colby said maintaining a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific required a “posture of deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain” and pointed to what he said was a growing U.S. military commitment in the region.

The First Island Chain refers to an area stretching from Japan down to Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo.

The strategy could not rest on American forces alone, he said, arguing that allies should invest more in their security.

“When we ask our allies and partners to step up, to invest more in their own defense, and to take responsibility for their own sovereign security, we are not signaling abandonment,” Colby said. “We are looking for partners, not protectorates.”

“When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong,” he added.

“The international community is facing its greatest trial since World War II and [is] entering a new era of crisis,” the document warned. “It cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in the future, particularly in East Asia.”

China, Russia and North Korea are fingered as culprits.

In fact, Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper noted China presents “the greatest strategic challenge,” also citing Beijing’s growing concordance with Moscow in joint exercises as an alarming trend.

After studying Ukraine and developments in modern warfare, the document highlighted necessary solutions such as renewed focus on lower-cost systems; innovations in research, development and production; increased production; and stockpiling of materiel.

Japan is acquiring a large number of low-cost, unmanned vehicles in the air, sea and underwater domains. These unmanned systems will help establish what it calls the Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated and Enhanced Littoral Defense, or SHIELD, by Fiscal Year 2027.

The paper highlighted how Japan’s indigenous defense industry is increasingly important. However, some companies like Komatsu and Mitsui have already abandoned or downsized their involvement in the defense sector.

Tokyo believes increased spending will help reinforce the military-industrial complex, but it wants industrial innovation to develop military equipment in response to rapid changes in combat. The industrial base also needs to be scalable to meet Japanese requirements, the paper says.

Likewise, Japan is strengthening defense equipment cooperation internationally, with the most obvious fruit being Australia’s decision to buy Upgraded Mogami-class frigates.

The white paper reiterated that the Japan-U.S. alliance remains its “cornerstone” relationship.

However, Grant Newsham, senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, highlighted Japan’s “decades of pathological dependence on the Americans to take care of Japan’s defense,” and its “so-called pacifist mindset and contrived constitutional prohibitions on an effective defense force” as challenges needing to be overcome.

Nonetheless, the paper asserted, by FY 2027, the country “will strengthen its defense capability to the point where Japan is able to take primary responsibility for dealing with invasions against its nation, and disrupt and defeat such threats with the support of its ally and others.”

Tokyo has already achieved 2% defense spending as a proportion of GDP, and it is seeking a record JPY8.9 trillion, or $56.1 billion USD, defense budget next year.

This budget request, likely to rise further, will be submitted at the end of August.

“Ukraine really spurred Japanese awareness — figuring that Taiwan was next, with everything that would portend for Japan’s security,” Newsham told Defense News. “This has not, however, translated into a Japan Self-Defense Force that’s organized and capable of fighting a war.”

Defence Minister Richard Marles made the announcement on Aug. 6 while attending the multinational fighter exercise Pitch Black 2026 in Darwin.

Marles said the JATM will allow the Royal Australian Air Force “to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary and protect our national interests.”

Australia and the U.S. are alarmed at growing threats from China, whose air force is fielding long-range missiles such as the PL-15 and the even larger PL-17.

With aging missile types like the incumbent AIM-120 AMRAAM now outclassed by their Chinese equivalents, the AIM-260 is designed to restore order.

Canberra will splash out A$736 million — around $520 million USD — on an unspecified quantity of AIM-260s through the Foreign Military Sales process.

On March 17, the U.S. had approved the sale of up to 450 JATMs with an estimated price tag of $3.16 billion USD. Given that the recently announced order costs significantly less than this sum, Australia is presumably purchasing well under 100 missiles in this first tranche.

The AIM-260 will be integrated first onto the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet, followed by the F-35A and then the EA-18G Growler. Another future Australian candidate is likely to be the MQ-28A Ghost Bat unmanned combat aircraft, which test-fired an AMRAAM last December.

Lockheed Martin’s secretive munition is a GPS-aided air superiority missile with increased range and effectiveness compared to existing U.S. air-to-air weapons. There have still been no official photos released of the missile.

The JATM’s capabilities — such as its range, propulsion and seeker — remain heavily classified. Its range is likely to be at least 120 miles — quite possibly more — which is far superior to the incumbent AIM-120 AMRAAM. Its form factor is similar to the AMRAAM’s to ensure it fits inside the weapon bays of existing fighters.

Australia said in a statement that the AIM-260 “will provide air force platforms with a credible deterrent against airborne targets, complementing existing air-to-air missile capabilities and other surface-based missile capabilities across the Australian Defence Force.”

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy described JATMs as “some of the most sophisticated air-to-air weapons in the world, and Australia will be the first country to operate them outside the U.S.”

However, it will take years — not before 2033, according to some reports — until the JATM reaches Australian hands and is bolted onto RAAF Super Hornets.

Australia’s acquisition also opens the door for other Indo-Pacific air forces to procure the JATM in the future, especially given the widespread adoption of the F-35 by close U.S. allies in the region.

Here is what is known about the growing military ties:

THE LATEST REPORTS

A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks on Ukraine, an official at Ukraine’s GUR military intelligence agency said.

The unit comprises about 90 North Korean personnel and is expected to be based in Russia’s Voronezh region, the official said. The United States is aware of the North Korean deployment, a source familiar with the issue told Reuters.

Forty North Korean missiles have already been supplied, at least two of which were launched at Ukraine last week during a deadly strike, the Ukrainian official said.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in July that Russia wanted to bring in 30,000 North Korean troops and was preparing facilities in Voronezh to receive them.

Reuters could not independently verify that statement.

HOW MANY NORTH KOREAN TROOPS WERE SENT TO RUSSIA IN 2024?

North Korea sent around 14,000 to 15,000 soldiers to Russia’s Kursk region, according to Ukrainian and South Korean estimates, helping Moscow’s forces repel a surprise Ukrainian ground incursion.

Russia and North Korea confirmed in April 2025 that North Korean troops had fought Ukrainian forces in Kursk.

Russia’s top military commander praised their role after Moscow said it had retaken Kursk territory, while Pyongyang said the deployment was ordered by leader Kim Jong Un.

The Ukrainian official said this month that around 9,500 North Korean troops remained in Kursk, but were not directly involved in operations against Ukraine.

WHAT OTHER PERSONNEL HAS NORTH KOREA SAID IT WILL PROVIDE?

In June 2025, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said North Korea would send 1,000 sappers and 5,000 military construction workers to Kursk to clear mines and help rebuild infrastructure damaged in the fighting.

That same month, South Korean lawmakers, citing a briefing by the National Intelligence Service, said that North Korea appeared to have begun recruiting personnel for an additional deployment to Russia, while continuing to supply Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles in exchange for economic cooperation and technical assistance.

It remains unclear how many engineers, deminers or additional troops have arrived in Russia, or whether they have been used in combat roles.

WHAT WEAPONS HAS NORTH KOREA PROVIDED?

North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery and mortar rounds, ballistic missiles, long-range artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, according to Ukrainian and independent assessments.

A Reuters analysis with the British-based Open Source Centre found four Russian-flagged cargo ships made 64 voyages to North Korea’s Rajin port between September 2023 and March 2025, transporting nearly 16,000 containers of ammunition to Russian ports.

Ukrainian officials said North Korea was supplying about half of the munitions Russia needed on the front lines.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said that North Korea had delivered 4 million artillery shells since mid-2023, excluding mortar rounds. It said North Korea had supplied 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles by the start of 2025.

WHY IS NORTH KOREA HELPING RUSSIA?

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty during Putin’s June 2024 visit to Pyongyang. The pact includes a mutual assistance provision if either country faces external aggression.

North Korea has cast its deployment as assistance to a treaty partner. Kim said in May 2025 that participation in the war was justified as an exercise of North Korea’s sovereign rights in defense of a “brother nation.”

Analysts say Pyongyang stands to gain hard currency, oil and other economic support, as well as access to Russian military technology and battlefield experience for its forces and weapons.

