Soldiers from the 125th Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, deployed unmanned surface vessels, or USVs, in Casiguran Sound bay, during an exercise with the Philippine Army. The USVs deployed ahead of a U.S. Army Logistics Support Vessel, or LSV, as it neared Casiguran port, the Army said in a June release, observing the environment and transmitting information to personnel on land.

The operation was part of Salaknib 2026, and supported the transportation of Philippine Army personnel and vehicles — including armored personnel carriers — more than 260 miles to Port Casiguran.

The USVs navigated autonomously using onboard sensors to identify potential threats and provide commanders with a continuous picture of the operating environment.

“We deployed the autonomous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance boats to provide security for landing craft today,” said Pvt. Caleb Hannah, a soldier from the 125th Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion, 25th Infantry Division. “They escorted the LSV to port from about six miles out, allowing Philippine vehicles to roll onto the dock.”

Photos released by the Army appear to show soldiers wading out into chest-deep water to recover a USV with HAVOC branding on its side. HAVOC is a defense technology company that develops autonomous systems.

The demonstration comes as the U.S. military is expanding its unmanned maritime fleet across the Indo-Pacific. Earlier this year, a Navy official said the service expects its fleet of medium unmanned surface vessels to grow from around four vessels in April to more than 30 by 2030, alongside thousands of smaller USVs and unmanned aircraft systems.

“These boats provide situational awareness to commanders with their ability to find, fix, target, kill, and confirm. With the information the USV provides, the commander’s decision-making process has been compressed from hours to seconds,” Ben Outlaw, an industry partner representative supporting the operation, said in the Army’s statement.

News of the exercise comes as the U.S. deployed a USV to help rescue two Army soldiers after their helicopter went down near the coast of Oman. In that incident, a U.S. Navy Corsair operated by 5th Fleet’s Task Force 59 was involved in the recovery. At the time, Capt. Tim Hawkins, a U.S. Central Command spokesperson, said the Task Force had started fielding those drones in the region in late March.

Ukraine previewed the shift weeks before Trump’s signal proved the point. Asked by Defense News earlier this month in Kyiv whether its growing web of weapons deals was changing its hand in the peace talks, Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and the country’s former military intelligence chief, said Kyiv no longer comes to the table empty-handed.

“Ukraine is not a leader that only asks — we are partners who are ready to offer something that will be interesting,” he said. “We will take on what is actually interesting for the USA.”

For most of the war, Ukraine has relied on Western weapons transfers to hold the line. That is starting to change as the United States looks to Ukraine’s interceptor drones to fill gaps in American air defenses that have been put to the test during the Iran war.

“Licenses for the production of our missiles are being perceived positively by the American side for the first time,” Zelenskyy said on Tuesday, describing his conversation with Trump in Évian.

Two days later in Brussels, Zelenskyy’s defense minister signed a separate agreement with Germany to jointly develop anti-ballistic missile defenses, the second major weapons-production deal with a key Western ally in a week.

The war, meanwhile, is grinding toward a possible ceasefire by September, a window Zelenskyy has called the effective deadline for serious talks that have effectively been on hold since February. Ukraine is approaching it with something to trade rather than only a list of needs, according to Budanov.

Some officials still see Ukraine’s stronger negotiating hand as a matter of debate. Trump said in March the U.S. does not need Ukrainian help with drone defense.

“We know more about drones than anybody,” he told Fox News while discussing Kyiv’s offer to share its counter-drone expertise.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, for his part, said over Victory Day last month that the war was “coming to an end,” with victory “always” Russia’s.

Budanov waved off the Russian leader’s optimism as “a classic special information operation.” Putin “will always say they’re good even if they’re collapsing,” he said.

Budanov has bristled at the supplicant framing more broadly. Pushing back at the same briefing on a question about when the war’s hot phase might end, he rejected the idea that Ukraine’s fate rests on what others decide to hand it.

“Stop diminishing our role as if someone has to give us something, tell us something, donate something,” he said.

The leverage is real, in his account, because Russia has exhausted its alternatives. Moscow cannot win the war by force and knows it, he said, which leaves the negotiating table as its only way out.

Ukraine underscored that argument last week, launching its largest-ever drone offensive on Moscow — striking the Russian capital’s main oil refinery twice in a single week — in a deepening campaign against Russian energy infrastructure that Budanov described as designed in part to push the Kremlin toward the negotiating table.

“Both Russia and the United States clearly understand that without resolving our situation, they cannot openly restart their economic relationship,” Budanov said.

On the battlefield, Ukraine’s interceptor technology is improving fast. Ukrainian air defenses downed roughly 92% of the Shaheds and other attack drones Russia launched in May, up from 80% in December 2024, the Defense Ministry reported.

Counting missiles as well as drones, the General Staff put the May intercept rate at more than 88%. Early-June attacks have run at similar levels. Ukraine intercepted 92% of a 272-drone barrage on June 6 alone, according to the Ukrainian Air Force.

Interceptor drones are driving more of those kills. Their share of downed Shaheds has doubled over the past four months, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said May 20. Ukraine produced 100,000 interceptor drones in 2025, a total Fedorov said it doubled in the first four months of 2026 alone.

The deal that would formalize the exchange remains unsigned. A draft memorandum drawn up by the State Department and Ukrainian Ambassador Olha Stefanishyna was completed in May but awaits Trump’s signature amid what CBS News reported as a “lack of buy-in” from senior Pentagon and White House officials.

What shifted the ground beneath that deal is Iran. The war there has freed Washington to refocus on Ukraine, Budanov said, and it exposed the precise shortfall Kyiv is positioned to fill.

The U.S. fired between 1,060 and 1,430 Patriot interceptors during the Iran war at roughly $3.9 million apiece, according to an April CSIS analysis — more than the roughly 600 Patriots Ukraine received from all its Western allies combined across four years of war.

That is the missile Ukraine wants to build. U.S. plants turn out only 60 to 65 Patriot interceptors a month, a rate Zelenskyy told CBS News is “nothing” for today’s challenges. Licensing production to allies, he argued, is the only way to close the gap.

What Ukraine offers in return is the other half of the air-defense problem: Its interceptor drones, built to knock down the cheap Shaheds that swarm Ukrainian cities nightly, run $1,000 to $2,500 apiece, and a new system automates 95% of the intercept, Fedorov said this month.

Ukraine spent more than four years asking for weapons from partners to survive. Now, it is taking the war to Moscow and betting that the pressure forces Russia back to the negotiation table before the September window closes.

“Winning by military means is not working, and they know it perfectly well,” Budanov said of the Russians. “It means you need to negotiate.”

U.S. maintenance facilities would be overwhelmed and would lack sufficient spare parts to repair ships in theater, concluded the study by RAND, a Washington-based think tank. Nor can the U.S. Navy assume that its Pacific allies have adequate shipyard capacity — or political willingness — to fix damaged vessels.

The U.S. Navy has struggled with overworked ships and crews, as well as overburdened shipyards and repair depots. But a war with China, which has the world’s largest navy, would almost certainly result in American ships being hit by everything from ballistic “carrier-killer” missiles, to hypersonic weapons and torpedoes, the study says.

“The Navy has not faced damage at the level likely to occur in a major war since World War II,” warned RAND.

The study recommended that command-and-control authority for repair work be streamlined, including prior agreements with allied nations regarding access to facilities. It also urged the U.S. Navy to expand its mobile repair capabilities, including “deployable repair teams, flyaway assessment units, and scalable Expeditionary Mobile Repair Facilities.”

Barriers to repairs

RAND’s analysis was based on a tabletop wargame conducted in August 2025. The setting was a hypothetical war with China, as U.S. ships race to defend Taiwan from invasion or blockade. The American vessels in question were Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the backbone of the U.S. surface fleet.

The U.S. Navy will need every ship it can get, including damaged vessels patched up and rejoining the fight. However, “existing Navy systems for battle-damage repair are burdened by a variety of inefficiencies that hinder the Navy’s capacity for responding to widespread battle damage,” the study warned.

