Winning the Soft War
Security Cooperation Is New Old Battleground
By SAM TANGREDI
Published: 10 November 2008
The anti-Western military resurgence of Russia under President Vladimir Putin is certainly a worrisome development, as is the continuing improvement in Chinese military capabilities. But for now, neither country can directly challenge the United States militarily.
The primary battleground for great power competition has shifted to an area that was of great importance during the Cold War, but only recently has regained the attention it deserves: security cooperation with potential allies and partners. This is a fight involving soft power.
Yet, the United States handicaps itself with unnecessary bureaucracy and regulations that complicate efforts to exert influence through such methods.
Security cooperation is the Bush administration's term for what used to be called security assistance - the provision of military hardware and training to foreign nations through sale or grant.
Security cooperation also brings together other partnership-building programs such as counterterror cooperation and military-to-military talks. But the central pieces of security cooperation remain Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training.
Although security cooperation is primarily carried out by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), it is actually under the final control of the Department of State and, ultimately, Congress.
Even within DoD itself, Foreign Military Sales programs are subject to approval by up to five technology-transfer committees, each of which operates on its own schedule. After DoD, the State Department must approve and Congress must be briefed. For a major weapon system sale to a critical non-NATO ally (and sometimes to a NATO ally) to be fully approved within two years is almost a miracle.
Still, the United States comes to the security cooperation battleground in pretty good shape. It retains much of its Cold War alliances, such as NATO, and has even expanded them. Cooperation with many nations has been forged during the global war on terror, but some promising partnerships have fallen away - including, paradoxically, Russia and China.
At that same time, U.S. success was aided by less competition from Russia and China. Russian arms sales were severely dented when former Soviet allies sought Western equipment, and China pursued a quiet program focusing on such rogue nations as Sudan. During the 1990s and early 2000s, foreign military sales were largely a competition among the United States, the United Kingdom and France.
This is no longer the case. Putin is rebuilding and unleashing the old Soviet military-industrial complex. His purpose is not simply to rebuild Russian military capabilities, but to reduce U.S. global influence.
The focus is twofold: woo away America's fledgling new partners and provide advanced heavy weaponry to the handful of militantly anti-American rogues. Sales of submarines to Hugo Chavez' Venezuela is just the start. Putin does not expect these states to use these weapons against the United States, but to divert Washington's attention from his actions on Russia's periphery.
China's security assistance programs also seek to reduce U.S. global influence, but are primarily directed to gain access to natural resources, such as in Africa and South America.
Although Chinese military equipment is perceived as inferior, they are the only weapons many African militaries can afford. Political influence follows the military equipment.
The dictatorial regimes of Russia and China hold great advantages in security cooperation. They do not subject themselves to two-year regulatory processes. With command or near-command econ-omies, they can undercut any market price, and they can offer free weapons and training, which DoD is largely prohibited from doing. And they have no qualms in dealing with states that have violated human rights or pose a potential threat to neighbors.
What can the United States do to retain its position on this battleground?
■ Reform the technology transfer process. Five committees can be melded into one. Fast tracks for close allies and special situations can be created. Even the United Kingdom and Australia are angered by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulation. Pres-ident Bush promised changes, but it is unclear whether they have been enacted. Potential partners like India are weighing superior but regulation-laden U.S. equipment versus comparable Russian systems with no strings attached.
■ Reform the Foreign Military Financing system, which is clogged by nations rewarded for participation in a peace process of 30 years ago. DoD has recently instituted low-cost work-arounds called "Section 1206" programs, and it is amazing that such positive results can be achieved by the combatant commanders with so little money. But our competitors are pouring even more financial resources into the gaps.
■ Reform International Military Education and Training and make U.S. military education low- or no-cost to every potential partner. We have done this to some extent, but student numbers are also kept low. Education and training is the No. 1 way to influence future security decision-makers. Yet, most services prohibit their "school houses" from spending money to create courses exclusively designed for foreign students. The U.S. Marines deserve the most credit in attempting to reform foreign training.
Security cooperation needs more funding, but it does not have the greatest priority in DoD, State and particularly in Congress because it is hard to demonstrate returns to constituents. The new old battleground may be soft, but it requires harder effort. Whatever increased funding security cooperation might require, war would be a lot more expensive. ■
Sam Tangredi is a retired U.S. Navy captain , director of San Diego Operations for Strategic Insight and author of the recently published book, "Futures of War."
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