North Korean soldiers have gained combat exposure to drones, electronic warfare, artillery coordination and modern battlefield tactics, while its missile and ammunition makers have been able to assess their equipment in wartime conditions.

THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION

The United States and its allies have said the troop deployments and arms transfers violate U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea.

Pyongyang has been subject to U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The sanctions prohibit countries from hosting North Korean trainers, advisers or other officials for military, paramilitary or police training.

Washington imposed additional sanctions in December 2024 on North Korean and Russian entities connected to Pyongyang’s military and financial support for Moscow. South Korea also blacklisted individuals and entities linked to illicit military cooperation between the two countries.

NATO has said Russia’s growing military and economic ties with North Korea, China and Iran pose a threat beyond Europe, extending to the Indo-Pacific and North America.

The 10-day annual Han Kuang exercise began early in the morning after an underground command center in Taipei issued the drill order, triggering combat-readiness moves that will include fighter-jet dispersals and emergency naval deployments, two senior Taiwan officials briefed on the matter told Reuters.

Taiwan will also incorporate for the first time a so-called “backbrief” approach modeled on U.S. military practice, in which junior officers receiving orders restate mission details to commanders — a move aimed at improving coordination, the officials added, requesting anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

The move, one of the officials said, is to “ensure commanders and subordinates are in sync on operational intent.”

The drill will also focus on a key wartime concern: that China, which claims Taiwan as its own despite the island’s objections, would try to paralyze command centers, ports, logistics and defense industry sites early in an attack.

China’s defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment. China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control.

Wartime Relocation

Held annually since 1984, the drills will include for the first time the deliberate slowing of mobile internet speeds to test how civilians would communicate if bandwidth became scarce.

The military will simulate the wartime relocation of a major arsenal, mobilize civilian factories and run escort drills off Taiwan’s Pacific coast, as concern grows that Beijing may be rehearsing how to sever the island’s Pacific supply lines from allies as Chinese military pressure intensifies.

“These are all part of a series of toughening exercises — this is no longer a laboratory-like exercise in a vacuum,” said a third senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the operation.

“You are entering a real field environment, facing real bottom-line conditions. We hope the final phase of training reaches that state,” the defense official said.

That is part of Taiwan’s ongoing effort to make its exercises more realistic, following past criticism that some drills were too highly staged.

Resilience Drills

The effort has included resilience drills testing how local officials would keep the government running during cascading crises, from earthquakes to a Chinese invasion.

“If the situation does not match the original enemy scenario, what should he do? How should he reassess, readjust, and quickly issue orders?” the defense official said, referring to field commanders who will be tested with “unexpected scenarios” during the drills, which end on Aug. 14.

The drills will also mobilize more than 20,000 reservists.

On the sports field of a Taipei high school on Wednesday, dozens of reservists gathered to practice using mortars and taking up rifle positions.

The military will also introduce an “embedded reporter” mechanism to assess wartime frontline news releases and efforts to counter enemy disinformation, the officials said.

“The emphasis will be on how our entire population, the Republic of China as a whole — especially our citizens — should face war,” the defense official said, using Taiwan’s official name.

Called the Guardian Angel, the four-wheeled UGV has already completed live-fire testing.

Thales Australia worked with two other Australian firms to create the new system. One was Chaos 1, which specializes in rapid assessments, prototyping and autonomous-system experimentation.

The second company was W&E Platt, which makes weapon mounts. Indeed, the Guardian Angel features its low-cost Remote Operated Weapon PLATTform, with an image showing the ROWP mounting a Dillon M134D Minigun.

Thales Australia said in a statement that this project showcases its “sovereign industrial strength, ability to meet the nation’s defense and security needs, and capacity to deliver and manufacture autonomous systems and solutions”.

The company said the project was driven by one aim: to keep Australian troops safe.

However, a spokesperson explained to Defense News, “The Guardian Angel is a prototype and wasn’t specifically built for market. It’s part of a program to test and strengthen our capability in autonomous systems and solutions.”

Nonetheless, its completion paves the way for future platforms, in which a containerized mission system could offer capabilities such as medical evacuation, troop support, cargo transport and fire support.

“UGVs can preserve soldiers by operating in high-risk environments while providing a clear tactical advantage, assisting operations on the battlefield,” Andrew Downes, vice president of Land Thales Australia, commented. “They offer scalable, agile, cost-effective capability that can increase operational reach without increasing risk to personnel.”

Meanwhile, Benny Johanson, Founder and CEO of Chaos 1, described the process as “rapid prototyping in true form — little time, extremely chaotic and high risk.“

“In just six weeks we moved from a concept graphic to live-fire demonstration, and many said it couldn’t be done,” Johanson said, adding that the Guardian Angel “proved the sheer horsepower industry can generate for the warfighter at speed.”

Australian industry has developed a number of UGV designs, and the army is actively experimenting with some of them. For instance, it is trialing M113AS4 armored personnel carriers converted into modular robotic vehicles by BAE Systems Australia.

BAE Systems Australia’s largest platform is the ATLAS 8x8, fitted with an unmanned turret and 25mm Bushmaster cannon. It is currently in a prototype demonstrator status.

The Australian Army has also tested the tracked Warfighter UGV from Cyborg Dynamics Engineering. The army is already using the Ground Uncrewed System, affectionately known as GUS and produced by Outlook Industries, for remote coastal surveillance.

A couple of attritable UGV platforms also being tested are GaardTech’s Jaegar-C and DefendTex’s Banshee, small vehicles that can carry kinetic payloads.

“We’re about to bring into the next exercise UGVs. We can practice breaching minefields, for example, with sacrificial UGVs that might drag a tube full of explosives across a minefield — and we can detonate that,” Brigadier Ben McLennan, commander of the Australian Army’s 3rd Brigade, recently told Defense News. “That’s just one application. There’s a raft of other applications we’re making.”

The Defense Ministry said that the maiden flight test intercepted a simulated high-speed, high-altitude aerial electronic target successfully, marking a “key milestone” in the program’s development. It was conducted Thursday from the A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Island off the coast of India’s eastern Odisha state.

Although India has developed short- and medium-range air defense systems, it relies heavily on Russia’s S-400 Triumf systems for long-range air defense. The Kusha, as the interceptor that was tested is called, could fill that gap.

“At present, the S-400 provides long-range coverage of about 400 kilometers, while the Barak-8 systems, co-developed with Israel provide shorter ranges of around 70 kilometers in our air defense. So there is a huge gap in between. Kusha will bridge this,” said Dinakar Peri, Fellow in the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India.

The project includes development of three variants with approximate ranges of 150 kilometers, 250 kilometers, and 350–400 kilometers. However, the official statement did not disclose the engagement range of the interceptor that was tested.

“The missile system is capable of neutralizing a wide variety of aerial threats including fighter jets, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and large enemy aircraft within a wide range & altitude envelope,” it said.

India touts new ballistic missile defense prowess after tests

The test marked the first demonstration of New Delhi’s efforts to build an air-defense system that could eventually be counted in the same strategic class as Russia’s S-400 Triumf.

“The capability in developing long range surface-to-air missile systems is possessed only by a handful of nations. This will also eliminate the import dependency for such systems and signifies a giant leap in air defense capability of the nation,” Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said following the test.

Analyst Peri pointed out that when validated, the variant with a range of 350 to 400 kilometers is expected to match the range of Russia’s S-400 and could complement the ones India has already deployed. The country’s long borders with Pakistan and China require wide coverage.

“The S-400 played a key role during the conflict with Pakistan last year and we have a good air defense architecture. But it may not be enough for the next potential conflict,” said Peri. “So the need is to scale up its existing long-range air defenses significantly, and this is where Kusha will play a key role. For India the reaction time, especially along the border with Pakistan, is very short, so the need is to have interceptors that can shoot down incoming aerial threats far away from population clusters.”

As India steps up its military modernization program, strengthening air defense has emerged as a priority amid the growing threats posed by drones, cruise missiles, long-range rockets and combat aircraft that are reshaping modern warfare. A $ 5.4 billion approval granted by the Defence Acquisition Council earlier this month for weapons and systems for the armed forces included counter-drone and layered air-defense capability.