Analysts also found that “attempting repairs in a hostile Indo-Pacific environment will be significantly more complex than existing plans allow. This complexity creates serious risks to U.S. and allied rapid force regeneration and maritime dominance.”

Meanwhile, Chinese ships would be operating close to their home bases and repair facilities.

“China is not only closer, it also has significantly better industrial repair capability,” Bradley Martin, a RAND analyst who co-authored the report, told Defense News.

Though the game focused on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, repair issues would “apply to all ship classes, and in fact may be more pronounced where nuclear repairs are involved. Issues of access, vulnerability, and industrial capacity apply across all ship classes.”

Rather than combat, the game focused on how damaged ships could be repaired in the Pacific theater and returned to combat, rather than spending weeks limping back to U.S. ports. This would likely require U.S. access to ports and shipyards in allied nations.

During the game, teams represented the U.S. and its allies, including Japan, Korea and Australia.

The four scenarios spanned a variety of situations. They included a U.S. destroyer colliding with a Chinese frigate in the Straits of Malacca, two destroyers damaged by gunfire and rockets from Chinese ships and helicopters while escorting Philippines ships in disputed waters in the South China Sea, several destroyers severely damaged by Chinese anti-ship missiles while defending the Philippines, and multiple destroyers badly damaged while intercepting a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

Poor coordination with allies

The common denominator was that all of the American ships needed quick repairs. But that was easier said than done.

For starters, there were difficulties determining what resources were needed for repairs, and whether a vessel could be fixed locally or would have to sail back to the United States.

Players also “assumed that regulations and standards for repair and maintenance would remain the same in a wartime environment as they are during peacetime,” the report said.

Nor were command arrangements clear. For example, “the group that represented the in-theater logistics and maintenance team at times took actions, specifically those related to in-theater repair options, that the theater operational commander had already rejected because of operational constraints,” said the report.

In addition, coordination was lacking between organizations in the Pacific and the U.S. The U.S. team didn’t fully understand what its Pacific allies could offer.

“U.S. participants demonstrated knowledge gaps about the locations of host nations’ ports, not to mention host nations’ capabilities or access requirements,” the study noted. Though Japan, Korea and Australia have significant resources, “some kinds of operations — such as ordnance handling or a lengthy repair — would bring complications.“

Allied nations were also mindful that repairing U.S. warships could bring Chinese retaliation.

“Japan, the ROK [Republic of Korea], and Australia are in principle committed to supporting U.S. repair, but this cannot be assumed once the threat level starts to escalate,” said Martin.

However, the study did note that “although there were significant knowledge gaps at the outset of the exercise, once ally members explained their capabilities, collaboration was mostly seamless.”

Sufficient spare parts were also an issue, especially for older ships.

“Even ships within the same class can be significantly different from one another,” the study noted. “Some critical parts or systems from one ship might not translate to another ship.”

The PL-16 beyond-visual-range missile as described in social and trade media would answer Lockheed Martin’s AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) for the U.S. armed forces, analysts believe, and improve on previous generations developed in China.

They say China’s missile boasts a long total flight distance estimated at 200 to 300 kilometers (124 to 186 miles) and dual-pulse or variable-thrust rocket motor technology that allow for a second burst of propulsion late in flight, the Indian defense news portal Indian Defence Research Wing said in a June 3 analysis.

Lockheed Martin’s system is also expected to feature extra propulsion for flights beyond visual range and travel at least 200 kilometers.

The PL-16’s specs would let it chase large, slower-moving aircraft, said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst for defense strategy and national security with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. That chase could be a battle changer.

“What matters at those long ranges is maneuverability in the terminal phase and guidance,” Davis said. The PL-16 is designed, he said, to hit airborne early warning and control platforms, refueling tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, so “the likelihood of a kill, even at very long range is very high.

“The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s strategy here is clear – take out the key combat enablers for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, as well as allied forces, and the U.S. and its allies can no longer project naval air power,” Davis said.

“The JTAM was a response to the PL-15, so there is an interesting race between China and the U.S. on beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles underway,” he added. “The key challenge is how quickly the U.S. can get JATM into production, because the Chinese will be moving very fast with PL-16 production.”

It’s unclear whether Washington would jump into any war with Beijing over Taiwan, a decades-old flashpoint, or in the South China Sea where American treaty ally the Philippines is wrangling for control of tiny islets with the Chinese. The U.S. military maintains bases in nearby Guam, Hawaii and Japan in case of an Indo-Pacific conflict.

“I’m pretty sure (PL-16) is going to be a headache for bigger bombers, B52 and the likes, if in range, but I am not quite sure about other smaller, nimbler, faster platforms,” said Enrico Cau, an associate researcher at the Taiwan Strategy Research Association think tank.

The missiles may fit adeptly into the bays of Chinese stealth fighters such as the J-20 and upcoming J-35, the Indian Defence Research Wing said.

A J-20 aircraft that can carry four earlier-generation PL-15 missiles in its internal weapons bay would be able to take as many as six PL-16s, said Huang Chung-ting, associate research fellow with the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.

“This means a J-20 can engage not only one or two more targets but also has a greater capacity to remain in the combat zone after the initial attack, rather than having to retreat after running out of missiles,” Huang said.

With no confirmation from Beijing about the PL-16’s development, analysts and media outlets are relying largely on leaked, sometimes second-hand information including presentation slides shown at a Chinese military aviation seminar.

A post to the image-sharing platform Imgur.com says the Chinese missiles would be four meters long, 203 millimeters in diameter and 200 kilograms.

The PL prefix stands for “Pi Li”, which is Chinese for “thunderbolt.”

The PL-16’s more than 10-year-old predecessor, the PL-15, can fly 200 kilometers, twice as far as the earlier PL-12 and more than three times the maximum distance of the oldest model, PL-11, according to the leaked presentation slides.

“China may indeed be developing a new air-to-air weapon that saves more (aircraft) bay space and allows the J-20 to carry more missiles — this general direction has a certain degree of credibility,” Huang said.

But he cautioned that information online today doesn’t confirm the PL-16’s specs, including its range and type of propulsion technology. Huang said the online material also cannot determine whether the PL-16 has been put into mass use.

The snazzily branded platform, called TrophyLab and accessible at trophylab.mod.gov.ua, currently catalogs more than 115 samples of seized Russian equipment across 79 categories. Users who pass a vetting process gain access to blueprints, component analyses, schematics, and the findings of Ukrainian state laboratories and intelligence agencies − more than 225 studies at present, according to the ministry.

Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the launch on social media Thursday, framing the platform as a strategic tool for “the entire civilized world.” Among the listed items available for study are, for example, a Kinzhal hypersonic missile and a T-90M tank.

Ukraine’s demand for tiny drone laser-targeting systems spurs new product launches

“Every missile, drone and vehicle seized on the battlefield is now a source of knowledge for the free world,” Fedorov wrote.

Beyond digital access, the platform allows verified partners to request the physical hardware itself for non-destructive inspection, disassembly or full destruction testing, a provision that could prove particularly valuable for nations developing electronic countermeasures or seeking to harden their own platforms against specific Russian threats.

Access is not public. Eligible users include Ukrainian defense forces and manufacturers, foreign defense ministries, partner-country defense companies meeting MoD requirements, and accredited scientific institutions. The vetting requirement reflects the sensitivity of the material − some of the captured systems have not been publicly disclosed in technical detail − but also limits the platform’s reach to states and firms already embedded in Ukraine’s defense cooperation network.

The initiative fits into a broader pattern of Kyiv institutionalizing battlefield knowledge as a transferable asset. Among similar moves, Ukraine has previously shared countless hours of frontline drone footage to train allied AI systems and signed a bilateral agreement with Germany − the so-called Brave Germany program − to jointly support startups to develop deep-strike weapons based on lessons learned in the field. Last month, Kyiv also established a formal legal framework for using captured Russian equipment in international defense cooperation.

The aircraft, assigned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing’s Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224 (VMFA-224), became the service’s first to deploy to the Scandinavian country as part of the NATO-led Exercise Ramstein Flag 2026, according to a release.

