On Oct. 9, NATO defense ministers will meet in Budapest to continue their recent discussions on how to improve the alliance's military capabilities. The allies will meet a little more than two months after one of NATO's steadfast partners, the Republic of Georgia, got pummeled by a bold Russia.
In this post-Georgia-Russia crisis period and with military operations ongoing in Afghanistan, defense ministers must tackle the simple questions of what they want NATO to do as a military alliance, and how NATO's Article 5 provision can remain an executable and real commitment.
Numerous efforts have been launched in recent years to develop NATO's defense capabilities. Some allies have effectively modernized their armed forces and purchased equipment and aerial platforms to meet NATO's goal of conducting expeditionary operations far from allied territories. NATO also created the NATO Response Force and agreed, in principle, to fund national defense budgets at a minimum of 2 percent of annual GDP.
Overall, however, the alliance's report card on developing and funding key enablers and critical capabilities has been less than glowing. Non-U.S. annual alliancewide defense spending continues to decline. This has translated into reduced operational defense capability, i.e., high-altitude helicopters, deployable joint logistics and UAVs for an organization founded on the Article 5 guarantee, which states that an armed attack against one is an attack against all, and that has declared Afghanistan to be its top priority.
So why the lack of investment? Arguments have ranged from questioning whether expensive and dangerous expeditionary operations in places such as Afghanistan are really what NATO should be doing, to contentions that military modernization is too expensive.
Others note that because the United States spends more on defense than all NATO allies combined, has a superior technological edge and has shown its commitment to European security time and time again, why should Europe bother to develop robust defense capabilities? Unfortunately, these arguments are coupled with recent trends showing more Europeans becoming casualty-averse, resulting in governments finding it politically more difficult to send forces abroad.
While it is still too early to establish what the lasting effect Russia's actions against Georgia will have on the alliance, some allies have questioned whether NATO is capable of honoring Article 5. This is understandable, given the geographic proximity of those who are "vulnerable" to pressure from Russia versus those who are "safe" (or safer) due to being farther away geographically, and who are not as energy-dependent on Russia as those in Central and Eastern Europe.
What, then, should defense ministers in Budapest agree should be NATO's primary focus: territorial defense (as it did during the Cold War)? Expeditionary operations, such as Afghanistan? Or nonconventional, asymmetric threats such as cyberwarfare, energy security and terrorism?
To choose only one of these courses of action would be wrong, unrealistic and self-defeating. NATO must be able to do all. NATO must develop broad-spectrum capabilities. However, none of this can be done on the cheap, and NATO allies should not be allowed to pick and choose which type of Article 5 ally they want to be.
Throughout this decade, alliance leaders have consistently agreed that NATO's future lies in developing expeditionary capabilities to defend trans-Atlantic interests far from European, Canadian and U.S. borders. Allied leaders have also placed increasing importance on developing capabilities (but not yet policies) to address cyberwarfare and energy security.
A call for NATO to reallocate resources and refocus efforts on restoring a territorial defense force posture would be wrong. Such actions would play into Moscow's hands that the alliance is directed against Russia, could allow an arms race to resume in Europe, would take resources away from the ISAF mission, and would give legitimacy to the argument that NATO is becoming a two-tiered alliance - those who invest in broad-spectrum capabilities and are willing to assume risks and burdens, and those who focus on hunkering down in garrison and are not willing to take risks.
Now is not the time for allies to ponder what NATO's role should be in the 21st century. Twice in the past two years, allied leaders have made that determination. Now is the time for allied governments (particularly finance ministers) and parliamentarians to make the hard but necessary choice to fund national defense budgets at the NATO-agreed minimum of 2 percent of GDP. Too few countries, the United States and United Kingdom included, are carrying too much of the financial burden.
As U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said repeatedly, NATO is first and foremost a military alliance, and military alliances need capabilities by which to operate. A lack of capability or political and financial resolve may well send the wrong message to fellow allies and, worse, to the enemies of the alliance. The costs of this, both politically and militarily, may be far beyond what an incremental annual increase to national defense budgets can provide.■
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Liam Fox is a British MP (Woodspring) and Tory shadow defense secretary. Daniel Fata is vice president at the Cohen Group in Washington. He stepped down last month after serving for three years as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy.
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