New Delhi hopes that the missile system could eventually reduce its dependency on foreign systems significantly.

Following the test, the government said that all weapon system elements, including the missiles, radars and the command center, were developed in the country by the Defense Research and Development Organization and industry partners.

However India will remain reliant on foreign air defense systems for some years to come as the indigenous system still has to be validated with more trials and is only expected to be ready for operational deployment after three to four years. Earlier this year, India approved the acquisition of five additional S-400 Triumf air defense systems from Russia to reinforce its long range air defenses.

India continues to rank among the world’s largest defense importers but over the past two decades, it has intensified its push for self-reliance by expanding domestic development and production of advanced military technologies and hardware.

But on July 15, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that includes $500 million in Foreign Military Financing for Taiwan, one in a chain of Pacific Rim allies that U.S. officials have long seen as a buffer against Chinese military expansion.

While the half-billion-dollar allocation in the 2027 fiscal year appropriations bill does not commit money to a particular arms package, analysts say it’s a sign that the Republican Party-dominated Congress values the defense of Taiwan in case China ever attacks with its larger armed forces, and that Washington intends to fulfill at least older arms purchase deals.

“This $500 million Foreign Military Funding demonstrates that Congress has not reduced its security support for Taiwan following the Trump-Xi meeting and reflects Congress’s desire to avoid long-term constraints on military aid to Taiwan due to White House negotiations with China through appropriations and delivery requirements,” said Huang Chung-ting, associate research fellow with the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.

The US usually sells weapons to Taiwan – with drones, expect the reverse

Trump’s signature, needed to pass the appropriations bill, would imply continued weapons sales of some kind despite the unknown fate of the $14 billion package, analysts said.

Foreign Military Financing – usually grants or loans – for U.S. allies abroad may technically go toward acquiring weapons, military training or other related services.

“Foreign military financing concerns how weapons are ultimately paid for but not whether the weapons are actually sold or transferred in the first place,” said Sean King, vice president of New York-based political consultancy Park Strategies.

Trump has not ostensibly withdrawn any previous but unfulfilled U.S. arms sales for Taiwan, meaning that the proposed congressional funding could go toward one of those, experts say. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan date back more than four decades and can take years before payments and delivery dates are settled. As of April, sales of 30 individual weapon types were partly unfulfilled, according to the Taiwan Security Monitor research initiative of the George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.

The most recent items appear in a $11.1 billion batch of weaponry fully approved by Washington in December. It includes M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, the high mobility artillery rocket system HIMARS, Javelin anti-tank missiles and unmanned attack aircraft systems. Taiwan’s Cabinet approved its own special budget in May to help pay for the purchases.

“My assessment is that while there was indeed a political pause after the Trump-Xi meeting, it was not a complete halt to arms sales to Taiwan, but rather (it) targeted new cases that had not yet received approval,” Huang said.

“This delay likely involved Trump’s negotiations with China, a review of weapons stockpiles and internal White House scrutiny, and cannot be explained by a single reason,” he said.

The appropriations bill still requires U.S. Senate review before it would go to Trump’s office.

China claims sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan and has threatened to take the island by force, if needed. Over the past four years the People’s Liberation Army has increased the frequency of military exercises near Taiwan, often in the 160km (100 miles) strait separating them.

Trump said after his meeting with the Chinese president that withholding the arms deal was a “good negotiating chip.” But in June, the U.S. State Department reiterated long-standing policy that arms sales to Taiwan were not dependent on Beijing’s consent.

Experts anticipate a White House announcement on the $14 billion arms package only after Trump and Xi meet in September in the United States, as announced by Washington.

“It may be that Trump is delaying a public announcement until after Xi’s visit to avoid being the skunk who came to the garden party,” said Doug Barry, a professor at The George Washington University and a former communications director with the U.S.-China Business Council.

“It’s odd there has been no public announcement,” he said.

Lorenzo Mariani, Leonardo’s CEO and General Manager, said: “The introduction of the M-346F in Indonesia provides clear evidence not only of the aircraft system’s inherent quality, but also of the country’s continued and yet growing trust in our capabilities across domains.”

Leonardo said the sale “includes the localization of a range of support, maintenance, overhaul and training capabilities, as well as human capital development.”

The Italian-built M-346 is well known as an advanced jet trainer, but the F variant is a dedicated, multirole, light fighter. It has an active electronically scanned array radar, Link 16 data link, seven hardpoints for carrying weapons, aerial refueling capability and electronic countermeasures system.

The first M-346s should be handed over to Jakarta in 2030. This will make Indonesia the 23rd operator of the M-346, but the first Asian customer of the newest Block 20 variant.

“Just eight months after the first order, strong and rapid global demand for the latest version of the aircraft clearly demonstrates it is meeting customer requirements,” reads a Leonardo statement. The firm said the M-346 has logged 170,000+ flight hours to date.

Indonesia is currently inducting Dassault’s Rafale fighter, but the air force maintains a hotchpotch fleet that includes the American F-16, Russian Su-27/Su-30 and Korean T-50i.

Jakarta invested in the Korean KF-21’s development, and it has also professed devotion to the Turkish Kaan. However, neither has resulted in production contracts yet. Indonesia’s defense minister has also expressed a desire for the Chinese J-10.

If all these aspirations came true, Indonesia would end up operating perhaps the world’s most complicated and varied fleet of combat aircraft.

“The Indonesian Armed Forces have been facing existing challenges related to interoperability,” Alban Sciascia, director of consultancy firm PT Semar Sentinel Indonesia, told Defense News. “It’s no secret that Indonesia has been focusing on procuring different equipment from different countries, as part of its diversification strategy, and that its joint operations concept is limited because of the relative inability to get all this equipment interoperating on the battlefield.”

Meanwhile, Leonardo, PT ESystem Solutions and the Indonesian Ministry of Defense also signed a letter of intent on July 21 for the prospective procurement of Leonardo AW149 medium helicopters for the Indonesian Navy.

“If followed by a contract, this could lead to the supply of AW149 helicopters for search and rescue and disaster relief, for both land-based and embarked operations,” Leonardo said in a statement.

The navy currently operates eleven Airbus AS565 Panther helicopters, but as guardian of the world’s largest archipelagic waters, it has a requirement for more shipboard helicopters.

After dawdling over the need to improve its ground-based air defense (GBAD) capabilities, Australia — with American assistance — is prioritizing a hybrid solution that takes sensors, software and weapons already in the Australian inventory.

This first-of-type integration, which successfully fired an SM-2 interceptor missile, offers an alternative to buying expensive Patriot-type air defense systems, for example.

A Department of Defence press statement said the SM-2 test “followed a period of close collaboration, innovation and engineering to produce this successful prototype.”

Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Navy were heavily involved, for example.

Piece of the puzzle

During Exercise Taipan Strike 2026, an SM-2 was launched from a Derringer trailer-mounted launcher – also called the Expeditionary Launch System – at the Woomera test range in the south of Australia.

To shoot down a BQM-74E target drone, the SM-2 was controlled by a virtualized Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system, and guided by a phased-array radar from Australian firm CEA Technologies.

Lockheed Martin’s Morfius X-Rotor built to fry 50 enemy drones in one flight

Aegis, normally utilized aboard warships, was deployed in a small-scale, expeditionary form factor. The Aegis test setup was based on the baseline version found on the Australian navy’s Hunter-class frigates and Hobart-class destroyers.

In a statement to Defense News, Lockheed Martin said this approach “unlocks cross-service integration and interoperability, delivering greater capability and value.”

Jeremy King, chief executive of Lockheed Martin Australia and New Zealand, also remarked that “this prototype system leverages existing weapons, launchers and command and control. It can fire any of the weapons currently fielded on the Hobart-class destroyers or future Hunter-class frigates.”

This is an important revelation for the Royal Australian Navy, as the service has the SM-2 Block IIIB and Block IIIC missiles in its inventory, as well as the SM-6.

The SM-6 could now be considered a candidate for an Australian defense against ballistic missiles. However, this would require a strike-length variant of the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System on the mobile Derringer launcher.