The June 8-12 exercise featured 19 nations operating out of 15 locations, with the highway air operations involving the U.S. F-35s, Spanish EF-18s and Polish F-16s, according to the release. Finnish air force F/A-18 Hornets were also pictured on the roadway.

“Our mission is to ensure the joint force can fight and win,” Maj. Gen. Daniel Shipley, the commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, said in the release. “Our participation in Ramstein Flag enhances the lethality of the Marine Corps, enables NATO success and guarantees our ability to deter and defeat sophisticated aerial threats.”

Elements of the 2nd MAW were previously slated to participate in the Norway-based Arctic warfare exercise Cold Response 2026 in March, but were pulled back amid concerns over the conflict with Iran.

The non-traditional Finnish highway operation was designed to test combat adaptability in an increasingly contested Arctic, the service said, with air command and control of the highway operations — and other air missions — coordinated from NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center in Bodo, Norway.

“This iteration of Ramstein Flag stretches from the northernmost parts of Norway to the southern reaches of Spain, showcasing Allied Airpower’s 360-degree approach to defend every inch of NATO territory,” U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, commander of Allied Air Command, said in the release. “The scale of this exercise is a testament to NATO’s determination to counter modern and emerging threats through distributed operations across NATO’s Joint Operations Areas.”

Soldiers at Joint Base Lewis-McChord cased the colors of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Forces Headquarters and 7th ID Headquarters Support Company and uncased the 7th Infantry Division (Multi-Domain Command-Pacific) Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion colors, in a merger that was first announced earlier this year.

“We are merging the operational endurance, flexibility and protection of our proven Stryker formations with the long-range sensing and precision fires of our multi-domain task force,” Maj. Gen. Bernard J. Harrington, the commanding general of the 7th ID (MDC-PAC), said in the Army release.

Central to the new command is what the Army calls the Cross Domain Contact Layer, a framework designed to connect intelligence gathering, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence into a continuous network.

It will combine sensors, drones, precision weapons and digital networks into a single architecture spanning land, air, sea, space and cyberspace.

“Through our emerging Cross Domain Contact Layer concept, our division will employ capabilities such as unmanned surface vessels; long-range, one-way attack drones; and launched effects to penetrate the adversary’s anti-access/area-denial network,” Harrington said in the release. “Every radar that emits, every node that transmits, every headquarters that commands, we aim to hold continuously at risk alongside our joint partners and allies.”

The change is part of the Army’s broader transformation initiative. According to the release, the redesignation reflects the service’s push to distribute advanced capabilities across maneuver formations operating in contested environments.

The redesignation builds on years of innovation in the Indo-Pacific, the Army said, including deployments by the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force, or MDTF, and collaboration with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

“These soldiers have invested wholeheartedly in experimenting, deploying, and employing capabilities that work from the heavens to the earth, from the air to the sea, and flow with all the digits that go in between,” said Col. Charles W. Kean, the 7th ID (MDC-PAC) deputy commanding officer-effects and former 1st MDTF commander. “It has truly been inspirational to watch them in action.”

The Qatari-donated Boeing VC-25B Bridge aircraft arrived at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, and will begin its initial commissioning flights, the U.S. Air Force announced Friday.

“Fresh from receiving its new red, white, and blue livery and the final government modifications, the aircraft has entered service to provide critical, secure continuity for the commander in chief,” the release reads.

The Air Force announced the interim presidential aircraft is on track for its summer delivery in May. The move to use the aircraft donated by Qatar followed President Donald Trump’s dissatisfaction of Boeing’s delay to replace the current Air Force One aging planes with the new VC-25B aircraft.

The initial timeline for the replacements was 2024, but a lack of properly cleared workers and supply chain issues pushed the date back to 2028.

The delivery of the Bridge aircraft is meant to relieve pressure on the aging fleet until the long-term VC-25B enters service, the release says.

The aircraft underwent security modifications to ensure it was suitable for a president, and Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink told lawmakers in June 2025 that it would cost less than $400 million to modify.

For the modification’s “final exam,” it must complete commissioning flights that allow White House officials to validate mission-capability and finalize protocols required for the president’s safe and secure transportation, the statement says.

Once the flights are completed, then the aircraft is considered officially “commissioned” into the active executive airlift fleet and will be available for the president’s use alongside the VC-25A and C-32 fleets.

The Air Force has not clarified the specific type of security modifications the aircraft completed, but the service did note in the announcement that it was altered in a “disciplined engineering approach” that prioritized rigorous safety requirements.

The Bridge aircraft is equipped with advanced technologies, with the previous interior layout minimally changed.

Pilots and maintainers began training last October with the lease of an Atlas Air 747-8F and then a purchase of a Lufthansa 747-8i to serve as a full-time training resource for the entire crew.

On top of the aircraft used for training, a three-dimensional mock-up of the Bridge aircraft’s interior was delivered to the White House in January so staff could begin familiarizing themselves ahead of the first commissioning flight.

“Many thought it could not be done, but the United States Air Force was able to execute and provide a secure, reliable airborne command post on an accelerated timeline,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in the release.

The Air Force did not say how many commissioning flights the aircraft is set to complete or when Trump is expected to take his first flight in the new Air Force One.

This news comes after the VC-25A, which Trump was previously using, took its last flight Thursday, according to a social media post by a Trump administration official.

A full U.S. supplemental request, which will include money for the Pentagon as well as non-defense priorities such as farm and disaster relief, could be sent to lawmakers in the coming days, the newspaper added.

Reuters could not immediately verify the report. The Pentagon declined to comment. The White House was not immediately available for comment outside business hours when contacted by Reuters.

The Iran war has cost around $25 billion, a Pentagon official told Reuters in April providing the first official estimate of war costs.

However, the full cost of the conflict, which began alongside Israel on Feb. 28, has remained an open question on Capitol Hill and an initial $200 billion request for additional funding met stiff opposition from lawmakers.

White House budget director Russell Vought told a hearing in April of the House of Representatives Budget Committee that he had no estimate for the cost of the war, as he defended a request for a $1.5 trillion annual military budget.

The proposed budget reflects Republican priorities ahead of November’s midterm elections, where the party is trying to keep control of Congress but is facing growing voter anxiety over rising living costs, high energy prices and the financial burden of the Iran war.

Cutting U.S. troops in Europe places transatlantic trade and investment ties in jeopardy, but additionally, the decision represents a potential missed opportunity – Washington risks giving away something for nothing. Russia wants U.S. troop reductions in Europe, and it’s not too late for the United States to get something in return from Moscow.

Cutting U.S. troops in Europe now carries great risk, but if troops must leave, bargaining with Russia makes far more sense than cutting unilaterally. Doing so could reduce the threat posed by Russian forces to NATO, it could facilitate an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and it could lower the risk posed to the transatlantic trade and investment relationship.

Earlier this month, the United States notified its NATO allies that it would reduce the number of forces it makes available to NATO for the implementation of the alliance’s operations plans. These plans – approved by all allies – were developed by NATO’s American-led military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, and they are largely focused on the defense of allied territory against Russia. The alliance uses the plans to build a list of the required military forces, and then those requirements are apportioned among the individual allies, building a country-by-country capability target list.

The reduced commitments unveiled by the United States earlier this month were, in many ways, expected. They’ve been signaled by American leaders for at least a year, most notably in February 2025 when Secretary of Defense Hegseth announced that Europeans would need to take the lead in conventional defense of Europe.

But keen observers of NATO understand that this trend has been unfolding for years. Between 2017 and 2025, the proportion of all capability targets assigned to the United States dropped from 46 percent to 38 percent. At the same time, the number of high-end, “exquisite” capabilities provided by the United States, such as advanced air defense, were reduced from 13 (out of 26 total) to 5.

In other words, America has long been on the path of reduced commitments in European defense planning, in the name of fair burden-sharing as well as the shifting of U.S. resources to the Indo-Pacific. The latest changes are the result of dialogue between American and European defense planners as well as between U.S. military officials based in Europe and those based in the Indo-Pacific.

These latter discussions, and the analyses that informed them, were necessary to truly assess what was needed by American military leaders based in the Pacific. It should come as no surprise therefore to see that naval and air forces are reportedly on the list of what the United States will no longer make available to fulfill the NATO operations plans.

