Each new U.S. administration starts with promises to fix the problems left behind by the old one. In defense, one of the promises always is acquisition reform, because there always are acquisition problems with which we must cope.
It matters not to the Obama administration that the new secretary of defense, Robert Gates, is the old administration's secretary of defense. The confirmation hearings for his new subordinates are filled with vows to reform the acquisition process, as if Secretary Gates hadn't been on watch over the system during at least part of the last administration.
"Yes, senator, we can and we will."
Let's be honest this time. Let's just skip the acquisition reform charade. The truth is you can't fix the acquisition system. All the insiders know this. The promise of reform is for the rubes, those dumb taxpayers whom we want to believe that, on the 85th or 86th time, we will get it right.
The limited number of available reforms have all been recycled, You can centralize or decentralize. You can create a specialist acquisition corps or you can outsource their tasks. You can fly before you buy or you can buy before you fly. Another blue-ribbon study, more legislation and a new slogan will not make it happen at last.
We can't fix it because we want crazy things. We want a system that can fire missiles from a submarine hiding beneath the surface of the sea and hit a target thousands of miles away. Or we want a tank that can survive a shaped charge round, pack its own lethal punch and is airlifted by a C-130.
Systems have to perform reliably in the snow, in the mud, in the sand. They have to communicate with every friend and not reveal themselves to any foe. And we want them soon, not later.
Worse, we already have a lot of first-class ships, aircraft, missiles and tanks; proposed new weapon systems have to be a lot better than them or any obvious modification we can make. To be worthy of our approval, the advocates of the new system have to dazzle us with expectations of what will soon be in our arsenal, something no enemy can match. It will likely cost billions, but it will be great.
With that gleam in their eye, the services seek bids for the weapons that will define their futures. Only a few contractors can qualify to make offers. After all, only a few firms know the acquisition regulations well enough and have sufficient engineering talent to manage complex projects.
Moreover, government-encouraged mergers have further thinned the ranks of eligible firms. Given that new starts in most weapon lines are once-in-a-decade-or-more events, project awards are survival tests. Not surprisingly, false optimism abounds: "Sure we can build that, and cheaper than you think."
More milestone reviews, high-level councils and mandated reports will not change the basic facts. You have to exaggerate the benefits and underplay the costs to get a weapon system approved. We know by now to discount everything promised, but we still want the best weapons for our forces, jobs in our communities and profits for our companies.
Acquisition rules intentionally slow things down with demands for constant reconsideration in the hope that support for the project will fade. When we really want something quickly, like MRAPs for Iraq and Afghanistan, we have to suspend the rules, set up a fast track and push aside the bureaucrats.
The problem with fast tracking as a solution is there has to be agreement that a weapon is needed. Most of the time, there is disagreement (e.g. EFV, F-22, DDG 1000). The Marines and Army supposedly delayed going for MRAPs initially and now it is said have regrets over the 15,000 bought as they can't go off road, weigh tons, have poor mileage, etc.
Changing the rules every time we change administrations or secretaries is a colossal waste of effort, forcing everyone involved to learn a new manual, another set of acronyms and a revised timetable for required approvals.
Skipping the reform charade might force officials to educate the taxpayers instead of hoodwinking them. Things often don't work well not because the acquisition system is run by crooks or idiots, but because making decisions on what weapons to develop and buy is very hard. We don't know what wars we will fight and what wea-pons we will have to counter. Proponents of various systems com-pete for attention and dollars, and when they do, they are prone to exaggerate. Motives are mixed.
We worry about jobs as well as national security. We want to believe that technology will give us a combat edge, so we are always on the technology frontier. But in the end, cost overruns and performance and schedule disappointments are inevitable.
By Harvey Sapolsky, professor of Public Policy and Organization Emeritus at MIT and co-author, with Eugene Gholz and Caitlin Talmadge, of "U.S. Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy."
The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is ready to test a few components that soldiers may have in their hands by 2010.
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