Taking aiming at GBAD

The novel Australian air-defense technology pairing appears to have been on the drawing board for a while, at least conceptually.

“When you have a limited [missile] inventory, you want to be able to be as flexible as possible, so that might be using maritime stocks on land, it might be using land stocks in the maritime domain,” Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, head of Air Force Capability told Defense News last year. “There are many options to go forward. What we’re trying to do is make sure, where possible, we can get the biggest return on investment using sovereign capabilities.”

Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review urged, instead of “pursuing a long-term, near-perfect solution at unaffordable cost,” that Canberra should allocate sufficient resources “to deliver the initial capability in a timely way”.

Later, the 2026 National Defence Strategy called for “accelerated introduction of medium-range, ground-based, active missile defense through investment in missile launchers and munitions and integrating them with … command-and-control systems.”

Missile threats

The same document identified missile defense as a priority, with a need to protect critical defense infrastructure from long-range and high-speed missile threats.

In fact, the July 9 timing of Australia’s announcement of the SM-2 test was significant. The test had actually been conducted a month earlier, but Canberra publicized it just three days after a Chinese submarine hurled a nuclear-capable ballistic missile deep into the South Pacific.

After the Chinese launch, Australia’s opposition party warned how “dangerously exposed” military bases are and the country’s insufficient ability to counter ballistic or cruise missiles.

Australian defense officials stress that the new air-defense weapon is still a work in progress. However, the test reduces technical risk and validates the prototype system’s performance, as Australia weighs cost-effective medium-range GBAD options.

Lockheed Martin added that this hybrid solution represents a “robust air defense capability option paving the way for continued integration efforts.”

The significance of this demonstration extends beyond Australia, as Lockheed Martin said “it demonstrates the potential for enhanced air defense capabilities that can be tailored to meet the specific needs of countries and regions.”

While the two maneuvers answered different security-related activities by U.S. allies in Asia, experts say China used both to try out new, attention-grabbing and long-term ways to deter others from challenging its territorial claims.

The Chinese Coast Guard vessels in waters east of Taiwan since May are meant as police activity rather than more provocative four years of sporadic naval or air force drills around the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as its own, analysts said. China has threatened to take Taiwan by force, if needed.

But a white-hulled vessel formation’s continued presence 54 nautical miles (100 kilometers) from Taiwan shows signs of becoming a long-term exercise – something that hasn’t been tried before – rather than a quick pass-through by armed forces, they said.

“That China uses the coast guard instead of the navy and air force is probably to reduce the threat profile of the exercises, so as to be able to claim restraint rather than escalating to the level of the formal military,” said Brian Hioe, a non-resident fellow at the Taiwan Research Hub of the University of Nottingham.

“Nevertheless, China increasingly integrates civilian and military forces, making it harder for other countries to respond to grey-zone activity,” Hioe said.

Large coast guard ships are designed for “longer deployments” than what naval vessels normally do, said Joshua Arostegui, chair of China studies and research director of the China Landpower Studies Center at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute.

“That’s kind of the big takeaway,” Arostegui said.

The rotation between two vessel formations on July 4, China’s description of the mission as a sustained one and its stated intent to keep strengthening patrols “all point in one direction”, said Sophie Wushuang Yi, postdoctoral teaching fellow with Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University. That, she said, is “routine.”

Beijing’s Taiwan.cn website said on July 10 its coast guard was sustaining “routine law enforcement patrols” as the new vessel formation took over.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, a government ministry, said on July 4 that the vessels were violating international law and “damaging regional stability”.

China’s initial patrols responded to maritime boundary negotiations between Japan and the Philippines, both of which are near Taiwan, experts said. They pointed to a Chinese government condemnation of the talks.

Taiwanese and Chinese coast guard units may find “confusion” along their respective routes if China keeps up its patrols, said Enrico Cau, an associate researcher at the Taiwan Strategy Research Association think tank.

Taiwan and Japan, maritime neighbors and historic de-facto allies, may respond with their own coast guards, Hioe said, while the United States could carry out “freedom of navigation” operations with other militaries in the Asia Pacific.

Those operations mean sailing warships through disputed or restricted international waters to indicate that Washington considers the channels open to all.

Meanwhile, the July 6 missile test, China’s first submarine-launched strategic missile into international open waters, drew statements of protest from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United States and some South Pacific island leaders.

The missile carried a simulated training warhead for 7,300 kilometers and likely overflew parts of the Philippines, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies said in July 7 commentary.

Though the test took place on the same day U.S. ally Australia signed a defense treaty with Fiji, analysts said Beijing set out mainly to warn multiple countries of what it could do in case of a nuclear attack in the disputed South China Sea.

“I don’t think it’s a new strategy as much as demonstrating its ability to have a nuclear triad basically,” Arostegui said. The triad includes land-based ICBMs, long-range bombers and submarine missiles, he said, with subs hard to detect and intercept.

The ballistic missile test specifically warned of what could happen if other countries build up military positions in the Indo-Pacific, Cau said.

“In particular it might be aimed at curbing any intention of regional powers harboring the ambition to either develop or host nuclear capabilities, Japan in primis,” he said.

Beijing also hoped the launch of its JL-2 or JL-3 ballistic missile would help test equipment and prove to other countries it has nuclear strike capability, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said.

It probably timed the sub launch for the 13th China-Russia Joint Sea 2026 exercise, “broadly consistent with China’s desire to portray Sino-Russian strategic alignment through coordinated military activities,” the think tank’s report says.

Expect more, Yi from the Schwarzman College said.

“I would expect such launches to become periodic but rare,” she said. “What the navy is proving, in my assessment, is that its sea-based deterrent is not merely symbolic but operational.”

The tests would be “consistent with the PLA-wide requirement of being ‘able to fight and win,’” she added.

China’s official Xinhua News Agency called the missile test part of an annual military training program and said the government had notified “relevant countries” in advance.

The system is called the Arctic Over-The-Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), and the deal is worth some US$1.75 billion to Australia.

Gordon Frazer – Founder and CEO of the Australia-based HF radar technical services company FrazerLab – told Defense News Canada’s decision would fill an urgent need.

“I used to say to people, you could fly a jumbo jet from Beijing to Canberra if it had its transponders off and no one would know,” he said, arguing the same is likely true for Canada.

“Russia could fly a Tu-95 from one of their bases, Engels Air Base or something like that, to Canada and possibly no one would know.”

He added, “That’s why NORAD is so concerned, and why they’ve been pushing so hard to get this sort of technology done.”

Frazer was formerly an engineer involved in Australia’s OTHR program known as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN).

Expanded surveillance coverage

While NORAD maintains the North Warning System, a line of microwave radars in Canada’s frozen north, Frazer said it would be “almost a trivial problem to defeat it” by flying at low altitude between these known and stationary radar sites.

Instead, because OTHR bounces high-frequency signals off the ionosphere, it can look down on airborne targets — and sometimes even surface vessels — with ease, including aircraft and missiles.

An over-the-horizon radar results in radar coverage stretching far beyond what traditional line-of-sight radars can achieve due to the curvature of the Earth.

With its particular A-OTHR contract, BAE Systems Australia will transfer technology and expertise for Canada to build its own OTHR radar sites to monitor its periphery. Officially, Canberra says JORN can detect targets 3,000 kilometers (1,700 miles) away, but its capability almost certainly reaches far beyond that.

Ottawa stated in a press release: “The signing formalizes Canada’s partnership with Australia and enables the delivery of Australia’s proven OTHR technology in support of Canada’s A-OTHR program. It marks a major milestone in the program, transitioning A-OTHR from the planning phase into delivery phase.”

Natural challenges

Canada has already been researching the application of OTHRs in its north, where environmental and solar conditions are far different than they are in Australia.

Furthermore, significant differences exist between operating OTHRs in equatorial, mid-latitude, high-latitude and polar areas. Frazer pointed out that Canada, despite the “Arctic” in the A-OTHR nomenclature, is actually buying a high-latitude system.