Coincidentally and largely unrelated to American capability targets and NATO plans, the United States also announced in early May that it would withdraw 5,000 troops from Europe. This decision, in contrast to the one described above, reportedly came as a surprise.

Initially, American military leaders decided that the largest portion of those 5,000 troops would come in the form of a 4,200-person tank brigade deployed to Poland on a rotational basis. However, that decision was quickly reversed following conversations between top American and Polish leaders. Now American military officials in the Pentagon and in Europe are wrestling with how to implement the cut, perhaps considering drawing down U.S. forces that are permanently stationed (usually with families) in places like Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Turkey or the U.K.

Reducing American troops stationed in or rotationally deployed to Europe makes little sense for several reasons. First, most of those troops are ground forces, which are unlikely to be as important for a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Second, basing U.S. troops in Europe can be cheaper than stationing them in the United States, especially when European allies like Poland or Lithuania pick up the costs. And third, U.S. reductions while Russia’s war in Ukraine rages on sends the wrong message to allies and enemies alike.

Even if none of these things were true and it made great sense operationally, fiscally, and strategically to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe, doing so in exchange for nothing amounts to a very bad deal.

Moscow has made clear it doesn’t want U.S. forces based in Europe, so why not bargain with Russia and get something in exchange?

This is precisely what U.S. officials did a generation ago as the Cold War came to an end – they negotiated simultaneous reductions in conventional and nuclear arms with Moscow.

It’s not too late – if Washington is intent on reducing troop levels in Europe, it can still wield this bargaining chip. In exchange for a 5,000 troop cut in U.S. forces based in Europe, Washington could demand Russia end its war in Ukraine, eliminate the military bases it’s been building up near NATO borders, or cease its hybrid war against U.S. and European interests across Europe and North America.

Something – really, anything – is better than nothing.

John R. Deni is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a nonresident senior fellow at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed are his own.

State procurement agency Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency has released notices for a demonstration schedule next month with the goal of fast-tracking acquisitions and expediting mass production and deployment.

The interceptor drone systems are expected to be installed by 2027 near radar sites, bases, vessels and other critical locations, the agency stated.

This follows an earlier notice released by the Ministry of Defense late last month for autonomous unmanned systems that could detect and counter swarms of “multiple long-range suicide UAVs … such as the Shahed-136.”

The envisioned craft should already be in use by other armed forces and have successfully shot down Shahed-like drones, according to the notice. In addition, they must be able to connect with existing radars and command-and-control systems, require two or fewer personnel for stand-off launch and flight management, and need minimal and simple maintenance.

The interceptor drones are recent additions to Japan’s massive UAV fleet plan. The ministry had been in talks with drone firm Terra Drone since the company fielded two types of interceptor drones in Ukraine through Kyiv-based startups.

In March, Terra Drone divulged investments in Amazing Drones to field Terra 1, a rocket-type interceptor, and two months later launched fixed-wing variant Terra 2 through Ukrainian defense tech firm WinnyLab.

The feedback is “very much positive,” company CEO Toru Tokushige told Defense News. He said there had been great interest in the interceptors, especially within the Japanese defense ministry.

Drone technology is quickly evolving in Ukraine, affirming the importance of interceptor drones as low-cost alternatives to interceptor missiles, Tokushige said.

Meanwhile, the conflict in the Middle East has shown the lethality of Shahed-like drones, which have been used more extensively than missiles.

The extended reach of the Shahed drones has also raised the stakes in East Asia. The aircraft flew as far as 1,100 miles from Tehran to Tel Aviv, and while battlefield circumstances and geography vary, the distance means such weapons launched in Northeast Asia could reach Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

“Originally my image of the defense industry is that it’s very much traditional, very much bureaucratic, very slow. But after visiting Ukraine, and also because of the war in the Middle East, everybody understands the value of drones and the value of investing in drones,” Tokushige said.

The Japanese government’s urgent call for proposals comes after reports that the U.S. military’s 38-day Iran campaign under Operation Epic Fury has strained missile stockpiles.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank warned of a “near-term risk” munitions shortage after the Iran campaign, which has already delayed U.S. supply contracts with European allies, raising worries that it could also push back Tomahawk deliveries for Japan.

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi both denied the Tomahawk conundrum, but Koizumi said the ministry plans to develop more domestic missile systems. This comes on top of a recent production agreement under Operation Supercharge, which will see the U.S. and Japan jointly manufacture interceptor missiles such as the SM-6 and SM-3.

Japan’s defensive umbrella, set to be completed in 2027 after five years, includes fielding standoff capabilities, missile defense networks, and unmanned systems such as drones, ground vehicles, and submarines.

Budget allocated for unmanned defense capabilities alone leaped this year to 277 billion yen ($1.72 billion) from 111 billion yen ($690 million) in 2025.

And the government’s move to increase defense spending up to 3.5% of GDP will likely see more investments in unmanned systems. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party on June 9 approved a proposal to produce some 80,000 drones annually by 2030, though allocations have not been finalized.

Addressing the Italian parliament this week, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto said Italy had decided against backing the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) scheme, under which nations agree to fund the purchase of U.S. arms which are then transferred to Ukraine.

“We have said no from the beginning, and it is still a no,” Crosetto said, in reference to PURL.

This month, NATO said contributors have now pledged nearly $6 billion to PURL, with cash to be focused on air defense systems for Ukraine.

NATO has said the scheme has helped fund the purchase from the U.S. of 70% of all missiles for Ukraine’s Patriot batteries and 90% of all ammunition used in other air defense systems.

Contributors include Germany, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden, which said on Thursday it had now put $543 million in the scheme.

Italy’s decision not to participate follows its announcement it will probably not subscribe to the EU’s NEC scheme which allows member states to exempt a quantity of defense spending from calculations of annual deficit spending in order to allow extra arms purchases without breaking EU deficit rules.

Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni has also said Italy may not enter the EU’s SAFE loans program, which would have ensured €14.9 billion in cheap loans for defense spending.

Meloni has warned that her government needs to focus on covering the cost of rising fuel bills. She is focusing a reelection campaign next year at a time when defense spending is falling out of favor with voters.

Crosetto, who is known to be in favor of taking out SAFE loans, told parliament on Wednesday the decision on entering the scheme rested with Italy’s finance ministry.

“The decision to adhere or not adhere to SAFE cannot be taken by the Ministry of Defense,” he said.

Italian government sources told Defense News discussions were still ongoing over using the loans.

On Monday, Crosetto flew to the U.S. to meet US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who posted after the meeting they had agreed on the “urgent need for NATO allies to increase defense spending, expand defense industrial production, and field combat-credible military forces.”

On Thursday, Hegseth was in Brussels, telling a meeting of NATO defense ministers that, “Some of Nato’s largest economies, some of our richest countries, allies that are happiest to go on about the rules-based international order and middle powers banding together, still seem to think the era of free-riding is here.” He did not specify which countries he was referring to.

Even as Meloni speaks of the need to focus on spending at home to reduce the cost of living for voters, Italy has told NATO it will join alliance members in pushing defense spending to 5% of GDP - a total made up of 3.5% in weaponry and 1.5% in spending on domestic security.

Last year, Italy announced it had increased defense spending from around 1.5% to 2% by recategorizing existing spending on Italy’s tax police and coast guard, as well as outlays on space and cyber defense, as defense spending.

On June 11, Meloni said she would announce at the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8 that Italy’s defense spending would hit 2.8% of GDP this year.

That rise comes thanks to “growth of 0.71%, guaranteed above all by spending linked to homeland defense,” she told parliament.

Italian government sources told Defense News that the new spending announced by Meloni would cover border security, cyber, space and dual-use technology and would form part of the 1.5% extra envisaged by NATO.

The Senate Armed Services Committee included a provision in its version of fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act that would reduce funding for Hegseth’s travel to no more than 25% until the committee receives what lawmakers describe as overdue reports and supporting documents.

The committee approved its version of the NDAA last week in an 18-9 vote, sending the bill to the full Senate. House lawmakers advanced their version the week prior.

