TEL AVIV - A week into Israel's Operation Cast Lead against Gaza-launched rocket attacks, air power advocates humbled from the 2006 Lebanon War remained hopeful that this time standoff strikes alone could shape the desired diplomatic end-state.
The Israeli air assault, which began Dec. 27 after prolonged rocket attacks by Hamas fighters, is using new ISR systems and better joint and service planning to shrink the sensor-to-shooter loop.
At press time, multiple active-duty Israeli combat brigades supported by thousands of reserve forces stood ready for orders to enter the densely populated strip. But many here are arguing against adding ground troops to the war between Israel and Hamas, a conflict in which civilians are on both sides' front lines.
Israeli political and military leaders alike are wondering what gains, if any, are possible through ground maneuvers. They say that the government has limited goals and advantageous geographic and political conditions, and that the air campaign has thus far been successful.
As of Jan. 2, decision-makers still hoped to end the confrontation through standoff attacks, barring a lucky Hamas rocket hit or errant Israeli airstrike that would cause intolerable casualties and devastation.
Sources here say societal staying power will prove decisive in an urban war against an extreme Islamist regime. Air power and supporting naval strikes offer the best chance of breaking Hamas' will to fight, they say, while denying them the morale-boosting possibilities of blown-up Merkava tanks and Israeli prisoners of war.
"There are certain situations in which the aerial war can bring about change, and my personal view is that this is one of those cases," one IDF officer said Jan. 1.
Standoff operations may be sufficient to achieve the government's stated goal of "changing the security situation" by "reducing Hamas' capacity to launch rockets against communities in southern Israel," the officer said. "We're resolute in stopping the firing from Gaza, and if there is a need to bring in ground forces, the Israel Defense Forces [IDF] is ready to do this."
Nevertheless, he said, continuous surveillance, targeting and attack operations are diluting enemy weapon stocks and preventing them from rearming. "We're in this for the long haul, and we'll continue aggressively yet cautiously until the enemy runs out of either weapons or the will to fight us."
Through Jan. 2, Israel claims to have destroyed more than 500 targets, including about 100 tunnels, one-third of the underground passages built by Hamas and other militant groups to smuggle and store rockets, weaponry and other supplies.
Since the airstrikes began Dec. 27, the Israel Air Force has flown 555 fighter sorties, 125 helicopter missions and hundreds of UAV flight hours. Those figures include the initial surprise attack, in which 88 aircraft simultaneously struck 100 preplanned targets within a record span of 220 seconds.
The Israel Air Force is claiming a 95 percent success rate on that opening attack on Hamas training bases, weapon depots, the presidential compound and headquarters of Hamas police and security forces.
"Apparently, we did not have any misses, but we had some munition failures where bombs didn't eject or a pilot chose not to release for various technical reasons," an IDF officer said.
In the first week following the opening attack, Israel repeatedly demonstrated its ability to act on intelligence well within one minute, sources here say. In many cases, where hovering aircraft identified preplanned targets and were awaiting authorization to kill, the cycle was shaved to the time it took for missiles to hit the ground.
"When pilots are actually waiting for authorization to push the pickle, the loop may be just a matter of seconds," an IDF officer said. "Depending on what targets are involved, what munitions are used, and the elevation, it could take 15 seconds for the missile to arrive."
Defense and industry sources here said the Israel Air Force made unprecedented, coordinated use of the one-ton Mk84 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) to attack buildings and tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border, as well as dropping the 500-pound variant against underground bunkers. Other gear making its combat debut or seeing expanded use include synthetic aperture radar targeting pods; vertical, high-resolution aerial imaging pods; Shoval UAVs; and a range of laser-guided bombs and missiles.
But sources also attributed air power successes thus far to intimate knowledge of the Gaza Strip; meticulous planning; and new procedures for gathering, processing and disseminating expanded sources of intelligence.
"The real story is intelligence gathering and fusion," a senior defense official said. He refused to elaborate for security reasons.
For the first time, for example, Israel's Shin Bet Security Service was part and parcel of operational planning, execution and after-action assessments, sources here say. This alone allowed Israel to start the war with a list of more than 400 targets, which were dispatched within four days and continually replenished.
In comparison, Israel started the Lebanon War with only about 150 preplanned targets, required about 10 days to destroy them all, and found it difficult to find more, Israeli defense analyst Amir Rappaport said.
"This time, they're a lot more ready across multiple parameters," said Rappaport, author of a widely acclaimed book on the 2006 war. "They learned critical lessons from Lebanon, yet most are careful not to try to fight in Gaza the way they should have fought in Lebanon."
The IDF officer agreed, calling the military "more focused and much better prepared."
But he said, "There's only one thing more dangerous than learning from history; and that's learning from history. You can't draw parallels between the two wars. It's a different ballgame, against a different adversary much less capable than Hizbollah. And because the terrain is easier, our aerial superiority is decisive, the ranges are so much shorter and the war aims are much more modest, there's a lot more reason to believe we can succeed here without ground maneuver."
Although most of the 440-some deaths so far have been armed fighters and others associated with the Hamas regime, Israel acknowledges that unintended killings of innocents are unavoidable because Gaza is among the most densely populated areas in the world, and because Hamas has built its war-fighting strategy around the use of human shields, with arms caches stored in or under mosques, schools and other targets formerly considered off-limits by the IDF.
In this war, however, Israeli Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni told reporters here, Israel will strike all targets associated with what she called the illegitimate, terrorist government of Hamas. At the same time, Israel is striving to distinguish between the Hamas government and its fighting forces and those innocents caught in the middle.
IDF sources said the Air Force dropped 400,000 leaflets since the beginning of hostilities warning people of pending attacks. Additionally, the Shin Bet security service actually telephoned residents of specific buildings and apartment blocks, giving them up to 15 minutes to leave the area. ■
The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is ready to test a few components that soldiers may have in their hands by 2010.
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