Polar regions present even more complicated challenges for OTHRs due to the Earth’s magnetic field, which creates serious background clutter. In fact, some 40% of Canadian territory lies above the Arctic Circle.

Although it may sound counterintuitive, Frazer said Canada’s A-OTHR radar facilities would be built as far south as possible. This is in order to bounce radar signals off the ionosphere ahead of the zone where the worst distortion occurs.

However, Canada will also have the future opportunity to expand its OTHR network with trans-polar coverage, which would allow it to see deep into Russia.

Positioned thus, the technology could enable NORAD to see Russian strategic bombers taking off or ballistic missiles being launched, for example.

If Canada does seek transpolar radar coverage, it would likely want to place those radar installations as far north as possible, Frazer explained.

Australia has three JORN radar sites, but it is unclear how many sites Canada will establish. In North America, Frazer expects the Pacific west coast will be covered by an American system, the Atlantic east coast will be covered by Canada, and then an additional system can cover the north. If NORAD wants 360-degree coverage, Frazer suggested five or six radar installations would be needed.

Australian expertise

Craig Lockhart, CEO of BAE Systems Australia, said: “Canada’s acquisition of a cutting-edge Australian OTHR system supports the strategic interests of both nations through enhanced detection and tracking of threats to North America, strengthening Five Eyes situational awareness.”

Frazer said Australia developed world-leading OTHR talent “because of multi-generational consistency” in its investment in the technology.

The New Zealand-born engineer pointed out that around 15% of the cost of OTHR technology sits in equipment to inform human operators how to set the radar’s parameters to account for constantly changing atmospheric conditions.

Frazer highlighted that OTHRs are bespoke, national systems built only once per generation. However, he hopes the Canadian deal will benefit both countries.

“I think you’re starting to get the critical mass of being able to keep the technology pipeline from design to sustainment to upgrade to far-reaching tech.”

Because over-the-horizon radar coverage can vary drastically due to solar conditions, other methods help plug surveillance gaps.

Airborne early-warning aircraft, for example, are complementary to OTHR. In May, Canada selected Saab’s GlobalEye as its future airborne early-warning platform.

Canada expects its A-OTHR to reach an initial operational capability by December 2029.

The ongoing Exercise Valiant Shield became the proving ground for III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel, as Marines at Camp Blaz successfully used the MRIC to intercept an aerial target on June 30, 2026.

The MRIC is a “significant leap in operational capability,” a service release stated. The system bridges the gap between the shoulder-fired Stinger Man-Portable Air Defense System and the long-range Patriot missile system and is designed for the “expeditionary nature of Marine Corps operations.”

Deployed via trailers carrying 20 interceptors each, MRIC systems can down targets from two to 43 miles away.

The deployment of the system allows Marines to provide an “air defense umbrella” that moves with Marine forces as they maneuver inside an enemy’s weapons engagement zone, all while defending critical assets like expeditionary air bases, runways and forward arming and refueling points, according to a service release.

In 2023, the service announced that it would incorporate technology from Israel’s Iron Dome system to help furnish the Corps with its first medium-range air defense system in decades.

According to the service’s Force Design 2030, three batteries of MRIC are slated to be fielded by 2028.

“Before the MRIC, we were primarily a short-range air defense capability,” Maj. Emi Gutierrez, commander of the firing battery, said in the release. “The Marine Corps employed the Stinger for years, but that capability is significantly different. With the evolution of air defense weapon systems, we saw a need to adapt.

“Our ability to rapidly insert and fill critical gaps within an integrated air defense system is critical not only to the Marine Corps but also the joint force as a whole,” Gutierrez continued. “The MRIC fits into expeditionary warfare perfectly because of its ability to be rapidly deployed.”

Suddenly in June it was showcased for the first time in official Chinese media, as analysts tell it, and described as one of China’s top military assets as English-language subtitles extolled its battlefield capacities.

Experts say the broadcast answers Asia-Pacific military exercises by other countries and aims to warn the U.S. military that the missiles better known as DF-17s, for short, have what it takes to cause particular pain in any war with China.

“Video footage might be political signaling or mild deterrence, because the DF-17 is very hard to defend against, especially for large surface targets,” said Alexander Huang, chairman of the Council of Strategic and Wargaming Studies in Taipei. “It’s a big threat to carriers and other assault ships.”

The medium-range missiles are equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle, which means they can fly at lower altitudes in unpredictable directions.

DF-17s have existed for at least 12 years and been available to the People’s Liberation Army since 2019, according to a paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington.

The release of DF-17 into the Chinese media syncs up time-wise with the ongoing U.S.-led 2026 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime military exercises near Hawaii and the U.S.-Japan drills in late June.

“The other exercises were pretty tough and harsh, clearly targeting Chinese possible actions,” Huang said.

By showing the DF-17s after RIMPAC, China wants to suggest that the missiles can evade interception and make “saturation strikes” at the same time, said Chen Yi-fan, assistant professor in the Diplomacy and International Relations Department at Taiwan’s Tamkang University.

“This signaling is intended to underscore the PLA’s growing confidence in its capacity to overwhelm regional missile‑defense systems and complicate operational planning” by any military opponents, Chen said.

The missiles, as shown during a drill in an English-language YouTube video by the Chinese state-run media outlet CGTN, can make “ultra-precise” strikes and “penetrate advanced defense systems”, per the video.

CGTN said the missiles may be used without fixed launch sites and in any kind of weather.

“The coordinated salvo launches greatly improve strike efficiency and battlefield safety, demonstrating China’s advances in military technology,” CGTN said.

The U.S. think tank describes the DF-17 missiles as 11 meters (36 feet) long with a range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers (1,118 to 1,553 miles). It says they can carry conventional or nuclear payloads. China has 1,300 missiles and 300 launchers.

“As one of the PLA’s premier strategic assets, the DF‑17 is likely reserved for the most consequential scenarios, such as foreign military intervention perceived as supporting Taiwan independence,” Chen said.

American military bases in Hawaii, Guam and Japan are monitoring the uptick in People’s Liberation Army naval drills around Taiwan and Beijing’s tiffs with the Philippines in the South China Sea.

China claims sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan, a de-facto U.S. ally. China and the Philippines – a U.S. treaty ally – contest sovereignty over small islets in the sea between them.

The DF-17’s hypersonic glide vehicle would give the missiles an edge in battle, said M. Taylor Fravel, Security Studies Program Director at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

“This maneuverability means that it is much harder to defeat than a ballistic missile without a hypersonic glide vehicle,” Fravel said. “It can more easily penetrate missile defenses.”

Earlier DF-series missiles flew the traditional path of a surface-to-surface missile, meaning they were easier to predict than the flight course of a DF-17, Huang said.

U.S. forces may need to expand their long-range radar technology to spot any DF-17s launchers and respond preemptively in the case of any conflict, analysts said.

The U.S. is already developing systems “similar” to the DF-17, Fravel said. He said those include the U.S. army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon missile system as well as hardware that may defeat hypersonic glide vehicles.

A long-range hypersonic system is designed to strike well defended targets from thousands of miles away.

“Washington must accelerate the development and deployment of its own hypersonic weapons to establish credible mutual deterrence,” Chen said.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy launched a ballistic missile from a submarine off its coast on Monday, which subsequently flew southeast over the Pacific for about 7,000 kilometers (4,350 miles), according to a map released by the Taiwan National Security Council, before splashing down near the island nations of Nauru and Tuvalu.

Both archipelago countries are part of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which was established by the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1986 and prohibits the stationing and testing of nuclear weapons on islands or in waters of the South Pacific, as well as threatening the countries in the region with the use of these weapons.

China, as well as Russia, the U.S., U.K., and France, have signed onto protocols committing them to the treaty.

The #PRC tested a JL2 #SLBM flying over the #Philippines moments ago. It’s a provocation that destabilizes the #IndoPacific. #China just proved itself again to be a bully on the block. pic.twitter.com/dOUbLBclmh

— Joseph Wu (@josephwutw) July 6, 2026

A missile test doesn’t technically violate the text of the treaty, so long as the missile is not nuclear-tipped. In the case of the Chinese test, the rocket was carrying a dummy warhead for testing purposes. However, southern Pacific nations were quick to accuse China of violating the spirit of the zone, which goes beyond the core legal definition.

