ALEXANDRIA, Va. — Transforming the U.S. military to lighter, more mobile forces will require a more fundamental change in the way troops think than in the equipment they use, says retired Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, the Pentagon’s director of the Office of Force Transformation.
Specifically, the military services need to focus on being interdependent when they train for future conflicts. Once that happens, building interoperable networks and weapon systems will become less of a problem, because it will be inherent to their needs, said Cebrowski Monday at a conference sponsored by Defense News Media Group: Strike Warfare Precision Attack: Compressing the ‘Flash-to-Bang’ Cycle.
All too often, the military has been forced to cobble together joint operational plans at the last minute. And although military personnel always manage to come up with innovative ways around the disjointed structure while on the battlefield, Cebrowski says this new thinking must become a permanent part of the United States’ approach to warfare.
The logical structure now in place is for military personnel to call on their own service for help, instead of the best option at the time.
For instance, a Marine Corps forward air controller is trained to call in a Harrier pilot before calling in aircraft from the Navy, Air Force or coalition forces, he said.
This is a huge problem because, in reality, between every link in the chain of command, there is about an eight-minute delay for that information to reach the next level. If soldiers on the ground are calling for close air support, it could take up to 32 minutes before the order makes it way down to the units that will provide it. That delay is “unacceptably long,” Cebrowski said.
Another way to increase the speed of warfare is to eliminate what Cebrowski calls the customer-supplier mismatch.
The services must put the demands of the personnel who need help at the center of the approach when determining how a mission should be conducted.
Using close air support as an example, Cebrowski said 75 percent of all missions are either aborted or the wrong target is hit because the pilot is at the center of the plan.
“As long as the pilot is at the center of the close air support problem, performance is always going to be limited,” he said. Instead, the troops asking for the support should be at the center of the problem because it will quicken the pace of useful information that is being transferred along the chain of command and will ultimately help “break the performance barrier.”
“If they are not in the center, you are probably dealing with dysfunction” in your chain of command, he said.