Chem-Bio Weapon Threat
Do Not Exaggerate Capabilities of Nonstate Actors
By AL MAURONI
Published: 6 July 2009
In developing the current Quadrennial Defense Review, the Obama administration has decided to move away from the previous strategy of planning to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major combat operations. This is a welcome change, as the Defense Department never had the necessary personnel or resources to effect such a stringent requirement.
Another welcome change is the decision to abandon the Bush administration's quad chart of future threats - traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive - and to focus on conventional, irregular and "hybrid" conflicts.
The Bush administration placed the mission of combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the catastrophic quarter of its threat chart. This was a convenient way of pushing this strategic issue to the side as it dealt with more urgent and near-term priorities. As a result, the U.S. government did not spend much energy on combating WMD outside of developing agreements to interdict WMD materials and missile systems, establishing the Army's 20th Support Command as the lead for WMD elimination, and bolstering the federal government's ability to respond to terrorist WMD incidents.
Combating WMD was not a priority and was not integrated into traditional or irregular warfare. It was a "special topic." The Obama administration views WMDs in much the same way - it remains a special topic for arms control advocates and homeland security officials. There are no new concepts or strategies for how the U.S. government ought to address WMDs.
"Counter WMD," the new term, overwhelmingly focuses on nuclear-weapon issues and emphasizes nonproliferation activities. This is unsurprising, considering that the former Clinton officials who have joined the Obama administration worked the same issues in the 1990s. It is also disappointing, as it reflects an inability to view nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons outside of a Cold War paradigm and an inability to realistically address the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards poised by nonstate actors.
The arms control community has grappled with the proliferation of NBC weapons developed by nation-states since 1945. As the threat of domestic terrorism grew in the 1990s, the U.S. government studied the challenge of responding to terrorist CBRN incidents.
In 1999, the Gilmore Commission's first report used the term CBRN because it recognized that WMD was overstating the actual threat. Many analysts and politicians still prefer to continue rhetoric about WMDs as "the most dangerous weapons in the hands of the most dangerous people." Yet a closer examination reveals it to be far less ominous.
The concept of fourth-generation warfare preceded hybrid warfare - that nonstate actors could significantly challenge nation-states through military operations using decentralized methods and tactics.
Certainly, many examples of this warfare exist - Chechnya, Kosovo, Somalia, post-invasion Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza. Yet military analysts and politicians continue to view NBC weapons and CBRN hazards in terms of third-generation warfare. Any use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons, no matter how small, is considered a mass-destruction situation.
Terrorist groups and insurgents rely on locally available materials and nonstate-affiliated personnel to acquire conventional weapons. At best, terrorist attempts to employ CBRN hazards as weapons will result in small-scale, single attacks with limited casualties.
There is no better example than Iraqi insurgents' failed use of chlorine tanks within vehicle-embedded improvised explosive devices. Those insurgents stopped employing this tactic because it didn't work, yet military analysts point to this singularity and call it the beginning of terrorist WMD ambitions.
It is not easy to obtain military-grade CBRN material, to make military-grade CBRN material or to effectively disperse such agents. Without access to tons of CBR material and a good dispersion system, the capability to cause mass casualties decreases dramatically. If terrorists attempt to develop a WMD-like capability, they will attract much more attention and are liable to be interdicted at multiple points in the process of executing their plot.
Certainly, it is possible to obtain toxic inhalation hazards, develop small amounts of biological toxins, or gain quantities of radiological material and develop improvised methods to disperse them. Nonstate actors can employ improvised CBRN weapons, but these are not WMD capabilities. Nation-state WMD programs are still a significant threat, but we need to stop acting as if nonstate actors can duplicate that threat.
Relying on counter-WMD strategies and military defense equipment that anticipate terrorist use of NBC weapons will not protect the public or armed forces. We need to desegregate counterproliferation, counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities and strategies. We need to focus on developing discrete capabilities that address the distinct threats of military NBC weapons and terrorist CBRN hazards.
Most of all, our leadership needs to stop acting afraid of terrorist CBRN incidents - the threat can be addressed easily if we stop using the term "WMD" so frequently and apply risk-management principles and, more importantly, common sense.
Al Mauroni is a senior policy analyst at a defense consulting firm and author of "Where Are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the Home Front and the Battlefront."
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