New Zealand’s foreign minister said the test “goes against the object and intent of that treaty,” referring to Rarotonga. Australia publicly raised similar concerns.

“We have seen a growing trend of nuclear weapons-armed states exerting pressure on nuclear weapons free zones for their geostrategic interests,” said Olamide Samuel, a network and engagement specialist at the Vienna-based Open Nuclear Network. “We’ve seen it with the U.S. pressuring the U.K. over Diego Garcia, the island in the Indian Ocean; with Russia pushing Kazakhstan to allow missile testing; and now with China conducting a missile test in the South Pacific.”

China has called the test routine. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning stated that “the launch activity was conducted safely, systematically, and professionally throughout,” and urged other countries not to “over-interpret it.” Beijing had given several hours of early notice to key governments in the region.

Tensions have been high over the spirit of Rarotonga since 2021, with China having repeatedly called out the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal between Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. as violating the treaty, to which Australia is a party. Under the AUKUS deal, Australia will receive up to eight nuclear submarines along with highly-enriched uranium for their onboard reactors.

“China has been quite public in voicing its support for nuclear weapons free zones, most recently indicating support for Southeast Asia’s. And then they turn around and do this,” said Samuel.

China’s action, combined with pressures from the U.S., Australia and other regional players, may lead to a “slow spiral” and a “race to the bare minimum” of what the treaty demands, he said, rather than furthering more aspirational, peace-oriented goals.

Aside from the South Pacific NWFZ, similar structures exist across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Central Asia, plus Mongolia. Antarctica, outer space and the ocean floor are similarly off-limits for the stationing of nukes, as agreed by the international community.

China last fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific in September 2024. The U.S. conducted a comparable ballistic missile test in March of this year, though its missile splashed down in a part of the Pacific Ocean not covered by any nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

Defense Logistics Agency head Yusuf Jauhan told reporters in late June that plans to domestically produce the jets will not materialize, confirming speculations that Jakarta had cancelled agreements to domestically manufacture the Korean jets under a 2015 co-production agreement.

The KF-21 Boramae, developed by Korea Aerospace Industries, is a twin-engine fighter designed to succeed South Korea’s aging F-4 and F-5 fleets. Indonesia intended to use these jets to replace older warplanes.

Jakarta had initially agreed to cover 20% of the development cost, then priced at 1.6 trillion won ($1.3 billion), to be paid until 2026. The deal includes the transfer of one prototype and technology that would allow state-owned PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI) to produce 48 units of KF-21 Block-I fighter jets in Bandung.

But the agreement had been bogged down by delayed payments and allegations of sensitive data theft, which were carried into numerous renegotiations on cost-sharing arrangements.

In 2024, Jakarta requested to extend the payment timeline until 2034, but Seoul declined because it would derail deployment plans. The countries eventually agreed to reduce Indonesia’s contribution to 600 million won, but the deal will significantly lessen tech transfer coverage.

There had been confusion on the status of the KF-21 co-production deal, which had been kept tightly under wraps.

Earlier in April, Indonesian authorities revealed that the KF-21’s domestic production would no longer push through and confirmed in June that the government had scrapped the program.

This comes after Jakarta finished settling the 600 million won commitment under the reduced agreement in exchange for a single-seat KF-21 prototype. Officials also said they are more interested in buying ready-made jets.

Jakarta’s decision “appears to be largely practical and financial,” Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute think tank, told Defense News.

“Indonesia may still want the aircraft, but not necessarily the burdens of local co-production. From Seoul’s perspective, this is probably easier to manage and potentially more attractive for the KF-21’s broader export campaign,” Kim said.

If Jakarta’s plans push through, Indonesia would also become a good first reference case for the KF-21 jets and will boost its market potential, Kim said.

Local officials said that procurement plans are still being explored. PTDI told Defense News that internal discussions are ongoing and no definitive plan has been established.

While purchasing the KF-21 remains on the table for Jakarta, official sources told Defense News the odds are in favor of existing contractors with more attractive tech transfer arrangements.

Officials are reportedly weighing the purchase of 24 additional French Dassault Rafale jets to supplement the 42 jets the government ordered under a contract signed in 2022.

Jakarta also signed in April an overseas loan scheme to buy 48 KAAN stealth jets from Turkish Aerospace Industries worth $10 billion, which will be delivered beginning in 2032.

Editor’s note: This story was updated to correct the name of the president of the Security Management Institute think tank.

The three nations said on Friday they had handed the 18-month contract to Edgewing, the industrial consortium grouping firms building the sixth-generation fighter.

The announcement came three days after the announcement of the U.K.’s delayed Defence Investment Plan (DIP), which contained funds for the fighter.

“The £4.6 billion contract will enable completion of the advanced concept and assessment phase of the program, and further joint detailed design and development,” the tri-nation agency running the program announced.

As the partners awaited the publication of the DIP this spring, they handed firms a £686 million stop-gap contract to keep work going until June 30.

To the relief of the partner firms, the DIP - which was released on the same day the stop gap contract expired - committed £8.6 billion ($11.4 billion) over four years to the program, more than the £6 billion expected.

The U.K.’s delay in finding the GCAP money sparked criticism from Japan, which is anxious to get a sixth-generation jet flying by the planned GCAP delivery date of 2035.

Japan’s prime minister reportedly threatened to pull out of a planned visit to the U.K. before the G7 in June if the U.K. failed to promise funding.

The signing of the contract comes days ahead of the opening of the U.K. Farnborough airshow this month.

U.K. defense procurement minister Luke Pollard called the contract “a major step forward towards delivery” of the GCAP.

He added, “This milestone strengthens our partnership with international allies, supports thousands of highly skilled jobs across the UK, and will give the RAF the tools they need to keep the UK safe, all backed by an £8.6 billion commitment in the defense investment plan.”

Edgewing, the industrial consortium running the program teams local champions BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co. Ltd. (JAIEC).

Edgewing is now expected to hand its own contracts to tri-nation consortia managing the electronics and propulsion on the jet.

Sunk more than 200 nautical miles off the coast in the Mariana Islands Range Complex, the death knell to the Juneau came from a torpedo strike from a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force submarine.

“This SINKEX provided an outstanding opportunity for our joint team to integrate capabilities across domains, honing the lethal precision and coordination essential for high-end maritime operations in the Pacific theater,” said Rear Adm. Eric Anduze, commander of Carrier Strike Group 5 and Task Force 70.

Valiant Shield involving the U.S., Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand is a biennial field training that builds real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces through detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, in space, on land and in cyberspace, according to the Navy.

The SINKEX of the USS Juneau comes nearly 84 years after the first USS Juneau, CL-52, was infamously sunk by a Japanese torpedo during the Guadalcanal campaign in November of 1942. Upon contact with the torpedo from Japanese submarine I-26, the Juneau exploded and sank within minutes. Only 10 crew members survived the attack — and among those lost were the five Sullivan brothers. As a result of their loss, according to Naval History and Heritage Command, the U.S. Navy barred close relatives from serving onboard the same ship.

Juneau (LPD-10) entered service in 1969, seeing action in the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm. It was decommissioned in 2008 and was moored in Naval Sea Systems Command Inactive Ships On-Site Maintenance Office at Pearl Harbor before being used by the U.S. and its allies as a means to gain proficiency and confidences in their weapons systems that can not be duplicated in simulations.

According to the Navy, prior to the sinking of any vessel for participation in a SINKEX, each vessel is put through a rigorous cleaning process, “including the removal of all liquid polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from transformers and large capacitors, small capacitors to the greatest extent practical, and all trash, floatable materials, mercury or fluorocarbon-containing materials, and readily detachable solid PCB items. Petroleum is also cleaned from tanks, piping, and reservoirs.”

In addition, a Navy environmental, safety and health manager and a quality assurance supervisor are on hand to inspect the environmental remediation conducted.