The provision cuts Hegseth’s travel funding by 75% until the committee receives the civilian harm investigations for three separate 2025 Yemen strikes and the February strike on the girls’ school in Minab, Iran.

On Feb. 28, the first day of the Iran war, a school in southern Iran was struck by a U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile, killing at least 165 people, most of them schoolgirls.

President Donald Trump claimed that Iran could have obtained the missile, despite questions about how Tehran would have gained access. The strike has been under investigation by the Pentagon since March.

Speaking on Wednesday in France, Trump was asked about the investigation and whether anyone in the Trump administration would be held accountable.

“It’s such a strange question to be asked at this state because you’re talking about a long time ago, but nobody did that on purpose,” he said in response.

“Mistakes are made. War is nasty. But I know it’s under investigation, and I could have a report for you tomorrow. I would ask Pete Hegseth that question because they have it under investigation,” he concluded.

Another provision in the Senate NDAA moved to prohibit the use of military funds for the operations against Iran without congressional authorization and restricted travel funding for Hegseth’s office until lawmakers submit a report on how the Iran war has impacted readiness. The amendment failed to pass in a 13-14 vote.

Unedited video of strikes conducted by U.S. Southern Command on terrorist organizations that were allegedly smuggling drugs in Latin American waters would also need to be submitted.

Since September 2025, the U.S. military has conducted strikes on vessels in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean that they alleged were carrying drugs.

As of June 16, the military has disclosed 64 strikes that have killed at least 191 people.

The committee is also seeking information about the Defense Department procedures for notifying Congress about sensitive military operations.

Lawmakers have previously criticized Hegseth over congressional oversight following reports that a special operations team attacked survivors of an alleged drug-smuggling vessel strike off Venezuela’s coast in September 2025.

Hegseth refused to publicly release footage of the attack, instead only showing members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee.

The provision would also require the unredacted investigation by U.S. Special Operations Command into Operation Absolution Resolve, the U.S. military operation executed on Jan. 20 to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

Senate lawmakers also requested a certification that shows contractor support for clandestine and intelligence activities and a report on support to Ukraine required under last year’s NDAA.

Poland has been pushing for a bigger allied presence on NATO’s eastern flank after Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine in 2022.

“I had the opportunity to speak today with the Secretary of War — we discussed collective defense and cooperation,” Kosiniak-Kamysz told reporters in Brussels.

“The U.S. responded positively to Poland’s proposal to establish a permanent U.S. military base in Poland.”

No decision has been taken yet, he added. Poland has so far hosted U.S. troops on a rotational basis.

On Thursday, Hegseth announced a new review of America’s troop deployments in Europe and threatened to withhold some U.S. dues to NATO if “free riding” allies did not meet their defense spending commitments.

One Republican senator called the framework pact announced this week the “worst foreign policy blunder in decades,” another said some reported provisions seemed “ill-advised,” and some pro-Republican commentators also broke with Trump over the agreement.

The criticism was a rare rebuke from members of the Republican Party who have mostly offered full loyalty to the president, but are increasingly restive as the economic effects of the Iran conflict have hurt their prospects ahead of midterm elections in November that will decide control of Congress. Democrats, who are seeking to regain control of one or both of the legislative chambers, have also been critical of the agreement.

The White House sent the text of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding to members of Congress on Thursday, a day after Trump signed the preliminary deal to end the war. The document, seen by Reuters, matched what had been read out by a U.S. official on Wednesday.

Lawmakers from both parties have said they want more information from the White House.

By Thursday, congressional aides said there had been no briefings for Congress on the deal or the administration’s plans, and there had been no announcement that any were scheduled.

Some of the sharpest criticism of the MOU has involved reports that the Trump administration has agreed to release frozen Iranian assets, allow the creation of a $300 billion private wealth fund to trigger investment in Iran and ease sanctions.

‘BLUNDER’

“Iran’s nuclear ambitions were not curbed, and they have learned that threatening the Strait of Hormuz works and will undoubtedly leverage it in the future,” Republican Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana wrote in a post on X.

He noted that before the war, the strait — one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes — was open and Iran faced steep sanctions.

“Now, 13 Americans are dead, families have paid billions at the pump, sanctions will be lifted, and the bombing has stopped. This is the worst foreign policy blunder in decades,” Cassidy wrote.

Roger Wicker of Mississippi, the Republican chairman of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee, said he worried that the MOU “negotiates away” U.S. military successes.

Wicker also said it would be a mistake to force Israel to stand down against Hezbollah in Lebanon and opposed lifting any sanctions on Iran or unfreezing Iranian funds, “in exchange for Iran’s mere agreement to negotiate for another 60 days.”

Trump blasted his critics in a post on social media.

“These fools, who think I haven’t been tough enough on Iran, when the Stock Market Just Hit A RECORD HIGH, and Oil prices are ‘tumbling’ down, are either jealous, bad people, or stupid. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!! President DJT” he wrote.

The agreement to end the conflict and open the economically vital Strait of Hormuz is in some ways a positive for Trump, who has needed a way out of a conflict that has driven up energy prices and sapped U.S. military resources. And the final agreement, still to be negotiated, could provide additional gains for the U.S.

But critics argue that the interim deal offers Iran significant benefits in return for giving the United States two things it had before — an open strait and a promise from Iran to not develop a nuclear weapon.

COMMENTATORS: ‘A DISASTER’

Ben Shapiro, a conservative pundit and podcaster who had previously cheered the U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, blasted the memorandum of understanding as a “disaster,” but placed the blame on Vice President J.D. Vance. Shapiro said Vance had failed Trump by backing the deal.

“This MOU appears to be, just from the text, a disaster that does not achieve any of the actual signal goals that were set by the administration,” Shapiro told Fox News on Wednesday.

Mark Levin, one of Trump’s most outspoken supporters, has also broken with him over the deal. On Thursday, the conservative Fox News commentator took aim at Republican Senator Roger Marshall of Kansas for suggesting Iran should be allowed to retain ballistic missiles for defensive purposes.

“This man should never be elected dogcatcher,” Levin said of Marshall in a Thursday post on X, calling the administration’s decision not to include ballistic missiles in the agreement an “outrage.”

“To downplay the damage these missiles do (ask the Arab countries what they think about ballistic missiles) and the significance of not including them in any deal is utterly irresponsible,” Levin wrote. “Iran is a terrorist regime that has killed our people, how many more times do we need to be reminded of this.”

Still, many Republicans praised the agreement.

On KCMO Radio, Marshall praised Trump for choosing “a path to lasting peace — not another forever war,” and said there would be controls on how Iran spends the money it receives and that it would not come from U.S. taxpayers.

Lawmakers may eventually review a deal. Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), passed after Democratic President Barack Obama’s international Iran nuclear pact, any agreement involving Iran’s nuclear program and the easing of sanctions must be reviewed by Congress.

The Trump administration has given mixed signals about whether he planned to do so, but several lawmakers, including Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a close administration ally, have said it must be sent to Capitol Hill.

The Air Force made the announcement Wednesday, saying it reached the decision four months ahead of schedule. The contracts went to General Atomics for its FQ-42A and Anduril for its FQ-44A, as part of CCA Increment 1.

The two aircraft were previously designated the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A. Dropping the Y prefix signals their shift from prototype to production.

Often referred to as “loyal wingmen,” CCA are jet-powered, semi-autonomous unmanned aircraft built to fly alongside crewed fighters such as the F-35 and the planned F-47, extending their sensors and weapons while taking on risk that would otherwise fall to pilots.

“Collaborative Combat Aircraft change how we project power and generate mass in highly contested environments,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in the release. “Delivering this capability to our warfighters faster ensures our forces maintain the tactical edge required to deter and, if necessary, defeat any adversary.”

The Air Force is committing to a large CCA fleet, though it won’t happen all at once. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said the contracts reaffirm the service’s confidence that it can buy more than 150 combat-capable CCA by the end of the decade, well below the program’s long-term goal of roughly 1,000.

