'High-End' Capacity Building
Partnerships Should Not Be Limited to Terrorist Fight
By ROBERT HAFFA and MICHAEL ISHERWOOD
Published: 26 October 2009
As the United States turns over urban peacekeeping duties to the Iraqi Army, the capacity of those units to accomplish their mission stems from a concerted American training effort. Given that effort, the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is sure to recognize that "building partner capacity," defined as "targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners," is essential for countering insurgencies.
As a strategy, building partnership capacity is meant to apply to a wide range of colleagues, including the interagency, state and local governments, as well as allies and friends. It covers a good deal of strategic territory, including building capacity to defeat terrorist networks, defend the homeland, shape choices of competitors and prevent weapon proliferation.
Despite this expansive charter, the focus of the international aspect of partnership capacity has been placed squarely on improving capabilities for irregular warfare and attendant stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. According to the 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap, the Defense Department is working "to improve the capabilities and capacities of international organizations, allies and partners to conduct SSTR operations ... and reduce the burden on U.S. forces."
While this may be the right approach for contingencies occurring at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, and SSTR capacity building should continue to be emphasized within NATO and in the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanis-tan, partner capacity also needs to be developed to face high-end asymmetric threats.
The terms of reference for the 2010 QDR emphasize that U.S. military strategy must consider "powerful trends" shaping the international landscape, including "rising powers with sophisticated weapons" and "increasing encroachment across the global commons." While maintaining a military and technological advantage over opposing forces, we also should be building partnership capacity to shoulder some of that burden.
Which regions and which capabilities should be emphasized? Recent studies show that adversaries are developing area-denial capabilities to hinder U.S. military access to vital regions. In the Pacific, Chinese investments in ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship weapons, and advanced air and space defenses pose significant barriers to U.S. operations.
Smaller but similar efforts by North Korea, Iran and other competitors, exacerbated by the presence of weapons of mass destruction, signify that the anti-access problem extends well beyond China.
Confronting such anti-access/area-denial capabilities suggests the need to build regional partnership capacity, including high-end conventional air and naval capabilities that enable and reinforce U.S. power-projection forces. Specifically, three important arenas appear ripe for such capacity building: improved air and missile defenses; enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and increased access to a wider range of improved facilities.
High-end capacity building in air and missile defense is needed to offset an adversary's investment in ballistic and cruise missiles, and in next-generation fighter aircraft.
Anti-Access Challenge
International cooperation in sea-based missile defense, to include modernized radar systems, and the export of the F-22, F-35 or advanced electronically scanned radar arrays to U.S. Pacific allies with modern air and naval fleets would significantly bolster partner capacity against anti-access threats.
The transfer of interoperable command-and-control networks - plus the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sensors and systems carried by medium- and high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs - would also benefit allies.
In concert with our allies, the United States should review the capability of directed energy systems, such as lasers and high-powered microwaves, to counter guided rockets, mortars and missiles.
Cyber defense, as classified as it can become, is another arena where building capacity can contribute to achieving mutual objectives.
Finally, a shared vision for investing in key infrastructure, such as air bases and seaports, should be a parallel tenet of high-end capacity building.
Options range from dispersed and dormant facilities that can be generated during a crisis to hardened and well-stocked bases that reflect the combined commitment of the United States and its allies to protect mutual interests in the region.
As the 2010 QDR reviews and updates U.S. policy on capacity building, the temptation to focus primarily on irregular warfare should be resisted. The balance that the defense secretary has called for in the U.S. defense portfolio should be extended to that of our allies, and an important way of restoring that balance - and sharing the burden of defense - is through high-end capacity building. ■
Robert Haffa and Michael Isherwood are senior analysts at Northrop Grumman's Analysis Center.
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