Yet this modernization push has major knock-on effects in terms of logistics support.

Brigadier Ben McLennan, the brigade’s commander, told Defense News, “The Australian Army is undergoing its most significant recapitalization, at least since World War Two, and I’d say it’s happening at record pace.”

Yet he noted most of his bandwidth is invested on how to sustain this armored brigade that has “the potential to be the most lethal formation of its type on the planet.”

McLennan quoted figures to underscore the criticality of logistics. “This brigade’s heavy armored vehicle fleet increases 630% in three years. Also, the brigade is going from 3,200 to around 4,000 personnel in three years,” including growth in “the very, very important logistics echelon.”

As another example of the growing sustainment burden, McLennan said his former multirole combat brigade is moving from an average of 40,000 liters (roughly 10,000 gallons) of diesel per day in high-intensity operations to a daily fuel requirement of over 300,000 liters (79,000 gallons).

Bulking up on armor

An important reason for such a thirst for fuel stems from heavier armored vehicles. For example, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment has already received its full complement of new M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks.

Furthermore, two armored engineering squadrons will have received all their Abrams-based combat engineering vehicles – the M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle and M1074 Joint Assault Bridge – by the end of 2026.

The first Hanwha AS9 Huntsman self-propelled howitzer (SPH) has arrived in Townsville, and due next year are Hanwha AS21 Redback infantry fighting vehicles. Then, Rheinmetall’s Boxer 8x8 combat reconnaissance vehicle will start replacing the long-serving ASLAV in 2028.

McLennan added, “Our stock of M88A2 recovery vehicles has tripled over the two years that I’ve been here, and our armored logistics battalion increases by a subunit at the end of this year.”

It is not just heavy armor that is snowballing either, for the brigade is adopting greater numbers of aerial drones for logistics, surveillance and attack. The commander revealed that unmanned ground vehicles will arrive soon too, including variants that can enter minefields dragging a tube full of explosives to clear paths.

All these new weapon systems require rearming too. McLennan spoke of the need for resilient logistics units “to move the heavy natures of ammunition and the increasing types of ammunition: 30mm, Spike LR, different types of 155mm, a whole lot more 12.7mm.”

He pointed out the brigade’s heavy-duty expansion “will take us from about 30 pallets of ammunition a day to 105 when we factoring us conducting high-intensity combat as a brigade with all our equipment. So it’s a significant transformation.”

Artillery advances

The brigade’s 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery is trading in its M777A2 towed howitzers for the AS9 Huntsman. The first 155mm SPH reached 106 Battery in late May, and the unit will eventually have a full allotment of six AS9s plus three AS10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles.

The regiment’s two other batteries will be identically equipped by the end of 2027. Significantly, the 4th Regiment is moving from four M777A2s per battery to six AS9s, with McLennan claiming the new structure and platforms “increase our capability, our firepower, our mobility, our protection by at least 300%.”

Maj. Fergus Robinson, commander of 106 Battery, highlighted: “One of the biggest challenges for soldiers will be vehicle husbandry – this is your vehicle, this is your home and you’re responsible for it. Their ability to maintain the vehicle, as well as the weapon system, is extremely important.”

Given the hulking size of the 48-ton AS9s and their supporting AS10s, the 4th Regiment will receive M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicles for the first time. “That will be something where we need to practice and develop our own skills to get it to a mature point, where we’re confident we can do this under night, under fire, under contact,” Maj. Robinson admitted.

Base infrastructure

All this expansion in capability requires new infrastructure, with McLennan discussing a transformation at the brigade’s home turf of Lavarack Barracks in Townsville.

“We’ll have opened by the end of the year probably the best common user facility, certainly in the Southern Hemisphere and perhaps the most modern in the world, that services all these fleets with light- and medium-grade repair.” That infrastructure work continues over the next couple of years as new equipment pours in.

As an example, the artillery regiment opened a new maintenance hangar in May. This features a 10-tonne gantry crane that permits vehicle power pack changes.

McLennan added: “Concurrently, additional range facilities are being built up at the Townsville Field Training Area to enable the armored brigade to achieve its mission-essential task lists in training year on, year on.”

Greater lethality

While some army units around the world are seeking to become lighter and more mobile, the opposite is true of Australia’s 3rd Brigade.

As McLennan explained to Defense News: “The fact is that the combined-arms fighting system – not just tanks, but armored engineering vehicles, self-propelled artillery – are just as relevant, if not more relevant, than ever. They’re adapting to the threat and also the technologies that can help them reach a level of potential that we previously couldn’t.”

He said “we’re very, very focused” on this transformation, and “we’re drawing lessons from others who are doing it for real routinely.”

As well as transforming the 3rd Brigade, the Australian Army is simultaneously raising a Littoral Maneuver Group, maturing its 10th Brigade equipped with HIMARS and NASAM, and inducting the AH-64E Apache helicopter.

The Army’s little-known fleet of watercraft included about 70 Pacific-based vessels in 2024, down from 134 in 2018. According to a Government Accountability Office report published two years ago, the mission-capable rate of the remaining vessels has sharply declined, from more than 70% in 2020 to less than 40% in 2024.

In a roundtable with reporters this month, Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, commander of the Hawaii-based 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said the command had requested that industry deliver an autonomous vessel for testing as early as next summer, in hopes of rapidly building a fleet of 30 to 100 drone boats.

While the Army considered divesting its fleet around 2019, it has since reversed course, making key moves in recent years to build up both vessels and personnel to man them. In 2024, the service activated its first new composite watercraft company in years, the 5th Transportation Company out of Yokohama, Japan.

And just this year, 8th TSC’s lone Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) – the first of a small fleet of landing craft intended to replace the Vietnam-era Landing Craft Mechanized-8 – executed a first with a littoral high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) launcher insertion on an austere beach.

“We can always use more watercraft,” Gen. Ronald Clark, head of U.S. Army Pacific, said earlier this year at the Land Forces Pacific symposium, according to a Stars and Stripes report. “Any commander that tells you he doesn’t need more is probably shooting beneath the target.”

Gardner and his senior enlisted adviser, Sgt. Maj. Montrell Kea, said they expected the future autonomous vessels to be heavy-duty, capable of carrying eight to 10 standard-size shipping containers.

“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner said. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”

He added that the plan would be to control the autonomous vessels from 8th TSC headquarters, saving on mariner manpower and travel duty status costs.

“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner said.

Gardner didn’t name any companies he expected to be in the running to deliver these large autonomous vessels. Earlier this month, Army officials announced they had used much smaller autonomous boats in the Philippines to escort a logistics support vessel, in another demonstration of the capabilities of drone watercraft.

“Industry partners have come out and demonstrated some unmanned vessels within the Pacific as a part of U.S. Army Pacific’s experimentation,” Gardner said.

“I don’t want to get ahead of where we are from a contracting, but we have offered up through Army senior leaders, that if we could have the opportunity to test and evaluate a contracted vessel as early as this time next summer, and we think that opportunity looks to be there as industry partners are developing capability. So we’ve asked to try to get the first one of those out to Hawaii next summer, so that way it would be able to participate in our ability to move equipment and supplies around Hawaii from like Oahu, say over to the Big Island of Hawaii. And so that is what we’re pressing for right now.”

In the meantime, Gardner said, the Army is actively pulling stored watercraft out of prepositioned stocks to position them forward in the Pacific, and contracting with two U.S.-flagged crewed offshore support vessels, crewed by Army mariners. The Army’s ultimately expected to receive six more Maneuver Support Vessels (Light), all prepositioned forward in Japan.

Even with autonomous vessels in the mix, training more soldiers to operate and supervise boats remains a priority. Gardner said the Army’s next composite watercraft company was set to become active in October, with another one to follow next year that could encompass autonomous as well as manned watercraft.

“We’re recruiting and training and bringing those that may have been previously in staff positions to bring them back on ocean status as we bring up that force structure in the theater,” he said.

He stressed that no Army plan has autonomous vessels taking over all watercraft duties; instead, they’ll be used in concert with strategically employed manned vessels, even at full fleet strength.

