Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
By Daryl Kimball
Published: 24 August 2009
The U.S.-Soviet standoff that gave rise to tens of thousands of nuclear weapons is over, but the policies developed to justify their possession and potential use remain largely the same. As the administration of President Barack Obama works to complete the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by year's end, it is clear to most that yesterday's nuclear doctrines are no longer appropriate for today's realities.
In an April address in Prague, Obama called for "an end to Cold War thinking" and declared that the United States will "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy."
Unfortunately, two previous post-Cold War efforts to update the U.S. nuclear posture fell woefully short. Over the past two decades, deployed arsenals have been significantly reduced, yet Washington and Moscow each deploy more than 2,200 strategic warheads, mainly to deter an attack by the other. Policies still call for the possible use of nuclear weapons to defend U.S. forces and allies against conventional attacks and counter chemical or biological threats.
The forces of nuclear policy inertia are hard to overcome. Once again, entrenched interests inside the Pentagon and elsewhere threaten to undermine long-overdue, transformational changes in U.S. nuclear weapons thinking. The White House must ensure the NPR process supports today's highest national security priority: preventing the use of nuclear weapons and their proliferation to terrorists and additional states, and moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons.
Obama should clarify that maintaining a large nuclear arsenal dedicated to performing a wide range of missions is unnecessary and contrary to U.S. security interests. The number and role of U.S. nuclear weapons should be strictly limited to what is essential and unique. Given the U.S.' conventional military edge, there is no conceivable circumstance that requires or could justify the use of nuclear weapons to deal with a non-nuclear threat.
As an eminent National Academies of Science panel concluded more than a decade ago, "[T]he only remaining, defensible function of U.S. nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era is 'core deterrence': using the threat of retaliation to deter other countries that possess nuclear weapons from using them to attack or coerce the United States or its allies."
Indeed, a U.S. nuclear arsenal of many thousands of weapons does nothing to deter terrorists from using a nuclear bomb should they acquire one. The more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the more difficult it is to maintain adequate security standards.
Without significant reductions in the role and number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, and without U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, our ability to harness the international support necessary to prevent nuclear terrorism and strengthen the beleaguered nuclear nonproliferation system will be greatly diminished.
Those who suggest that deep U.S. nuclear weapon reductions would lead certain U.S. allies to consider building their own nuclear arsenals exaggerate the role of "extended nuclear deterrence" and ignore the risks and costs of going nuclear. Many factors beyond sheer numbers of nuclear weapons mitigate against a decision by a U.S. ally to go nuclear, not the least of which is the diplomatic and conventional military support the U.S. could provide.
A core deterrence approach is consistent with current U.S. policy not to develop or produce new design warheads, yet would allow us to maintain our arsenal in a safe, secure and reliable fashion. Contrary to the suggestions of some, the United States is not on the brink of losing that capability, which has never depended on a program of nuclear test explosions.
In fact, the nuclear weapon labs have more information and higher confidence in the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal than ever before. Since the U.S. halted nuclear test explosions in 1992, new tools and programs have enabled nuclear labs to discover causes for concerns in the nuclear stockpile and fix them without test blasts. Despite recent challenges replacing non-nuclear components in the W-76 bomb, the weapon labs have modernized two major warhead types and stretched out their effective life for decades.
Warheads of new designs are technically unnecessary and contrary to our nonproliferation objectives. Lab studies indicate that weapon plutonium is not affected by aging for more than 80 to 100 years, removing any urgency to manufacture replacement warheads, as some NPR participants are advocating.
Rather than authorize the development of new design warheads, Obama should ensure that the NPR directs the labs to focus on core stockpile stewardship tasks and avoid unnecessary alterations to existing weapons during refurbishment, and he should reiterate his January pledge "to stop the development of new nuclear warheads."
It is up to the president and his Cabinet to provide the leadership needed to usher in a more realistic and effective nuclear risk reduction and elimination strategy. ■
Daryl Kimball is executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington.
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