“By moving fast from competitive selection into full-scale manufacturing, we position ourselves to field highly credible and combat-ready semi-autonomous systems to stay ahead of the pacing challenge,” Meink said in the announcement.

Separately, the Air Force opened a competition for the software that will operate the CCA.

“Mission autonomy is the cornerstone of the CCA concept, and leveraging a competitive, multi-vendor environment ensures we capture the latest technology,” Meink said, noting that this approach capitalizes on current technology while leaving room for future breakthroughs.

Six companies won spots in a six-year pool: Anduril, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, RTX Collins Aerospace and Shield AI.

From that group, the service picked three to begin work on autonomous software right away. Anduril, RTX Collins Aerospace and Shield AI will take part in the first of two six-month rounds of head-to-head competition.

The service said those three were chosen based on their ability to meet the program’s schedule and cost demands. The Air Force plans to name a single primary software provider for Increment 1 by summer 2027.

Using an approach the Air Force calls first-of-its-kind, the service will pay the full licensing fee only if a vendor “provides a combat capability aligned with warfighter needs and feedback.”

This arrangement affords the Air Force the ability to acquire and implement state-of-the-art technology that is continually evolving.

Despite three companies getting first crack at developing the autonomy software, the Air Force may award software licenses to any of the six vendors within the pool at any point over the next six years.

Providing the foundation for this strategy is the government-owned Autonomy Government Reference Architecture, a modular, open-systems approach that enables the Air Force to move software between aircraft and avoid being locked into a single vendor.

The service said in February that it had integrated government-owned autonomous software into both prototypes using that architecture, which it called proof the software could move across vendors and platforms.

The contracts come on the heels of the service’s fiscal 2027 budget request, which marked the first time it asked Congress for money to buy CCA rather than just develop them.

The service declined to disclose the value of the contracts or how many of each aircraft the two companies will build.

“We don’t want this war, we never did, and everyone knows it, and our partners know it,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a voice message sent to reporters on a WhatsApp group. “But if Ukraine burns, your Moscow will burn.”

Russia, for its part, fired missiles into Kyiv, also for the second time this week, following the attack that damaged the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery and drew international condemnation. Russia denied striking it.

In Moscow, Reuters saw flames and plumes of smoke over the densely populated southeastern district of Kapotnya, where the refinery supplying the capital is located.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said that several drones managed to reach the refinery, adding that a shopping centre also suffered minor damage.

DIPLOMATIC PUSH

Russia’s defense ministry said 555 drones were shot down across the country. Sobyanin said 180 were shot down around Moscow alone. State news agency TASS said the attack on Moscow was one of the biggest this year.

Zelenskyy confirmed the attack on the refinery. Ukraine’s military said that Ukrainian forces also hit an oil depot in Russia’s southern Rostov region and another two bridges as Kyiv intensifies its campaign to hamper Russia’s logistics.

More than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has increasingly been targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure with long-range drone strikes, while Russia has continued firing missiles at Ukrainian cities.

After years when Russian forces made slow but relentless gains on the battlefield, Kyiv says its improving drone capabilities are shifting the war’s momentum in its favor, providing new impetus for Moscow to agree a peace deal.

Zelenskyy has launched a diplomatic push to increase pressure on Russia to negotiate an end to the war.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?’ I can answer. Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people. Now that you know what’s going on, ask Putin when he is planning to end it,” Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha posted on X.

MOSCOW SAYS ATTACK PUSHES BACK PROSPECT FOR TALKS

Moscow, which says Ukraine is losing, has demanded Kyiv cede its territory before it will discuss peace.

Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said that Ukraine’s latest attacks on Russia are pushing back the prospect of any direct contacts between President Vladimir Putin and Zelenskyy, the Interfax news agency reported.

Zelenskyy called the attacks on Russia a “totally fair response to Russian strikes on our cities and communities and another important result of the work of our soldiers on facilities that provide support for the Russian war machine.”

A drone strike on Tuesday on Moscow’s refinery had already halted operations there, sources said, adding to widespread damage to Russian energy facilities.

Russia, the world’s third-biggest oil producer and a major oil and fuel exporter, is set to import fuel by sea this month as it seeks to manage a gasoline shortage following Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries, according to industry sources.

In the surrounding Moscow region, a high-rise residential building, an industrial facility and a number of private houses were damaged in the drone attack, which also injured 16 people, the regional governor said.

Flights were suspended at all Moscow airports and traffic shut on the highway around the capital near the refinery. Sheremetyevo airport, Moscow’s busiest, said it had been evacuated.

Elsewhere in Russia, officials said a Ukrainian drone strike killed a man in his car in the Belgorod border region, and a Ukrainian drone attack killed one person and caused a fire at two commercial facilities in the Rostov region.

EXPLOSIONS IN KYIV

Meanwhile explosions rang out in Kyiv and airstrike alerts were issued for most of Ukraine’s territory.

Tymur Tkachenko, the head of Kyiv’s military administration, said Russia was attacking the capital with ballistic missiles. There were no further reports from the authorities on damage or casualties in the city.

Authorities in the northeastern Ukrainian city of Sumy said one person was killed in a drone attack overnight, while a man was killed and a further 11 people were injured in a Russian attack on the southeastern city of Dnipro early on Thursday, the regional governor said.

An attack helicopter went down off the coast of Oman this month after a Shahed drone engaged with the aircraft. Though the Pentagon said that its two crew members were rescued by an unmanned surface vessel hours later, public details surrounding the incident remain sparse.

The military’s investigation may ultimately determine what happened between the Apache and drone, but for experts and analysts, the event is a snapshot into how warfare is changing: attack helicopters, once the apex predators of the battlefield, must learn to navigate an ecosystem crowded with unmanned systems that are smaller, cheaper and deadlier than ever before.

The interaction itself seemed an anomaly.

Iranian Shahed-136 drones are typically programmed to fly to set coordinates before launch, which makes them adept at striking targets that do not move, according to Kelly Campa, Middle East Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War.

“A Shahed hitting a helicopter is highly unusual,” Campa said, noting that Russia has increasingly used remotely guided Shahed variants capable of striking moving targets, like trains.

Campa added that Russia, however, generally has not used those variants to attack aircraft without additional modifications like small missiles, and Iran has not publicly demonstrated similar capabilities.

The unusual nature of the incident — and the scarcity of publicly available information — has made drawing definitive conclusions difficult.

Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, said several explanations for the Apache’s downing are plausible.

The helicopter may have collided with the drone while attempting an intercept, interacted with a more advanced variant than the baseline Shahed design or encountered a drone with a proximity fuse, which detonates near a target instead of on contact.

“The fact that both crew members survived and appear to have made a controlled water landing argues against a direct impact with the warhead,” she said, because if a drone’s warhead blasted into the Apache and detonated, the damage would likely be catastrophic and unsurvivable.

To some analysts, the more pressing question is not what happened between the Apache and drone, but what the incident says about the helicopter’s place in modern warfare.

Apaches, heavily armed to destroy tanks and support ground troops, have historically occupied a fearsome skyward position atop the battlefield hierarchy. However, experts say the proliferation of increasingly capable unmanned systems is challenging that dominance.

Doug Birkey, the executive director of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, said the incident is a warning sign after operating in relatively permissive environments during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“This should be the last fight where we use a lot of legacy constructs, technologies, etc.,” he said, calling the conflict a “transition” into a different way of war.

“It’s time to move on to some newer capabilities and ways of warfighting,” he said.

The Army is moving in that direction, and in March, the service received its first pilot-optional Black Hawk helicopter for testing.

Birkey also pointed to the need to couple crewed-capabilities with uncrewed assets.

“Could you partner that Apache with an uncrewed asset to net similar effect?” he asked, adding that the military could “keep the human cognition and some of those mission capabilities proximate, but you don’t put them in the immediate line of fire.”

Those changes may already be taking shape. One expert sees the early June incident as evidence that developments associated with the war in Ukraine may be appearing elsewhere.

“It was the Shahed being used as anti-helicopter,” said Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “That had happened in Ukraine. It had not happened in the Gulf.”

Apache helicopters routinely fly missions over and around the Strait of Hormuz, Cancian said, attacking Iranian speedboats and shooting down drone threats.

