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In recent weeks, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and his key officers, including Pacific Commander Adm. Robert Willard, have exerted themselves to explain the implications of President Obama’s defense budget for the Asia Pacific.
Southeast Asian counterparts want to clearly understand American intentions so they can calibrate China’s response and fluently translate joint plans with the United States into their domestic political discourse.
As the United States moves to fulfill Obama’s promise of a policy “pivot” toward Asia, American policy-makers should help colleagues throughout the Asia Pacific understand that the enhanced U.S. presence in the region is part of a comprehensive policy that includes robust economic and political engagement. In other words, the United States must be clear that its Asia-Pacific strategy is not a security-dominated approach but a broad, long-term commitment. The U.S. is re-emphasizing longstanding security and economic commitments to the region and adding new political focus.
Getting Specific
Balance is the most important ingredient in this recipe. If Asia is not convinced of America’s intentions to step up its game in economic competitiveness, the security focus will be less effective.
Specific actions are vital. That includes progress and continued leader-level focus on trade, specifically on the Transpacific Partnership negotiations; talking to Americans about trade and Asia’s contribution to economic recovery and long-term growth; welcoming investment from Asia; demonstrating a willingness to table economic and financial issues within the constructs of the East Asia Summit; and organizing presidential or Cabinet-level business missions of American CEOs to the region.
Understanding these linkages and broadening the talking points of various U.S. senior officials should become a rhetorical mantra supported by actions.
Reassure on China
Southeast Asia needs the United States to be clear about its intentions and understand that the American end game is to have good relations with China. The U.S. strategy should be to convince China that it can meet its energy, food and water security goals and expand its economic might within regional security and trade frameworks.
The region is anxious because it does not know what China wants or how China will define itself in the coming decades. Economic power and growth is welcome, but using that new muscle to try to define sovereignty in disputed regions such as the South China Sea, land borders with India or elsewhere has raised alarm among China’s neighbors.
Looking into the Chinese leadership transition, even the best China experts can’t say for sure which elements will define the country’s new posture in 2013 and beyond.
Paradoxically, while Southeast Asia’s uncertainty about China has motivated countries to encourage a more proactive U.S. role in the region, it also heightens concerns that U.S. re-engagement not be construed or presented as trying to contain or oppose China.
Southeast Asia is now convinced the U.S. is not in a spiraling economic decline — signs of recovery have encouraged leaders and policy-makers that the U.S. model continues to work and produce results.
Fear of a U.S.-China condominium or “G-2” has also been put to rest. The U.S. and China have normalized and stabilized relations, but they are clearly not aligned on a preponderance of global issues. What no one in Southeast Asia wants is direct competition in a nouveau Cold War format between the United States and China. Fortunately, both Beijing and Washington seem to agree on that point.
Rotations, Not Bases
Strategically, the United States must continue to deepen its relationships around Asia. It has to listen and understand what traditional and new partners want and need. That posture is being reflected in the new defense approach in Asia.
Adm. Willard, head of U.S. Pacific Command, has said the focus is “rotations, not bases,” signifying a new-age lighter, but likely more omnipresent, footprint for the United States in Asia.
That is a smart and sustainable approach if executed well and consistently. Asia will likely see a new U.S. presence “inside the horizon” in the next few decades — sharing facilities, emphasizing interoperability and joint exercises, and, highly important — provision of public goods such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
Expect this effort to not only include treaty allies such as Australia, the Philippines and Japan, but to expand in Singapore, Malaysia and even Vietnam and possibly Indonesia in the future.
A key objective of a successful strategy is to constructively engage China in these efforts. A significant benchmark in this effort would be to see China accept the invitation that has been tabled several times to participate in regional exercises such as Cobra Gold.
Building trust and expanding relationships with China’s military is a long-term goal for the United States. Doing so will put our partners in Southeast Asia at ease and provide a possible double dividend of peace and prosperity in the world’s most dynamic region.
Ernest Bower, senior adviser and director, Southeast Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