“I use autonomous watercraft to do routine delivery, and then I see my manned Army watercraft systems to really give commanders operational maneuver to deliver at the time and place of our choosing, on the beach, that maybe an autonomous watercraft doesn’t have the capability to do, but current Army watercraft systems are designed to do,” he said. “So one does kind of port-to-port, and then Army watercraft systems would then do, you know, from the ocean to a beach of our choosing.”

The U.S. Embassy in the Philippines announced this week the transfer of the AUSVs worth 754 million pesos ($13 million) and produced by American firm Ocean Aero to the sea forces to enhance capabilities “to detect and respond to maritime challenges and illegal maritime activities.”

The transfer comes after the Armed Forces of the Philippines revealed that China discreetly deployed a 6x6 meter floating platform equipped with an antenna in late May at the southeastern portion of Scarborough Shoal, a fishing lagoon within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Philippine officials claim the platform was being used to illegally gather Philippine maritime data and could serve as a prelude for China’s island-building activities. Philippine officials lodged diplomatic protests, and China removed the structure last week.

Solar-powered Tritons are capable of autonomous navigation both on the surface and underwater and can support a diverse array of missions such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, maritime strike, and mine countermeasures.

The drones can be fitted with video cameras, thermal imaging and sonars, and may be deployed from shore, vessels, or aircraft. It can dive down to 100 meters and remain underwater for 10 days. It can also conduct surface patrols for up to 30 days.

In Ocean Aero’s headquarters in Gulfport, Mississippi, the AUSVs are mobilized to protect subsea cables from sabotage, and the company has pitched the AUSVs for U.S. Navy mine-clearing in the Strait of Hormuz.

Officials told Defense News the AUSVs were shown to the Navy during the recent iteration of Exercise Balikatan and are among a series of systems and platforms the U.S. had planned to transfer to the Philippines to boost military capabilities.

The Tritons will also boost existing efforts to monitor subsea cables and gas pipelines, officials said.

“The ability to monitor and respond to maritime challenges — illegal fishing, gray zone activities, and threats to freedom of navigation — requires persistent, long-endurance awareness that no single ship or aircraft can provide alone. The Triton fills that gap by expanding the capabilities of the Philippine Navy into critical waterways,” U.S. Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Bridgette Walker said in a statement.

The drones are included in the Philippines-U.S. Security Sector Assistance Roadmap, a multi-year agreement to ease the acquisition, transfer, and sharing of equipment like radars and unmanned systems to strengthen maritime surveillance.

Last December, the U.S. Senate earmarked $2.5 billion for Philippine military modernization to be disbursed from 2026 to 2030.

China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, sent Coast Guard ships earlier in June into the waters off the island’s east coast for what it called a “special maritime traffic law-enforcement operation,” angering Taipei.

China said the operation was in response to an announcement by Japan and the Philippines that they would begin formal talks on their maritime boundaries, which Beijing viewed as involving Chinese waters off Taiwan.

China has also been sending maritime survey ships into the same waters.

“China’s actions are deeply destabilizing,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson said regarding reports that Chinese Coast Guard vessels were harassing commercial ships.

“We reject any assertion by China of authority to interfere with freedoms of navigation or overflight, the freedom to lay cables, or other lawful uses of the sea,” the U.S. official said, adding that Beijing was undermining the peaceful resolution of issues that it claims to seek.

The de facto British, French and German embassies in Taipei said in a separate but rare joint statement that the Chinese activity was concerning.

“These actions threaten regional stability and the freedom of navigation and safety of international shipping. We reiterate our opposition to any unilateral change to the status quo, particularly by threat or use of force or coercion,” they said.

“It is fundamental that all navigational rights and freedoms and the safety of seafarers and vessels are guaranteed and respected.”

China’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The U.S., Britain, France and Germany, like most countries, have no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. But like many Western countries, they have repeatedly voiced concern at Chinese pressure against Taiwan, whose government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims.

Merchant ships ‘harassed’

Taiwan says the waters off its east coast are not China’s and that Beijing has no right to claim any sort of jurisdiction.

China said the Coast Guard patrol had inspected 198 passing vessels and “rectified violations” involving three ships, carried out a hydrographic survey and patrolled areas where undersea cables are located.

Taiwan has said that three passing merchant ships in the area were “harassed” by the Chinese Coast Guard, which asked them for information about their points of origin and destination and claimed jurisdiction.

Speaking to reporters in Beijing earlier on Wednesday, Zhang Han, a spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, said the waters Japan and the Philippines were seeking to delineate were China’s exclusive economic zone.

She said the patrols were lawful, legitimate and necessary and that they constituted a just action to “safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”

Both awed by — and apprehensive about — U.S. stealth capabilities, China has invested heavily in developing stealth aircraft, as well as anti-stealth air defenses.

But China has learned the wrong lessons from America’s stealth program, according to U.S. Air Force analysis released this month. China is convinced that advanced technology is the foundation of U.S. stealth capabilities.

But in reality, the key to American success has been treating stealth as just one component of integrated aerial warfare, the report said.

China’s “assessments of U.S. stealth often diverge from technical reality and operational practice,” said Maj. Derek Ecklebe, a U.S. Air Force officer and a fellow at the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute.

The reality is that the U.S. treats stealth “as a multifaceted capability that integrates technology with operational tactics to maintain air superiority,” he said. “Stealth technology, while expensive, complex, and important, is only part of the equation.”

China is responding to U.S. stealth warfare with a mixture of fear and confidence.

“Chinese views of stealth as an asymmetric yet counterable U.S. advantage have driven a bifurcated strategy: robust investments in layered air defenses and a rapid program to field domestically developed [low observability] aircraft,” Ecklebe said.

Ironically, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are often depicted as being fixated on technology at the expense of strategy and tactics. But in Ecklebe’s view, it is China that is overemphasizing tech.

Because Chinese experts believe that technology is at the heart of American stealth warfare, then it follows that the best defense against stealth is also technological. Thus, China has poured resources into developing anti-stealth sensors.

Chinese media and military journals suggest that better sensors, such as low-frequency radar, are the best countermeasure against stealth.

“These sources treat stealth as a technical problem to solve with new detection tools,” Ecklebe said. “They present low-frequency radars, passive sensors, and terahertz sensors as potential solutions that could soon counter U.S. advantages.”

But these stealth-busting technologies are either unproven or have limitations, such as accuracy, filtering out clutter or vulnerability to electronic warfare.

“In practice, these systems face significant physical and operational constraints,” said Ecklebe.

Nonetheless, Chinese air defenses should not be underestimated, even against stealth aircraft like the F-35 and B-2.

“What makes China’s defenses formidable is not any single radar or missile, but rather their integration into a unified IADS [integrated air defense system],” Ecklebe warned. “The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has prioritized multi-domain integrated operations, pulling data from low-frequency early-warning systems, passive detectors, and even satellites into shared command centers at the corps level.^”

This same enchantment with technology applies to China’s own stealth aircraft.

China’s J-35 — which looks remarkably like the U.S. F-35 — “replicates features of the U.S. F-35 platform but prioritizes hardware metrics over U.S.-style software-defined adaptability coupled with [tactics, techniques and procedures] modernization,” said Ecklebe.

Ecklebe suggests that China’s perceptions of U.S. stealth aircraft — and their vulnerabilities — may be influenced by problems with Chinese stealth planes, which suffer from issues, such as unreliable engines.

“Mirror-imaging may further contribute to these distortions, as PLA planners project domestic constraints, such as WS-10 and AL-31F engine reliability and modernization issues that limit J-10 and J-20 sortie rates, onto U.S. systems,” he said.

One question is whether Chinese misconceptions of U.S. stealth could increase the chance of war. If Chinese leaders are convinced that better sensors can neutralize American stealth airpower, then they may feel more emboldened to invade Taiwan.

“Chinese strategists appear to view stealth not as an insurmountable barrier but as a factor that can be managed through overwhelming volume and integrated networks, leading to a deterrence posture that emphasizes rapid, decisive action to limit U.S. involvement,” Ecklebe said.