The helicopters can still do those things, he added, but doing so may require more controls — like potentially moving the aircraft in groups — and less freedom than in the past.

For crews, that means operating in an environment where the margin for error is shrinking and the risks are heightened.

One helicopter pilot who underwent underwater escape training recalled being taught to expect disorientation and complete darkness while trying to egress from an inverted cabin after an aircraft goes down in water and rolls over.

Before the training, Kurt Rosell described the experience as his “biggest fear.”

And while exactly how the two rescued crew members survived remains undisclosed, they certainly trained for the risk of going down over water: a scenario with a water-filled cabin where there was only one certainty: bubbles always rise.

Speaking to the press before a meeting of NATO defense chiefs in Brussels, German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius said that the mine-clearing ship Fulda and the supply ship Mosel had passed the Suez Canal. They are bound for Djibouti, which they are expected to reach in five to seven days and where they will be refueled and restocked.

A total of 140 German soldiers are aboard the ships, according to the German Ministry of Defense, including mine clearance divers, vessel protection teams and “autonomous systems.”

The two ships are currently operating under the EU operation Aspides, which was launched in response to the strikes against commercial ships by the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. During their Red Sea transit, the ships will contribute to the situational awareness of the EU naval mission as a whole, the German MOD said in a press release.

A mission in the Strait of Hormuz would require separate parliamentary approval, Pistorius said. The Ministry of Defense said it intended to present a corresponding resolution to the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, before the summer recess, which is set to begin on Jul. 10.

Additional preconditions for a German involvement in the strait include a durable end to hostilities surrounding Iran, as well as an international mandate.

France’s Mediterranean armada signals clout as Middle East may rethink alliances

Pistorius also outlined the need for a “permissive environment” on Thursday, saying that included “in particular, the consent of Iran and Oman for the relevant mine-clearing activities.”

He welcomed the negotiated cessation of hostilities between the U.S. and Iran but said the details of any possible German mission would depend significantly on the outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran over the course of the next 60 days.

A multinational naval mission in the Strait of Hormuz has been brewing for months, led by the United Kingdom and France and including Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Japan, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden, as of May 12.

On Monday, the leaders of France, the UK, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement welcoming the ceasefire announced by U.S. President Trump and reaffirming that their countries remained committed to a “strictly defensive and independent mission to reassure commercial shipping and conduct mine clearance operations.”

Iran has previously warned European nations not to send warships to the region, even for the stated objectives of mine clearing and protecting shipping. In May, Tehran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, warned that European warships would be met with a “decisive and immediate response” from the Iranian armed forces.

“The Strait of Hormuz is not a property shared with powers from beyond the region, and Iran, as a littoral state, has the right to exercise sovereignty and determine its legal arrangements,” Gharibabadi was quoted by Iranian media at the time.

Hegseth, addressing defense ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, said the U.S. review would last for up to six months and include consultations with the U.S. Congress, which has legislated a minimum number of U.S. forces in Europe.

While he did not explicitly say the review could result in reductions in U.S. force deployments in Europe, he stressed the goal would be to prompt the continent to do more while ensuring the U.S. military would be able to meet its global commitments.

“Make no mistake about it, this will be a real review. It will be designed to ensure that NATO is moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe leading, stepping up to take primary responsibility for the defense of Europe,” Hegseth said.

Report: US to cut strategic bombers and warships available to NATO in a crisis

Hegseth also slammed allies who did not support the United States during its war with Iran, after some denied the U.S. basing and overflight rights for war-related activities.

He said the U.S. review would ensure U.S. basing and overflight rights were assured.

His comments came as countries in the alliance scrambled to fill gaps in their crisis forces — national capabilities committed to the transatlantic alliance in an emergency — after Washington cut some contributions with immediate effect.

The U.S. told its allies last month that it had decided to shrink the pool of U.S. military capabilities available to the alliance in a crisis, raising urgent questions as leaders prepare for a NATO summit in Ankara on July 7-8.

The move is meant to gradually end an “unhealthy co-dependence” on U.S. forces as Washington faces the potential of simultaneous conflicts in multiple theaters, according to NATO’s top commander, U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich.

Arriving for a meeting with his counterparts at NATO’s Brussels headquarters, Hegseth said the United States would be candid in public and private about countries that need to do more to meet their commitments.

“(There are) some that still need to do more, and we will be candid about that, both in private and in public. I think that’s important, friends being honest with friends,” Hegseth said.

“NATO 3.0 is post-Cold War recognition that it needs to go back to a real hardline military alliance that has real military capabilities capable of deterring right here on the continent and taking the lead for the conventional defense of Europe.”

‘It is immediate’

NATO chief Mark Rutte acknowledged that the reduction of U.S contributions to NATO’s crisis forces has already taken effect.

“The question yesterday came up: Is this immediate or not? It is immediate,” he told reporters.

“However, why I’m a little bit reluctant to say this is because it is a planning tool. So what would happen in reality? If war would break out ... all allies, including the U.S., will max out what they can do to make sure we can fight the war.”

Some ministers spelled out offers to raise their contributions to NATO’s crisis pool as they entered the Brussels meeting.

Belgian Defence Minister Theo Francken said his country would contribute more to NATO’s crisis forces to help replace some U.S. capabilities, including with F-16 fighter jets and MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones.

“There will be heavy discussions on who is doing what, but I can say that Belgium is contributing,” the minister said.

Plugging other gaps will take longer as Europeans lack weapons such as deep strike missiles, prompting German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius to call for a synchronized process to prevent “dangerous capability gaps in Europe.”

“It is difficult and dangerous for the security of NATO’s territory in Europe if capabilities are withdrawn very quickly without having clarity when they can be compensated for,” he warned, citing deep strike as one of the capabilities hard to replace.

“There, we will need either stop-gap solutions or time before their withdrawal. This will need to be negotiated with our American partners. Generally, we will be able to compensate much but we will need some more time,” Pistorius said.

The U.S. has not publicly disclosed details of its reductions, but they range from refueling aircraft to fighter jets, drones and ships, according to figures provided to Reuters by a military source.

The number of U.S. F-15 and F-15E fighter jets available to NATO will fall by a third to 99 and the number of MQ-4 and MQ-9 Reaper drones by half to 12, according to the source.

President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance electronically signed the accord Sunday, ahead of a formal ceremony scheduled for Friday in Switzerland. Vance is expected to lead the American delegation alongside special envoy Steve Witkoff and the president’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.

The agreement leaves the most difficult points of contention between Washington and Tehran – such as the fate of Iran’s nuclear program – to the next phase of negotiations.

Trump, speaking at the Group of Seven summit in France on Wednesday, warned that any Iranian violation of the terms would spark a renewed U.S. military campaign.

“If they don’t behave, we’ll go right back to dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their head,” the commander-in-chief told reporters.

The full text of the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran” is as follows:

Paragraph 1

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war, by signing this MOU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operations against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph.

Paragraph 2

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.

Paragraph 3

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days, extendable with mutual consent.

Paragraph 4

Immediately upon the signing of this MOU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade, and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of prewar traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.

Paragraph 5

Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements, using its best efforts, for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the needs for removing the technical and military obstacles, and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.

Paragraph 6

The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers, and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.

Paragraph 7

The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions termination issue above mentioned, and expressed their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

Paragraph 8

The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpile enriched material pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in paragraph seven with the minimum methodology to be down-blending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs, based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues above mentioned, and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.

Paragraph 9

Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy additional forces in the region.

Paragraph 10

The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MOU and until the termination of sanctions, U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.

Paragraph 11

The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MOU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during negotiations. Such funds, whether obtaining the original account or transfer, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.

Paragraph 12

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MOU and the future compliance of the final deal.

Paragraph 13

After signing this MOU, and subject to the beginning of the implementation of paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11 of this MOU, and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.

Paragraph 14

The final deal will be endorsed by a binding UNSC resolution.

First reported on by the U.S. Naval Institute, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s markup of the Fiscal Year 2027 defense policy bill seeks to strip the presidential waiver authority granted to the commander-in-chief in Title 10 section 8679, which would allow the president to approve offshore ship construction under a vague description of “national security interest.”

Under the language of the markup, the defense secretary may arrange to “construct not more than two vessels for each class of covered vessels in a[n] [allied] foreign shipyard.”

“Covered vessels” listed within the bill’s language include only bulk fuel vessels and roll-on/roll-off ships.

Stipulations for such ships include the defense secretary determining — with evidence — that such a construction “is in the national security interests of the United States.”

Within 30 days of a construction deal with an Allied nation, the Pentagon must submit a report that aligns with the congressional stipulations, as well as the identification of the vessels to be built and “a description of the enforceable provisions that will govern the protection of classified information and controlled unclassified information” during the foreign construction process.

Additional requirements include “all critical mission systems, command and control equipment, and secure communications systems are installed in the United States or a secure allied facility; the vessels are projected to be constructed and delivered faster than if the vessels were constructed at a shipyard in the United States, or construction at a foreign shipyard otherwise provides a material benefit to readiness or force posture.”

The limitations put forth in the draft version of the National Defense Authorization Act were rolled out after the Trump administration revealed its designs to tap foreign shipyards to design and build U.S. Navy combatant ships.

Touting it as the “Finland model,” the expansion of auxiliary naval ships built from allied shipbuilders mirrors the push to expand the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet, solidified in the 2024 ICE Pact — a trilateral agreement between the United States, Canada and Finland to combine collective knowledge, resources and expertise to produce Arctic and polar icebreakers, according to the Department of Homeland Security.

“Those can follow the ICE Pact model where they’ll build up to two overseas, which would be concurrent with foreign direct investment into U.S. yards for subsequent ships to be brought, including their supply chain, and other guardrails,” a Senate Majority official told the U.S. Naval Institute last Thursday.

Overall, the service aims to increase its number of ships dramatically, according to President Donald Trump’s proposed $1.5 trillion fiscal 2027 defense budget.

There are currently over 290 battle force ships, though the number, according to Navy requirements by law, is 355, the document stated. The service intends to have 395 vessels in fiscal 2027 and 450 vessels by the end of fiscal 2031.

Currently, only 10% of shipbuilding is taking place at distributed sites. The service wants to increase that number to 50% to increase flexibility, reduce reliance on legacy shipyards and accelerate delivery.

Military Times reporter Riley Ceder contributed to this report.

The move, according to a Pentagon release, “honors the command’s deep historical roots, fostering a sense of pride and collective spirit among all who serve in the Pacific.”

“From its critical role in establishing the post-WWII regional security architecture to its coordination of joint forces during the Korean War, the Vietnam War and countless humanitarian operations, the USPACOM namesake carries decades of military heritage and enduring regional partnerships,” the release states.

U.S. Pacific Command was the official name of the formation until May 2018, when, during the first term of President Donald Trump, it was changed to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command “in recognition of the increasing connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans” and rising military and economic pressure emerging from Beijing, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said at the time.

The command’s top officer in 2018, Adm. Harry Harris, acknowledged then that the change reflected the return of great power competition as decades of combat in the Global War on Terror were winding down.

“I believe we are reaching an inflection point in history,” Harris said in 2018. “A geo-political competition between free and oppressive visions is taking place in the Indo-Pacific.”

The name change announced Tuesday, meanwhile, will have no impact on the command’s mission or areas of operational responsibility that were in place under INDOPACOM, according to the release.

The move is the latest in a series of rebranding initiatives launched by the Pentagon — from base names to the department itself — since Trump began his second term.

In recent weeks the House and Senate armed services committees voted to advance legislation that would ratify the rebrand of the Department of Defense to the Department of War.

While the latter designation, which was the official department name from 1789-1947, has been used by Pentagon officials since September 2025, it has yet to be signed into law by Congress.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth took to social media on June 5 to praise the recent votes, noting, “The Department of War will officially be restored soon.”

“Their intention is to also cooperate with Poland, and to produce in Poland, for the X-BAT program, the first autonomous combat aircraft in the world,” Tusk said at a June 16 press conference in Warsaw. “It’s top-tier technology, a chance for air domination in case of an armed conflict, and an incredibly ambitious project with regard to technology and innovativeness.”

Shield AI unveiled the X-BAT in October 2025, promoting its artificial intelligence-driven unmanned fighter capable of vertical takeoffs and landings as a platform suitable for expeditionary and maritime operations in contested environments.

“At the core of X-BAT is Shield AI’s Hivemind, AI-enabled autonomy software designed to fly platforms in communications-denied, degraded, and limited environments,” the company said in a statement. “Hivemind enables X-BAT to autonomously penetrate contested battlespace, dynamically team with manned aircraft, and execute collaborative tactics without constant communications. This autonomy allows X-BAT to function as a drone wingman or as a standalone asset.”

The latest announcement comes as the Polish government is mulling plans to acquire up to 32 new fighter jets, with some of the evaluated options including: Lockheed Martin’s F-35; the Eurofighter Typhoon, a jet produced by a consortium of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo; and Boeing’s F-15EX.

At the same time, Warsaw is also considering to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) and involve the country’s defense sector in the project to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet. The Polish government is evaluating whether engaging its state-dominated defense industry in the tri-nation initiative, which is spearheaded by Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, could boost the sector’s capacities and innovativeness, according to Polish Deputy State Assets Minister Konrad Gołota.

Set up in 2015, Shield AI is a venture-backed defense tech company. In addition to X-BAT and Hivemind, its other products include the V-BAT drone.

Speaking to Defense News from the Philippines, Bartholomees confirmed that, as an original Transformation in Contact division, four of his five brigades have changed significantly already. Following his mobile infantry, artillery and sustainment brigades, he revealed the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is “next on the docket to do some transformation.”

“The Gray Eagle company that was in Alaska is going to move to Hawaii – and what we see over time is, as the Army determines what type of larger-class unmanned aerial systems it uses, that those will land in the CAB.”

The general said longer-range drones “are essential to support the ranges that we can now shoot out to, particularly with HIMARS.”

In fact, 25th ID was the first U.S. infantry division to receive HIMARS, a weapon that greatly extends the formation’s reach compared to incumbent M777 and M119 towed howitzers. Because of HIMARS, Bartholomees pointed out his “division artillery is really what transformed the most.”

He highlighted how the “Tropic Lightning” Division performed a number of HIMARS infiltrations to Luzon Strait islands during recent Philippine wargames. Indeed, Exercises Balikatan and Salaknib allowed 25th ID to test new tactics and technologies from April to June.

The Ranger-qualified general added that the Army wants maximum flexibility in “new technologies, drones, counter-drones, electronic warfare, software-enabled technologies, and less [reliance] on a program of record that, by the time you receive it, is obsolete and you’re stuck with it for too long.”

For example, Bartholomees praised the Infantry Squad Vehicle that makes his soldiers “more lethal, light and mobile.” By increasing the mobility of his two infantry brigades, it helped shed a lot of needless vehicles. “Infantry brigades had too much stuff, too many vehicles, they were too unwieldy,” he said.

Balikatan and Salaknib were valuable to 25th ID because “you don’t really know if [equipment] is going to work until you operate with it in these environments,” Bartholomees explained.

He also highlighted the democratization of electronic-warfare capabilities across units, in addition to the transformation of communication systems. “We’re one of two divisions in the U.S. Army that’s conducting what’s called Next-Generation Command and Control,” he explained. This entails moving to smaller form factors and software-enabled systems.

Pushing new capabilities into frontline units is vital for 25th ID, especially when so far from home in places like the Philippines. “Shipping capability costs really drive forward the need for us to innovate,” he said.

One response has been the Forge, an expeditionary capability that allows soldiers to manufacture spare parts using 3D printing, for example. Bartholomees said the Forge is important “because it’s helping to thicken our sustainment lines by creating capability, creating parts and manufacturing forward where we can”.

He said 25th ID’s fielding of new technologies will continue unabated: “We’re literally transforming all the time,” although “we do have to manage how we do this, and we have to be disciplined in this approach.”